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REFERENDA1 IN MARYLAND: 
THE NEED FOR COMPREHENSIVE STATUTORY REFORM 
Michael D. Berman and Melissa O'Toole-Loureiro2 
The referendum is a much praised, often criticized, frequently 
misunderstood product of divergent views of the political process, 
reflecting a profound contradiction between direct and indirect, or 
representative, democracy.3 Use of the referendum is "increasingly 
popular .... "4 The number of recent trial court and appellate 
decisions, coupled with repeated suggestions for legislative 
1. It has been suggested that use of "referendums" is "logically preferable" to the term 
"referenda." K.K. DuVivier, Out of the Bottle: The Genie of Direct Democracy, 70 
ALB. L. REv. 1045, 1045 n.2 (2007); accord MD. CODE ANN., LOCAL Gov'T § 4-
412(d)(2). "Referenda" is also properly used as a plural term. Merriam-Webster 
online dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/referendum. 
2. The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the authors and not of any 
organization with which they are affiliated. Mr. Berman has been counsel of record in 
a number of referendum lawsuits, including Town of La Plata v. Faison-Rosewick, 
LLC, No 68, 2013 WL 5354355 (Md. Sep. 25, 2013); Canavan v. Md. State Bd. of 
Elections, 430 Md. 533, 61 A.3d 828 (2013) (per curiam); Citizens Against Slots at 
the Mall v. PPE Casino Resorts Md., LLC, 429 Md. 176, 55 A.3d 496, (2012); Anne 
Arundel Co. Taxpayers Ass'n., Inc. v. Anne Arundel Co. Bd. of Elections, 415 Md. 
433, 2 A.3d 1095 (2010) (per curiam); and, Gelbman v. Willis, No. C-2001-7340.0C 
(Cir. Ct. Anne Arundel Co. Oct. 5, 2001), as well as a number of general election 
cases. Schade v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, 401 Md. 1, 930 A.2d 304 (2007); Liddy 
v. Lamone, 398 Md. 233, 919 A.2d 1276 (2006); Ross v. State Bd. of Elections, 387 
Md. 649, 876 A.2d 692 (2005); Md. Green Party v. Md. Bd. of Elections, 377 Md. 
127, 832 A.2d 214 (2003). Ms. O'Toole-Louriero is a graduate of the University of 
Baltimore School of Law and an associate at Goodell, DeVries, Leech & Dann, LLP. 
3. See DuVivier supra note 1, at 1045-53 (explaining the difference between direct and 
indirect democracy). 
4. Whitley v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, 429 Md. 132, 135, 55 A.3d 37,39 (2012). See 
also S. Lash, Capital Punishment Gets a New Lease on Life, THE DAILY RECORD, May 
3, 2013, http://thedailyrecord.com/20 13/05/03/md-death-penalty-supporters-to-make-
announcement/ (discussing an effort by death penalty supporters to place ban on 
ballot), Md. Woman Plans Referendum Petition on Gun Bill, THE DAILY RECORD, 
May 6, 2013, http:/ /thedailyrecord.com/20 13/05/06/md-woman-plans-referendum-
petition-on-gun-bilU (discussing an effort to place Maryland's gun control bill on 
ballot). In comparison, between 1916 and 1980, there were only eleven state-wide 
referenda in Maryland. Note, Interaction and Interpretation of the Budget and 
Referendum Amendments of the Maryland Constitution- Bayne v. Secretary of State, 
39 MD. L. REV. 558, 581 (1980). 
655 
656 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
amendment of the referendum statute, demonstrate the need for 
comprehensive statutory reform. 5 
Regardless of one's view of the referendum, and its sibling,6 the 
initiative, and regardless of which side of the "v." one occupies in a 
particular case, it is time to clarify the statute so that its 
administration by boards of election is simplified and so that 
participants need not engage in costly, accelerated lawsuits over 
arcane and technical principles such as the "sufficient cumulative 
information standard," use of nicknames, or whether a circuit court 
engages in judicial review of an administrative decision of the board 
of elections.7 An example of the technical statutory framework is 
5. The statute is a trap for the unwary. DAN FRIEDMAN, THE MARYLAND STATE 
CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 275 (2011) (quoting George Liebmann, Curbing 
Legislative and Executive Abuse: Referendum and Initiative in Maryland, MD. B.J. 
Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 34, 36). Nevertheless, what is "reform" to one person is voter 
suppression to another. See Glynis Kazanjian, Proposed New Referendum 
Requirements Will Be Amended, Election Law Subcommittee Chair Cardin Says, 
MARYLANDREPORTER.COM (Mar. 4, 2013, !2:39AM), 
http:/ /mary landreporter.com/20 13/03/04/proposed-new-referendum-requirements-
will-be-amended-election-law-subcommittee-chair-cardin-says/. 
6. "Referendum" and "initiative" are defined terms. See infra note 15. "Recall," in 
which elected officials are removed from office, has been called "a governmental 
associative cousin" of referendum and initiative; however, "the power to recall elected 
officials never has been made a part of the Maryland political scheme." Town of 
Glenarden v. Bromery, 257 Md. 19, 23, 262 A.3d 60, 62-63 (1970). As such, "recall" 
is not addressed in this article. 
7. Montgomery Cnty. Vol. Fire-Rescue Ass'n. v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 
418 Md. 463, 473-74, 15 A.3d 798, 804 (2012); see also Swatek v. Bd. of Elections 
of Howard Cnty., 203 Md. App. 272, 274, 37 A.3d 1045, 1046 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
20 12). The need for clarification is illustrated by signature disqualification rates in 
recent referenda. For example, in Swatek, 203 Md. App. at 274, 37 A.3d at 1046, the 
court noted that 1,352 signatures on a county petition were invalidated, out of 3,941 
that had been submitted. In Burruss v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm 'rs of Frederick Cnty., 427 
Md. 231,235,244,46 A.3d 1182, 1184-85, 1190 (2012), 1,173 of2,915 signatures 
were invalidated. "[M]any of the entries were invalid due to signature defects such as 
an omitted first or middle name or initial." !d. at 244, 46 A. 3d at 1190. In Int 'I Ass 'n 
of Fire Fighters, Local v. Mayor & City Council of Cumberland, 407 Md. 1, 6, 962 
A.2d 374, 377 (2008), 3,550 signatures were initially submitted and 2,172 were 
approved. In Ferguson v. Sec'y. of State, 249 Md. 510, 511, 240 A.2d 232, 232-33 
(1968), 31,693 signatures were submitted and 28,970 were deemed valid. An 87% 
rate was described in Kendall v. Balczerak, 650 F.3d 515, 519 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 402 (20 11 ). In the past, the State Board of Elections recommended 
that petitions be signed by at least 20% more than required because of the rejection 
rate. Roskelly v. Lamone, 396 Md. 27, 32 n.8, 912 A.2d 658, 661 n.8 (2006). 
Similarly, the dissent in Fire-Rescue Ass 'n, 418 Md. at 488, 15 A.3d at 813, noted that 
one "petition solicitor achieved a signature acceptance rate of84 percent." 
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provided by the "duplicate" signature rule.8 Obviously, a voter may 
sign a referendum petition only one time; however, due to the 
statutory wording, if a voter's first signature is rejected for technical 
errors, a second, valid signature is still deemed an invalid duplicate, 
even though the first signature did not count. 9 
Because the mechanics of referenda are not the stuff of everyday 
practice, a general understanding is important at the outset. The 
referendum process permits voters to accept or reject legislation 
enacted by the General Assembly. 10 The history ofthe referendum in 
Maryland is presented in Part I. Referendum by petition, a 
"facultative" referendum, was unconstitutional in this state until 
1915. 11 Under the referendum, the elected legislative body 
"continues to be the primary legislative organ,"12 however, the 
electorate at large exercises a legislative veto. 13 In the main, 
Maryland has not adopted the "initiative,"14 a process that permits 
voters to institute legislation. 15 There are, however, some narrow 
exceptions where the initiative exists in Maryland.16 
8. Md. State Bd. of Elections v. Libertarian Party of Md., 426 Md. 488, 495, 44 A.3d 
1002, 1006 (2012). 
9. !d. at 495, 498, 44 A.3d at 1006-07. No criticism of the court's decision in that or 
any other case is implied here or elsewhere herein. The statute compels the result. 
H.B. 42, introduced in the 2012 Session of the Maryland General Assembly would 
have, perhaps impractically, provided a process for notice to voters of rejection of 
their signatures and a process for re-submission of a valid signature. The bill did not 
pass. 
10. FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 269. 
II. See infra note 35 and accompanying text. 
12. Cheeks v. Cedlair Corp., 287 Md. 595, 613, 415 A.2d 255, 264 (1980). 
13. E.g., Save Our Streets v. Mitchell, 357 Md. 237, 247 n.6, 743 A.2d 748, 754 n.6 
(2000) (quoting Bd. of Supervisors of Elections of Anne Arundel Cnty. v. Smallwood, 
327 Md. 220, 232 n.6, 608 A.2d 1222, 1228 n.6 (1990)). 
14. Handgun Control Part of Chapter 533 May Be Petitioned to Referendum, but 
Rejection of Handgun Control Part Will Render Strict Liability Part of Chapter 533 
Ineffective as Well, 73 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 78, 86 (1988) (citations omitted); see Save 
Our Streets, 357 Md. at 247 n.6, 743 A.2d at 754 n.6 (2000) ("The power to initiate 
local legislation is repugnant to Art. XI-A,§ 3, of the Maryland Constitution .... "). 
15. The court of appeals has frequently emphasized the differences between the two 
processes: 
Although the processes of initiative and referendum may both 
require a petition to submit legislation to the electorate, they are 
distinct with respect to the role they assign to elected government: 
"Initiative refers to the process by which the electorate petitions 
for and votes on a proposed law. Referendum is the process by 
which legislation passed by the governing body is submitted to the 
electorate for approval or disapproval." 
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A person seeking to bring a state or county statute to referendum is 
the "petition sponsor."17 The state petition sponsor prepares 
"signature pages," and may submit them to the State Board of 
Elections (SBE) prior to circulation for an "advance determination" 
of their sufficiency .18 Then the pages are presented to the electors by 
"circulators," who must submit a "circulator's affidavit" attesting (in 
part) that all signatures were affixed in the circulator's presence. 19 
The submitted signature pages are reviewed for legal sufficiency by 
the Secretary of State and, if sufficient, are transmitted to SBE.20 
SBE engages in two distinct processes, validation and verification.21 
Those processes are governed by statute, regulation, and several 
decisions of the court of appeals interpreting the applicable 
principles.22 If the elections board23 determines that sufficient valid 
and verified signatures have been submitted, it "certifies" the petition 
for the ballot. 24 
Next, a ballot question must be drafted.25 Sufficiency of the 
question is governed by statute and a body of case law?6 Finally, the 
question is submitted to the electorate.27 
Legal challenges may be made either before or after the election; 
however a more stringent standard of review applies to post-election 
Save Our Streets, 357 Md. at 247 n.6, 743 A.2d at 754 n.6 (quoting Smallwood, 327 
Md. at 232 n.6, 608 A.2d at 1228 n.6). 
16. See infra Part III. 
17. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW§ 6-101 (LexisNexis 2010). 
18. See infra Part II.A.2. 
19. See infra Part II.A.2. 
20. See infra Part II.A.8. 
21. See infra Part II.A.9. 
22. See infra Part II.A.9.a-b. 
23. SBE generally delegates the validation and verification task for state petitions to the 
local boards of election. COMAR 33.06.05.0l.A ("For a petition filed with the State 
Board, the State Administrator shall transmit to the election director of each county, 
for verification under this chapter, all of the signature pages that, in accordance with 
CO MAR 33.06.04.03, the sponsor designated as containing the names of individuals 
residing in that county."). 
24. See infra Part II.A.l 0. 
25. See infra Part II.A.ll. 
26. Even the timing of a challenge to a ballot question can be subject to technical rules. 
Smigiel v. Franchot, 410 Md. 302, 319-20,978 A.2d 687,698 (2009) (holding that a 
challenge is not ripe until question is drafted); accord Stop Slots MD 2008 v. State 
Bd. of Elections, 424 Md. 163, 189, 34 A.3d 1164, 1179 (2012). 
27. See infra Part II.A.ll. 
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challenges. 28 Appellate review is often on a very-accelerated basis. 
While much of the attention has focused on state and county 
referenda, municipal referenda have also been subject to review, even 
though they are not subject to the Election Law Article of the 
Maryland Code, and the robust body of regulatory safeguards is not 
directly applicable to them.29 
At the state and county level, when a petition sponsor causes 
signature pages to be circulated, the electors who sign those pages are 
exercising their reserved30 legislative power. In short, they are acting 
as the jurisdiction's largest legislature.31 At the municipal level, 
however, voters are often exercising a statutorily-delegated power.32 
28. E.g., Whether County's Failure to Comply Fully with Pre-Election Notice 
Requirements Affects Election Results Concerning Two Proposed Charter 
Amendments, 94 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. Ill, 111-12 (2009) (citing Surratt v. Prince 
George's Cnty., 320 Md. 439, 449, 578 A.2d 745, 750 (1990)) (opinion limited to 
post-election challenge). 
29. In Town of La Plata v. Faison-Rosewick, LLC, No 68, 2013 WL 5354355 (Md. Sep. 
25, 2013), the court did not reach the issue of whether state regulatory safeguards 
applied by analogy; however, it noted that a municipal government may voluntarily 
incorporate them. 
30. Mo. CONST. art. XVI, § I (a). The court of appeals has described the referendum as a 
"retained, but limited" concept. Koste v. Town of Oxford, 431 Md. 17, 38 n.3, 63 
A.3d 582, 584 n.3 (2013). 
31. See Ficker v. Denny, 326 Md. 626,634,606 A.2d 1060, 1064 (1992) (describing the 
voters' "great rights to legislate .... ")(citation omitted); Ritchmount P'ship v. Bd. of 
Supervisors of Elections for Anne Arundel Cnty., 283 Md. 48, 61, 388 A.2d 523, 532 
(1978) (stating that county charter's referendum clause established "what is in effect a 
coordinate legislative entity, that is, the county electorate .... "). 
32. E.g., MD. CODE ANN., art. 23A, § 19 (LexisNexis Supp. 20 12). 
The power of annexation may be delegated by the General 
Assembly to the municipalities of the State and this has been done 
by Code (1957), Art. 23A, sec. 19 .... It is apparent from the 
provision of subparagraph (a) that the power delegated by the 
General Assembly was not coincident to its own powers. 
Mayor & City Council of Rockville v. Brookeville Tpk. Constr. Co., 246 Md. 117, 
136, 228 A.2d 263, 274 (1967) (Barnes, J., dissenting). The Ocean City municipal 
charter "establishes the procedure for petitioning ordinances to referendum vote of the 
people of the municipality." Inlet Assocs. v. Assateague House Condo. Ass'n, 313 
Md. 413, 426, 545 A.2d 1296, 1303 (1988). Please note that, after this article was 
written but before it went to press, the municipal annexation statute, Md. Code Ann., 
Art. 23A, § 19, was moved as part of the code revision process to the LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT article. No substantive changes were made during that process. 
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I. IN MARYLAND, REFERENDUM BY PETITION IS THE 
PRODUCT OF A 1915 AMENDMENT TO THE 
CONSTITUTION 
There is no fundamental right to a referendum33 and, on the federal 
level, there is no right to a referendum at all.34 Prior to 1915, the 
referendum on general laws was unconstitutional in Maryland. 35 
33. Kendall v. Balcerzak, 650 F.3d 515, 521-22 (4th Cir. 2011) (agreeing with the 
determination of The Hon. J. Frederick Motz that there is no fundamental right to a 
referendum). The Fourth Circuit wrote that: "Whereas the right to vote is 
fundamental, the [district] court reasoned, the State-conferred privilege to undertake 
ballot initiatives and referenda is not." !d. at 521; Kendall v. Howard Cnty., No. JFM-
09-660, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97829, at *12 (D. Md. Oct. 20, 2009) ("There is no 
fundamental right to initiate legislation as there is a fundamental right to vote."). For 
example, while there is a statutory right to referenda on municipal annexations, the 
General Assembly was not required to create that right. See Mayor & City Council of 
Rockville, 246 Md. at 136, 228 A.2d at 274 (Barnes, J., dissenting). The Fourth 
Circuit has reasoned that "[t]he basis for distinguishing between the right to vote in a 
representative election, on the one hand, from the right to petition for referendum and 
initiative, on the other, is a sound one. The referendum is a form of direct democracy 
and is not compelled by the Federal Constitution." Kendall, 650 F.3d at 523, (citing 
inter alia, Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2827 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)). 
An alternative analysis might be that, when participating in the referendum process 
under their reserved right, the people are acting in a legislative capacity. See supra 
note 31. But cf Howard Co Citizens for Open Gov't. v. Howard Co. Bd. of Elections, 
201 Md. App. 605, 622, 30 A.3d 245, 256 (2011) ("a voter's right to take a legislative 
enactment to referendum is fundamental. ... "). 
34. "There is no provision for any sort of ballot proposition at the national level in the 
United States." What Are Ballot Propositions, Initiatives, and Referendums?, 
INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST. AT THE UNIV. OF S. CAL., http:// 
www.iandrinstitute.org/Quick%20Fact%20-%20What%20is%20I&R.htm#Popular 
referendum (last visited Aug. 30, 2013). 
35. Bayne v. Sec'y of State, 283 Md. 560, 565, 392 A.2d 67, 70 (1978) ("Prior to the 
constitutional amendment, legislative referendum with respect to a law of general 
applicability did not exist in Maryland. This Court had consistently held that to 
condition the operative effect of such a law upon approval by the voters of the State 
was an improper delegation of legislative authority."); Cole v. Sec'y of State, 249 Md. 
425, 434, 240 A.2d 272, 277 ( 1968) ("Prior to the amendment of our constitution on 2 
November 1915, when Art. XVI was ratified, referendum by petition did not exist in 
Maryland. Legislative referendum was possible only with respect to local laws, since 
this Court had consistently held that to condition the operative effect of a law of 
general applicability upon approval by the voters of the State was an improper 
delegation of legislative authority.") (citing Hammond v. Haines, 25 Md. 541 (1866); 
Burgess v. Poe, 2 Gill. II (1844)); see Doe v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, 428 Md. 
596, 607, 53 A. 3d !Ill, 1117 (20 12) ("The Referendum Amendment to the Maryland 
Constitution was first proposed by the General Assembly in Chapter 673 of the Acts 
of 1914. The Amendment was ratified in 1915 and added to the Constitution during 
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During the early twentieth century, however, the Populist and 
Progressive movements viewed many state legislatures as either 
corrupt, inefficient, or both.36 The Populists and Progressives began a 
national drive for direct democracy, particularly in the form of the 
initiative and referendum.37 In Maryland, this resulted in article XVI 
the wave of Populist and Progressive Movements sweeping the country at the time."); 
Camden Yards Stadium Legislative Package Not Subject to Referendum, 72 Md. Op. 
Att'y Gen. 43, 48 (1987) (explaining that until adoption of Art. XVI, the "people had 
lived under a well recognized form of representative government"); Beall v. State, 131 
Md. 669, 677, 103 A. 99, 102 (1917). 
36. Kelly v. Marylanders for Sports Sanity, Inc., 310 Md. 437, 450, 530 A.2d 245, 252 
(1987) ("The Referendum Amendment to the Maryland Constitution was proposed by 
ch. 673 of the Acts of 1914 and was ratified on November 2, 1915. It was 'the 
brainchild of Populist and Progressive Movements which dominated national politics 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries' .... ")(quoting Ritchmount P'ship 
v. Bd. of Supervisors for Elections for Anne Arundel Cnty., 283 Md. 48, 60 n.9, 388 
A.2d 523, 531 n.9 (1978)). The Kelly v. Marylanders for Sports Sanity court cited 
Beall, 131 Md. at 677, 103 A. at 102, for the proposition "that after the close of the 
Civil War, and in particular between the years of 1880 and 1900, 'great abuses began 
to creep into legislation and into the administration of National and State 
governments."' The Kelly v. Marylanders for Sports Sanity court noted that there 
were "charge[s] that the government in all its departments, was prostituted to corrupt 
and selfish purposes."' Kelly, 310 Md. at 451, 530 A.2d at 252. The Referendum was 
designed to replace representative government and counterbalance these abuses. See 
id.; accord Doe, 428 Md. at 608, 53 A.3d at 1118 (2012) (citing Beall, 131 Md. at 
676, 103 A. at 102); Town May Amend Charter to Allow for Legislation by Ballot 
Initiative, 88 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 156, 157 (2003) (stating that the referendum "sought 
to limit the influence of wealthy special interests in favor of the electoral power of 
voters."). 
37. /d. "Two cornerstones of the populist movement (which stresses the rights and innate 
wisdom of the common people) are the power of referendum and the power of 
initiative." MD. DEP'T. OF LEGIS. REFERENCE, REFERENDUM, Vol. 87-1, at 1 (May 21, 
1987); accord see infra note 622. In Ritchmount, the court wrote that the referendum 
"may have been known in early colonial America and still persists as a feature of the 
celebrated New England town meeting form of government," thus predating the 
Populist and Progressive movements. 283 Md. at 60 n.8, 388 A.2d at 531 n.8 (citing 
E. OBERHOLTZER, THE REFERENDUM IN AMERICA (3d ed. 1912)). Between 1898 and 
1918, over half of the states adopted initiative and referenda processes. DuVivier, 
supra note 1, at 1045-46. The Attorney General has noted that, "[ d]uring the first two 
decades of the 20th century, twenty-two states (most of them in the West) adopted 
constitutional provisions for referendum, initiative, or both." DEP'T OF LEGIS. 
REFERENCE, UPDATE, Vol. 87-1, at 1 (May 21, 1987). Since then, four more states 
have added such provisions. See State-by-State List of Initiative and Referendum 
Provisions, INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM lNST., http://www.iandrinstitute.org/ 
statewide_i%26r.htrn (last visited Aug. 30, 2013). A county attorney's letter 
appended to Art. 23A § 2(30) Permits but Does not Require Municipal Zoning 
Regulations to Be Put to Referendum, MD. OP. No. 82-021, 1982 WL 195056 (1982), 
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to the state constitution, authorizing the referendum, but not the 
initiative.38 Thus, article XVI and the election law article "set forth 
the procedures governing the referendum" on State general laws. 39 
A. A Brief Overview of the Populist Drive for the Initiative and 
Referendum 
"By 1900, reformers had organized a Maryland Direct Legislation 
League, with A. G. Eichelberger as its president. Ten years later the 
League claimed 'more than 1 ,000 active, working members.' In 
1914, the League promoted an I&R [initiative and referendum] bill 
sponsored by State Senator William J. Odgen of Baltimore, but the 
legislature amended it to remove the initiative provision."40 A year 
after describing the general national history of the referendum movement, states: 
"With the exception of Alaska in 1959, no state has since adopted or jettisoned the 
referendum." 
38. See infra Part I.B. 
39. Kelly v. Vote Know Coal. ofMd., Inc., 331 Md. 164, 167, 626 A.2d 959,961 (1993) 
(addressing the referendum on Maryland's abortion statutes). 
40. See Maryland, INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST. AT THE UNIV. OF S. CAL., 
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/Maryland.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2013). The 
initiative, referendum, and recall originated in Switzerland. Town May Amend 
Charter to Allow for Legislation by Ballot Initiative, supra note 35, at 157 n.l (2003) 
(citing Town ofGlenarden v. Bromery, 257 Md. 19,23 n.1, 262 A.2d 60,62 (1970)). 
See infra note 625 for additional petitioning history. 
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later, an attempt to add the initiative failed,41 as have more recent 
attempts. 42 
The philosophy behind the referendum movement reflects a basic 
distrust of representative governmene3 
There is a radical difference between a democracy and a 
representative government. In a democracy, the citizens 
themselves make the law and superintend its administration; 
in a representative government, the citizens empower 
legislators and executive officers to make the law and carry 
it out.44 
The referendum is a reservation of power by the people "of the 
right to have submitted for their approval or rejection, under certain 
prescribed conditions, any law or part of a law passed by the law 
making body.'>45 As such, it was a modification of, or supplement to, 
41. Town May Amend Charter to Allow for Legislation by Ballot Initiative, supra note 
40, at 157-58 n.2. A proposal to include the initiative in the constitution was rejected: 
"Proposals were made to abolish the principle of representation and to adopt the 
principle of initiation of legislation by the people, and the principle of referring 
legislation already adopted by the Legislature to the people. The last of these 
proposals was adopted by this state in the Referendum Amendment .... " Bd. of 
Educ. of Frederick Cnty. v. Mayor & Aldermen of Frederick, 194 Md. 170, 177, 69 
A.2d 912, 915 (1949); accord Town May Amend Charter to Allow for Legislation by 
Ballot Initiative, supra note 35, at 156 & n.2 ("[The Maryland Constitution] does not 
provide for an initiative process at the State level.") (citing MD. CONST. art. XVI; 
EVERSTINE, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND, 1850-1920, 566-70 (1984)). 
Maryland is one of only three states that have the referendum without the initiative. 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 269; Kelly, 310 Md. at 452 n.7, 530 A.2d at 252 n.7; 
Camden Yards Stadium Legislative Package not Subject to Referendum, supra note, 
35 ("Only Maryland and two other states have referendum powers but no initiative 
provision.") (citing DEP'T OF LEGIS. REFERENCE, UPDATE, Vol. 87-1, at 1 (May 21, 
1987)). 
42. See H.B. 871, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012) (proposal to amend Maryland 
Constitution to provide for initiative). 
43. "When they introduced the initiative process, the Progressives believed that 
representative government had failed because legislatures were controlled by special 
interests." DuVivier, supra note I, at 1046. 
44. /d. at 1045. 
45. Beall v. Maryland, 131 Md. 669, 677, 103 A. 99, 102 (1917); accord Anne Arundel 
Cnty. v. McDonough, 277 Md. 271, 283, 354 A.2d 788, 796 (1976) (noting the 
reservation of right of the people in county charter); Jackson H. Ralston, "To the 
voters of the State of Maryland," Direct Legislation League of Maryland (circa 1915), 
4 ("The referendum, after all, is nothing but the exercise of power by its original 
possessor."). Ralston suggested that: "Propositions are made in the legislature .... 
Active lobbies and interested speakers support them. Without any popular test at all, 
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the concept of representative government.46 It has been described by 
its advocates as a "new instrument of government .... "47 
Of course, that "division of labor ... is at the very foundation of 
our representative democracy."48 As will be seen in Part I below, the 
alteration of this foundation has profound impacts on interpretation of 
the referendum statute. Just as the referendum has many supporters, 
there are many who oppose or seek to limit it. 
B. Article XVI of the Maryland Constitution, Provides for a 
Referendum on State Legislation, But Not the Initiative 
In article XVI, the Maryland Constitution provides for referenda on 
state legislation with certain express limitations.49 Curiously, 
however, "[t]here does not seem to be much available legislative 
history to inform us about art[icle] XVI."50 Although the 
constitutional provision "defines" the referendum power, 51 it has been 
described as "an introductory general description of the principle of 
the referendum. "52 The referendum amendment has six sections; 
however, "[s]ection 1 is at the heart of the amendment."53 Article 
these propositions become law." !d. at 5. He argued that: "The people, taken as a 
whole, have no axes to grind so far as legislation is concerned. They do not put selfish 
desires into bills and haunt the halls of the General Assembly until bills become law." 
!d. at 5. In his "Address to the citizens of the state of Maryland upon the initiative 
and referendum," Ralston argued: "Our whole theory of government is based upon the 
fact that the people are competent enough to rule themselves and pass on all questions 
coming before them." For a different perspective, see infra note 630. 
46. McDonough, 277 Md. at 283, 354 A.2d at 796. Most recently, the court described the 
referendum "as a supplement to the principle of representative government." Doe v. 
Md. State Bd. of Elections, 428 Md. 596,608,53 A.3d 1111, 1118 (2012) (citation 
omitted). 
47. Beall, 131 Md. at 678, 103 A. at 102. 
48. Smigiel v. Franchot, 410 Md. 302,313,978 A.2d 687,694 (2009). 
49. See infra Part I.D. 
50. Kelly v. Marylanders for Sports Sanity, Inc., 310 Md. 437, 478, 530 A.2d 245, 265 
(1987) (Adkins, J., dissenting). 
51. Doe, 428 Md. at 600, 53 A.3d at 1113. 
52. FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 260. A gubernatorial commission recommended deletion 
of the referendum from the constitution. !d. 
53. Bayne v. Sec'y of State, 283 Md. 560, 565, 392 A.2d 67, 70 (1978); accord Doe, 428 
Md. at 607-08, 53 A.3d at 1117. See generally Whitley v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, 
429 Md. at 138-39, 55 A.3d at 41 (explaining the importance of Section 1). During 
the 2013 Session of the General Assembly, an amendment to article XVI was 
proposed. S.B. 706, Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013), available at http://mga1eg.maryland.gov/ 
2013RS/bills/sb/sb0706f.pdf. It did not become law and was intended to alter certain 
dates, alter the number of signatures required to refer a law, and make other changes. 
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XVI, section !-"Reservation of power of referendum m people; 
article self-executing; additionallegislation"-provides: 
(a) The people reserve to themselves power known as The 
Referendum, by petition to have submitted to the registered 
voters of the State, to approve or reject at the polls, any Act, 
or part54 of any Act of the General Assembly, if approved by 
the Governor, or, if passed by the General Assembly over 
the veto of the Governor; (b) The provisions of this Article 
shall be self-executing; provided that additional legislation 
in furtherance thereof and not in conflict therewith may be 
enacted. 55 
The word "referendum" is a term of art: "The Referendum, broadly 
speaking, is the reservation by the people of a State, or local 
subdivision thereof, of the right to have submitted for their approval 
or rejection, under certain prescribed conditions, any law or part of a 
54. A petition sponsor seeking to refer only part of an act should do so expressly. Absent 
such an expression, the court has viewed the petition as one seeking to refer the entire 
act. Winebrenner v. Salmon, 155 Md. 563, 571, 142 A. 723, 726 (1928). A 
referendum on part of a law "has only been sought on very few occasions and the 
resulting interpretations have not been conclusive." FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 270. 
Perhaps that is because of common law constraints on that provision. Part of an 
excepted law, e.g., part of a Budget Bill, is "ordinarily" not referable. Bayne, 283 Md. 
at 576, 392 A.2d at 76. The Attorney General interpreted this portion of the 
constitution and addressed a referendum on part of a statute where the two provisions 
were not severable. Handgun Control Part of Chapter 533 May Be Petitioned to 
Referendum, supra note 14, at 43. The constitutional language "part of any Act" 
permits a referendum petition on the part that the petitioners found objectionable; 
however, the Attorney General cautioned that: "Of course, the right to refer a part of a 
law is not unlimited." !d. at 86. He wrote in part: "Moreover, one can imagine 
referendum attempts that so parse an enactment as to be misleading, too fragmentary, 
or otherwise beyond the permissible bounds of the referendum. A petition that seeks, 
through the device of a referendum, merely to tinker with legislative decision is 
probably invalid." !d. For example, a referendum that sought to remove the word 
"not" would be of doubtful validity. !d. In an unpublished order, however, the court 
of appeals has severed invalid provisions and permitted a referendum on the 
remainder under Mo. CONST. art. XI-A. Bait. Cnty. Citizens for Representative Gov't 
v. Bait. Cnty., 1990 Md. Lexis 146, *2 (1990). See generally Camden Yards Stadium 
Legislative Package not Subject to Referendum, supra note 35, at 43 (discussing 
"legally inseparable bills" under the appropriation exception). 
55. In Beall v. State, 131 Md. 669, 678, 103 A. 99, 102 (1917), the court held that Art. 
XVI did not impliedly repeal MD. CONST. art. III, § 31. 
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law passed by the law making body."56 By its express terms, article 
XVI does not create a right to initiative. 57 Section 2 of article XVI, 
has been described as "complicated to read" and it, and Section 3, are 
comprehensively addressed in another recent publication. 58 
C. The Two Types of Referenda 
There are two types of referendum and "Maryland law recognizes 
the distinction between compulsory referendum mandated by a 
legislative body and optional or 'facultative' referendum [initiated] 
by citizen petition."59 Thus, "[i]t is customary to draw a distinction 
between compulsory referenda on the one hand and optional or 
'facultative' referenda on the other. Where the Legislature directs 
that a given statute not take effect until and unless approved by a vote 
of the electorate, it is described as 'compulsory. "'60 
Article XVI of the Maryland Constitution authorized facultative, or 
optional, referenda on public generallaws.61 In short, after 1915, the 
people had the right to petition state statutes to referendum. 62 
The compulsory referendum also exists.63 For example, Maryland 
Constitution, article XIX, section 1 (e), directs a referendum on any 
act expanding gaming. 64 Article XIV provides that constitutional 
amendments must be submitted to the voters, 65 stating that, after the 
General Assembly enacts a constitutional amendment it "shall be 
56. Beall, 131 Md. at 678, 103 A. at 102 (1917); accord Anne Arundel Cnty. v. 
McDonough, 277 Md. 271,283, 354 A.2d 788, 796 (1976). 
57. The difference between a "referendum" and the "initiative" is discussed above. See 
supra note 33. 
58. FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 271-75. 
59. Kendall v. Howard Cnty., 204 Md. App. 440, 452 n.7, 41 A.3d 727, 735 n.7 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App.), aff'd on other grounds, 431 Md. 590, 66 A. 3d 684 (2012). 
60. Ritchmount P'ship v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections, 283 Md. 48, 60, 388 A.2d 523, 
531 (1978). 
61. !d. ("Prior to 1915, facultative referendum was thought to be impossible in Maryland 
on the theory that the authority to enact, repeal or amend laws had been vested 
exclusively in the General Assembly-the people having completely transferred all 
legislative power to the Legislature."). MD. CONST. art. XI-F, § 7, provides that an 
action of a code county regarding a public local law "is subject to a referendum of the 
voters in the county .... " 
62. See Ritchmount P 'ship, 238 Md. at 60, 388 A.2d at 531. 
63. See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. 
64. The court of appeals recently granted certiorari in a case challenging MD. CaNST. art. 
XIX, § 1. The case was decided, however, under a time bar. Canavan v. Md. State 
Bd. of Elections, 430 Md. 533, 61 A.3d 828 (2013) (per curiam). 
65. Mo. CONST. art. XIV "first appeared in 1864 and remains substantially unchanged 
today." FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 260. 
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submitted, in a form to be prescribed by the General Assembly, to the 
qualified voters of the State for adoption or rejection." Article XIII, 
section 1, permits the legislature to create new counties, "but no new 
county shall be organized without the consent of the majority of the 
legal voters residing within the limits proposed to be formed into said 
new county .... "66 Each provision is a compulsory referendum. 67 
Ordinarily, the referendum is limited to legislative matters.68 In 
addition to public general laws, adoption of a charter, charter 
amendments, local laws authorizing issuance of bonds or 
indebtedness,69 zoning/0 annexation,71 and public local laws72 are 
referable. 
66. MD. CONST. art. XIII,§ 1. 
67. While the initiating mechanism is markedly different in facultative referenda, on the 
one hand, and compulsory referenda, on the other, the post-initiation process is 
parallel. For example, the Attorney General has stated that, while there is a 
distinction, "[t]he Court apparently proffered this distinction without intending a 
difference .... " Applicability of Contribution Limitation to Contribution to Governor 
and Lieutenant Governor Running Mates, 63 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 291, 292 (1978). 
68. Anne Arundel Cnty. v. McDonough, 277 Md. 271,283,354 A.2d 788, 796 (1976). 
69. /d. at 283, 354 A.2d at 796; see also MD. CODE ANN., art. 23A, § 32(b) (LexisNexis 
2011) (describing how bonds of a municipal corporation shall be authorized by 
resolution and providing for how such resolutions are to be adopted); City of 
Frostburg v. Jenkins, 215 Md. 9, 12, 18, 136 A.2d 852, 853, 857 (1957) (upholding a 
public local law providing for a referendum on industrial development bonds); 63 Md. 
Op. Att'y Gen. 291 (1978) (discussing county charter amendment, which may provide 
that bond bills be submitted to voters). In Mayor of Mount Airy v. Sappington, the 
court described a public local law that conferred the power to regulate slaughter-
houses within corporate limits, "after a referendum before exercising these powers." 
195 Md. 259,267, 73 A.2d 449, 452 (1950). 
70. McDonough, 277 Md. at 283-84, 354 A.2d at 796 (noting that the court also assumed 
that a comprehensive zoning bill was referable); Superior Outdoor Signs, Inc. v. Eller 
Media Co., 150 Md. App. 479, 489, 822 A.2d 478, 484 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003) 
("The Town of Willards is a municipal corporation. Among its enumerated express 
powers is the power to 'provide reasonable zoning regulations subject to the 
referendum of the voters at regular or special elections."' (citing art. 23A, § 2(b)(30)). 
71. MD. CODE ANN., art. 23A, § 19(f)--{h). 
72. Sufficiency Determination Concerning a Referendum on a Public Local Law Enacted 
by the General Assembly is to be Made by State Officials, 85 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 
120, 120-22 (2000). 
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D. The Express Limitations on the Right to a Referendum under 
Common Law and, article XVI of the Maryland Constitution 
In sections 2 and 6 of article XVI, the constitution imposes several 
express limitations on the right to referendum.73 There are additional 
common law exceptions.74 
1. Exceptions Under Article XVI, Sections 2 and 6 
The primary exceptions to the right to facultative referenda are 
expressly included in article XVI. 75 The "appropriations exception" 
is stated in article XVI, section 2: "No law making any appropriation 
for maintaining the State Government, or for maintaining or aiding 
any public institution, not exceeding the next previous appropriation 
for the same purpose, shall be subject to rejection or repeal under this 
Section."76 Article XVI, section 6, states that: "No law, licensing, 
regulating, prohibiting, or submitting to local option, the manufacture 
73. MD. CONST. art. XVI,§§ 2, 6. 
74. See discussion infra Part I.E. 
75. The court of appeals has recently stated that article XVI contains "several" 
exceptions. Doe v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, 428 Md. 596, 608, 53 A.3d 1111, 1117 
(2012) ("The right of referendum is subject to several exceptions .... "). In the past, 
it has variously stated that there are two or three express limitations on the right to 
referendum. Compare Dorsey v. Petrott, 178 Md. 230, 234, 13 A.2d 630, 633 (1940) 
("The general application of the Referendum is subject to two express limitations 
which are found in sections 2 and 6."), with Bayne v. Sec'y of State, 283 Md. 560, 
566, 392 A.2d 67, 70 (1978) ("The general application of The Referendum is subject 
to three express limitations."). Accord Camden Yards Stadium Legislative Package 
not Subject to Referendum, 72 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 43, 49 (1987) ("There are three 
exceptions to referendum, two of which are set out in Article XVI, §2 .... The third 
is in Article XVI, §6 .... "). The apparent discrepancy was resolved by the Bayne 
court, by reference to a study performed in the 1968 Constitutional Convention. 
Bayne, 283 Md. at 566 n.2, 392 A.2d at 70 n.2, and it appears to be of no moment 
whether there are two or three exceptions. The court has clearly stated that limitations 
are found in article XVI, section 2, and in article XVI, section 6. Id. at 566-67, 392 
A.2d at 70; Doe, 428 Md. at 608, 53 A.3d at 1117. Thus, "[t]here are exceptions [to 
the right to referendum], notably those embraced in the sixth section, which indicate 
clearly that it was not intended that the provisions of the Article should apply to all 
legislation." Beall v. State, 131 Md. 669, 678, 103 A. 99, 103 (1917). The court has 
stated, "exceptions from its power are limitations upon the power." Jd. 
76. Article XVI, section 2, also provides that: "The increase in any such appropriation for 
maintaining or aiding any public institution shall only take effect as in the case of 
other laws, and such increase or any part thereof specified in the petition, may be 
referred to a vote of the people upon petition." MD. CONST. art. XVI, § 2. Thus, 
there is an exception to the limitation. 
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or sale of malt or spirituous liquors, shall be referred or repealed 
under the provisions of this Article.'m 
It could be asserted that there is an additional, partial limitation in 
article XVI, section 2, because emergency laws are not suspended 
while a referendum is pending. 78 Thus, there are several exceptions 
to the power to refer under article XVI. 79 
While it is neither a limitation on, nor an exception to, article XVI, 
it is important to note that, even after enactment of the referendum 
amendment, the General Assembly cannot direct that a public general 
law be submitted to referendum.80 There are two reasons. First, 
because the people have delegated the law-making power to the 
General Assembly, the legislature cannot re-delegate the power to 
them. 81 Second, the General Assembly is "not competent" to change 
by statute the constitutional provisions prescribing how laws may be 
77. The "spirituous liquors" limitation was explained in Beall v. State, 131 Md. 669, 103 
A. 99 (1917), and applied in Poise/ v. Cash, 130 Md. 373, 100 A. 364 (1917), to a law 
prohibiting the sale of liquor in Carroll County. See Beall, 131 Md. at 676-78, 103 A. 
at 102-03; Poise/, 130 Md. at 374-75, 100 A. at 364. The court held that article XVI 
did not bar a referendum; however, the statute at issue also appears to be a public 
local law. See Poise/, 103 Md. at 375, 100 A. at 364. 
78. See discussion infra p. 124. 
79. See discussion infra Part 1.0.2-3. 
80. Bd. of Pub. Works v. Bait. Cnty., 288 Md. 678,681,421 A.2d 588,589 (1980) (citing 
a line of cases commencing in 1866). As to public local laws, "a public local law may 
be conditioned upon a referendum of the voters in the area or political subdivision 
affected by the legislation." !d.; see also Harford County may by Charter Amendment 
Provide that Bond Bills be Submitted to County Voters for Approval, 63 Md. Op. 
Att'y Gen. 291, 291 (1978) (holding that a referendum provision be incorporated into 
a county's charter for certain public local laws). 
81. Bd. of Pub. Works, 288 Md. at 681-82, 421 A.2d at 589-90 (citing Brawner v. 
Supervisors, 141 Md. 586, 595, 119 A. 250, 252 (1922)); see Bd. of Supervisors of 
Elections v. Att'y Gen. ofMd., 246 Md. 417,431, 229 A.2d 388, 396 (1967) (also 
citing Brawner). The re-delegation doctrine is a "dead letter" as to all referenda 
within the scope of constitutional provisions that authorize referenda. See e.g., Mo. 
CONST. art. XVI, § !(a); Mo. CONST. art. XI-A, § I; Mo. CONST. art. XI-F, § 7; Mo. 
CONST. art. XIX, § 1(e). The decision in Carrier v. Lynch, 209 Md. 349, 121 A.2d 
246 (1956), appears anomalous. There, a state "blue law" provision, article 27, 
section 609a, "was made subject to a referendum of the voters of the County at the 
next general ... election." !d. at 353, 121 A.2d at 248. Such a procedure would 
appear barred by Brawner and the re-delegation doctrine. The court, however, wrote 
simply: "If the voters are against baseball and motion pictures on Sunday, they may 
vote to retain the law as presently in effect." !d. It would appear that a legislatively 
directed referendum on section 609a would run afoul of the re-delegation doctrine; 
however, that was apparently not the case. 
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enacted.82 In short, only facultative referenda are contemplated by 
article XVI. 83 
2. The Appropriations Exception 
The constitutional appropriations exception provides that: 
No law making any appropriation for maintaining the State 
Government, or for maintaining or aiding any public 
institution, not exceeding the next previous appropriation for 
the same purpose, shall be subject to rejection or repeal 
under this Section. The increase in any such appropriation 
for maintaining or aiding any public institution shall only 
take effect as in the case of other laws, and such increase or 
any part thereof specified in the petition, may be referred to 
a vote of the people upon petition. 84 
a. Purpose of the appropriations exception 
The underlying purpose of the appropriations exception is to 
"prevent interruptions of government. "85 The theory is "'that if laws 
making appropriations for maintaining the state government were 
subject to referendum, it would be possible, through the exercise of 
this power by the people, to cause the state serious financial 
embarrassment in the performance of its vanous essential 
functions. "'86 
In Kelly v. Marylanders for Sports Sanity, Inc., the Maryland Court 
of Appeals provided the historical context in which to interpret the 
82. Bd. of Pub. Works, 288 Md. at 681-82, 421 A.2d at 589-90 (citing Brawner, 141 Md. 
at 595, 119 A. at 252). The General Assembly may make a change by constitutional 
amendment. See Mo. CONST. art. XIX, § l(e) (section 1(e) provides that a law 
expanding gaming be submitted to referendum). 
83. See Culp v. Comrn'rs of Chestertown,l54 Md. 620, 622, 141 A. 410, 412 (1928) 
(noting that article 16 of the constitution, "makes no provision for a referendum to the 
voters of any city of the state other than Baltimore City, or any rural section of the 
state of a less extent than a county"). 
84. MD. CONST. art. XVI, § 2. 
85. See Bickel v. Nice, 173 Md. I, 10, 192 A. 777, 781 ( 193 7); see generally Note, 
Statutes - Referendum - Stadium Enactments Not Subject to Referendum Because 
They Fall Within Appropriation Exception to the Referendum Amendment, Kelly v. 
Marylanders for Sports Sanity, Inc., 18 U. BALT. L. REv. 212 (1988). 
86. Kelly v. Marylanders for Sports Sanity, Inc., 310 Md. 437, 456, 530 A.2d 245, 254 
(1987) (quoting Gasoline Tax Law Not Referable, 12 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 228, 235-
36 (1927)). 
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appropriations exception. 87 When the referendum amendment was 
ratified in 1915, the Budget Act had not yet been passed and 
Maryland "had no orderly system of planned public expenditures."88 
The "power to expend public monies was vested solely in the 
Legislature," and "appropriations for various purposes were made 
piecemeal by a series of bills ... each project receiving independent 
consideration without relation to other claims upon the public 
purse."89 As a result, the legislature lacked a "complete picture of the 
financial condition and needs of the government. "90 
The Kelly court observed that it was almost impossible to "glean[] 
from the literature on the subject" whether, in "proposing the 
exceptions to the people's right to Referendum" in 1915, the General 
Assembly "was undertaking to insulate its interest in spending public 
monies, or [whether it] had some higher purpose in mind[.]"91 
Notwithstanding the inability to discern the General Assembly's 
initial intentions, the substance of the exception "exclude[ s] from 
[article XVI's] coverage all those bills, with or without revenue-
raising provisions, which authorized the expenditure of public money 
to maintain the State government[.]"92 
The budget amendment to the Maryland Constitution, ratified in 
1916, one year after the referendum amendment, effected "radical 
change" and addressed the budgetary deficiencies and "dismal fiscal 
practices of the General Assembly" by "providing for a 
comprehensive executive budget system for the State."93 Of note, but 
simplified greatly, the Budget Amendment specified that "'[e]very 
appropriation bill shall be either a Budget Bill, or a Supplementary 
Appropriation Bill, as hereinafter provided. "'94 
Thus, the 1916 budget amendment provided for appropriations and 
the 1915 referendum amendment made specified appropriations non-
87. See id. at 450-59, 530 A.2d at 251-56. 
88. !d. at 450, 453, 530 A.2d at 251, 252. 
89. !d. at 453, 530 A.2d at 252-53. 
90. !d., 530 A.2d at 253. 
91. !d. at 454, 530 A.2d at 253. 
92. !d. 
93. !d.; see also Bayne v. Sec'y of State, 283 Md. 560,567,392 A.2d 67, 71 (1978) ("The 
purpose of the Budget Amendment was to ... provid[e] an intelligent and definite 
method of estimating and appropriating the income of the state.") 
94. Doe v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, 428 Md. 596, 603, 53 A.3d II II, 1115 (2012) 
(quoting Mo. CONST. art. III,§ 52(2)). 
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referable.95 Nevertheless, the word "appropriation" did not have the 
same meaning in each provision.96 
b. While budgetary appropriations bills are clearly within the 
scope of the referendum exception, the exception encompasses 
much more 
The specific language of the referendum amendment, exempting 
from referendum all laws "making any appropriation for maintaining 
the State Government,"97 clearly includes "a Budget Bill or 
supplementary appropriation bill."98 The meaning of the word 
"appropriation," in the referendum amendment, however, is not 
limited to the term's meaning within the context of the budget 
amendment.99 
In 1927, the Attorney General expansively interpreted the 
appropriations exception. 100 The Attorney General was asked 
"whether a statute which increased the gas tax and dedicated the 
proceeds for highway construction and maintenance was a law 
making an appropriation 'for maintaining the State Government' and 
thus was not referable under [article] XVI."101 Opining that the 
statute was non-referable, the Attorney General interpreted the word 
"appropriation" in the budget amendment differently than the same 
word in article XVI, writing: 
As to the exception in the Referendum Amendment, the 
word "appropriation . . . signifies the act of setting apart or 
assigning to a particular use or person in exclusion of all 
other, that is to say, the application to a special use or 
purpose"; whereas in the Budget Amendment[,] the word 
95. Kelly, 310 Md. at 450-52, 454, 530 A.2d at 251-53. 
96. Jd. at 456, 530 A.2d at 254 ("[T]he word 'appropriation' is not used in the same sense 
in the budget amendment and in Article XVI." (quoting Gasoline Tax Law Not 
Referable, 12 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 228, 235 (1927)); cf Note, Statutes- Referendum 
- Stadium Enactments Not Subject to Referendum Because They Fall Within 
Appropriation Exception to the Referendum Amendment, Kelly v. Marylanders for 
Sports Sanity, Inc., 18 U. BALT. L. REv. 212, 213 (1988) (noting conflicting 
definitions of"appropriations" in other constitutional provisions). 
97. MD. CONST. art. XVI,§ 2. 
98. Kelly, 310 Md. at 455, 530 A.2d at 253. 
99. See Gasoline Tax Not Referable, 12 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 228, 234-35 (1927). 
I 00. I d. 
101. Kelly, 310 Md. at 455, 530 A.2d at 253 (1987) (citing Gasoline Tax Not Referable, 12 
Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 228, 228, 233, 235 (1927)). 
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"appropriation" "denotes disbursement . . . of appropriated 
monies from the State Treasury."102 
673 
Put differently, then-Attorney General Robinson stated that, while 
"[t]he Budget Amendment prescribes the method whereby 
appropriated funds may be withdrawn from the State treasury[,]" in 
contrast, "[a ]rticle XVI refers to all laws assigning public monies to a 
particular use or purpose, regardless of whether such law is adequate 
or legally sufficient to authorize the payment or disbursement of the 
appropriated monies."103 
Thus, "[t]he opinion concluded that 'the broad language of the 
exception was intended to include all laws providing for revenue for 
and/or appropriating monies to any organized department of the State 
... [for] the exercise of state functions."' 104 Obviously, Attorney 
General Robinson's definition of what constituted an "appropriation" 
under article XVI was much broader than an "appropriation" under 
the budget amendment. 105 
The opinion received judicial imprimatur in Winebrenner v. 
Salmon, 106 where the court held that, although a statute dedicating 
proceeds from the gas tax for highway construction may not be 
"sufficient in itself to authorize the withdrawal from the treasury of 
the state the money collected under its provisions [i.e., a budget bill], 
it was at least a direction to the Governor to make the disbursement 
in the budget," and as such, was sufficiently an appropriation act to 
avoid referendum. 107 While the highway construction bill was not a 
budgetary appropriation, it was nonetheless non-referable under the 
102. !d. at 456, 530 A.2d at 254 (quoting Gasoline Tax Not Referable, 12 Md. Op. Att'y 
Gen. 228, 235 (1927)). 
103. !d. 
104. !d. at 457, 530 A.2d at 254 (quoting Gasoline Tax Law Not Referable, 12 Md. Op. 
Att'y Gen. 228, 236 (1927)). 
I 05. See supra text accompanying notes I 03-04. 
106. !55 Md. 563, 142 A. 723 (1928). 
107. !d. at 566-70, 142 A. at 724-26. The issue found its way into the court because on 
May 31, 1927, various residents of Baltimore City and other Maryland counties "filed 
a petition in due form and with the required number of signatures . . . for a 
referendum." !d. The Secretary of State, after being advised by the Attorney General 
that the act was non-referable because it fell within the appropriations exception, 
refused to place the statute on the ballot, and on March 21, 1928, the "appellees filed 
a petition for mandamus in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel county" challenging 
the decision. !d. The appellees argued, inter alia, that the statute was not an 
appropriation act exempt from referendum, or, in the alternative, if it was an 
appropriation act, that it is not one for "maintaining the state government." !d. 
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broader definition of "appropriation" as it appears in the referendum 
exception. 108 Accordingly, the scope of the appropriations exception 
has expanded "to cover, in addition to Budget Bills and 
Supplementary Appropriation Bills, 'that class of money bills109 or 
spending measures 110 contemplated by the exceptions to the 
referendum right under [article] XVI."' 111 
c. Courts engage in a multi-step analysis to apply the 
appropriations exception 
Courts employ a multi-step analysis in applying the exception. 112 
The first question is whether the statute is an appropriation within the 
meaning of article XVI. 113 Next, if it is, a court must ask whether it is 
an appropriation "for maintaining the State Government."114 
Although an act of the legislature "may be passed for the purpose of 
maintaining the State government, the act is nevertheless subject to 
the Referendum, unless it be an act so appropriating public funds for 
that purpose."115 
108. See id. 
109. A money bill is a revenue-raising measure or a revenue-related measure. See Doe v. 
Md. State Bd. of Elections, 428 Md. 596, 610, 610 n.5, 53 A.3d II II, 1119 n.5 
(2012). 
II 0. The court of appeals defined a spending measure appropriation as any "law[] 
assigning public monies to a particular use or purpose, regardless of whether such law 
is adequate or legally sufficient to authorize the payment or disbursement of the 
appropriated monies." !d. at 610, 53 A.3d at 1119 (quoting Kelly, 310 Md. at 456, 
530 A.2d at 254). 
Ill. !d. at 609, 53 A.3d at 1118 (quoting Kelly, 310 Md. at 455-56, 530 A.2d at 253-54 
(internal quotation omitted)). Winebrenner took an expansive view. In Note, Statutes 
- Referendum - Stadium Enactments Not Subject to Referendum Because They Fall 
Within Appropriation Exception to the Referendum Amendment, Kelly v. 
Marylanders for Sports Sanity, Inc., 18 U. BALT. L. REv. 212,212,214, 224 (1988), it 
was argued that the court has taken a "broad" view of the exception. On the other 
hand, it has been argued that the court of appeals decreased the power of the electorate 
under the appropriations exception in Bayne v. Sec. of State, 283 Md. 560, 392 A.2d 
67 (1978). See Note, Interaction and Interpretation of the Budget and Referendum 
Amendments of the Maryland Constitution- Bayne v. Secretary of State, 39 MD. L. 
REv. 558, 582-83 (1980). 
112. See infra text accompanying notes 114-25. 
113. See Doe, 428 Md. at 606, 53 A.3d at 1117. 
114. See, e.g., id. at 620 n.l 0, 53 A. 3d at 1125 n.10; Bayne v. Sec'y of State, 283 Md. 560, 
570,392 A.2d 67, 72 (1978); Dorsey v. Petrott, 178 Md. 230, 245, 13 A.2d 630, 638 
(1940); Winebrenner v. Salmon, 155 Md. 563, 566, 142 A. 723,725 (1928). 
115. Dorsey, 178 Md. at 245, 13 A.2d at 638. 
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Most recently, the Maryland Court of Appeals addressed the 
exception in Doe v. Md. State Bd. of Elections in the context of the 
Maryland Dream Act. 116 Because the statute was not a budget bill, 
supplementary appropriation bill, or "money bill," the court stated 
that, in order to be exempt from referendum, the Act would "need to 
constitute a spending measure appropriation."117 
The court then wrote that, to be a spending measure appropriation, 
the statute's "primary purpose must be to assign the monies for a 
specified purpose."118 Importantly, the court distinguished between a 
statute's "primary purpose" and an incidental provision, writing that 
general legislation "cannot be converted into an appropriation bill 
merely because there may be an incidental provision for an 
appropriation of public funds."119 
In holding the Dream Act referable, and not within the scope of the 
exception, the court determined that its primary purpose was "not to 
appropriate funds from the treasury to support certain classification 
of students," but rather, to "se[t] eligibility requirements" for higher 
education that may have an incidental effect on state spending. 120 
116. The Maryland Dream Act, or Senate Bill 167, "establish[ed] new categories of 
individuals who may be eligible for in-state tuition rates at community colleges and 
public four-year colleges and universities in Maryland." Doe, 428 Md. at 601, 53 
A.3d at 1114. The first category consists of military veterans and the second permits 
undocumented immigrants "who meet certain conditions to be eligible for the in-
statute tuition rate at community colleges in Maryland ... [and] also includes similar 
eligibility criteria to qualify for in-state tuition at a four-year public institution in 
Maryland." !d. at 601-02, 53 A.3d at 1114. A summary provided to the Members of 
the General Assembly by the Department of Legislative Services cautioned that the 
bill affects a mandated appropriation because "[s]tate expenditures would rise as a 
result of an increase in the enrollment of qualified in-state students at community 
colleges." /d. at 602, 53 A.3d at 1114. After the enactment of the Maryland Dream 
Act on May I 0, 20 II, MDPetitions.com collected enough valid signatures to put the 
Act to referendum in the November 2012 General Election. !d. at 598, 603, 53 A.3d 
at 1112,1115. 
117. !d. at 609-10, 53 A.3d at 1119. 
118. /d. at 610-11, 53 A.3d at 1119; accord Note, Statutes - Referendum - Stadium 
Enactments Not Subject to Referendum Because They Fall Within Appropriation 
Exception to the Referendum Amendment, Kelly v. Marylanders for Sports Sanity, 
Inc., 18 U. BALT. L. REv. 212, 229 (1988) (primary function analysis); cf Note, 
Interaction and Interpretation of the Budget and Referendum Amendments of the 
Maryland Constitution- Bayne v. Secretary of State, 39 Mo. L. REv. 558, 581 (1980) 
(suggesting that primary function test is "entirely spurious"). 
119. !d. 
120. /d. at 613, 53 A.3d at 1120-21. 
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The court specifically recognized that "there is a distinctive 
difference between referring a bill that, in itself, would stop the state 
from meeting its financial obligations, and a bill that changes the 
state's obligations such that at some point in the future, financial 
adjustments may be needed."121 Indeed, many, if not a substantial 
number of, bills passed by the General Assembly may require or call 
for some unquantifiable future financial adjustment in one way or 
another. 122 To hold that all such bills are non-referable would, in 
effect, expand "the exception beyond its intended purpose" and 
"effectively depriv[e] voters the right to referendum."123 Thus, to fall 
within the exception, the law's impact on appropriations cannot be 
several steps removed from the law's primary purpose. 124 
d. "Package analysis" and the in pari materia expansion of the 
appropriations exception 
Just as the Attorney General and Winebrenner expanded the 
appropriations exception beyond budget bills, "package analysis" or 
the synonymous in pari materia doctrine may do the same. 125 Under 
this doctrine, even though a single law, analyzed in isolation, may not 
be a non-referable appropriation, the combination of multiple laws 
considered in pari materia may lead to a different result, making an 
otherwise referable law non-referable. 126 In deciding whether to read 
separate laws in pari materia under the appropriations exceptions, 
121. /d. at 610 n.5, 53 A.3d at 1119 n.5. 
122. /d. 
123. /d. at 613, 53 A.3d at 1121. 
124. !d. Previously, in Dorsey, the court engaged in a parallel analysis and reached a 
similar result. There, the law at issue concerned conservation of Maryland fisheries 
and, inter alia, involved the salaries of employees and various additional provisions 
regarding inspection fines. Dorsey v. Petrott, 178 Md. 230, 235, 246-47, 13 A.2d 
630, 638-39 (1940). While the court recognized the subject matter of the law as 
"undoubtedly a function of the government," id. at 235, 13 A.2d at 633, it nonetheless 
characterized it as a general law and not an appropriation, because the law's primary 
purpose was to change state policy by "creat[ing] or abolish[ing] an office, or [by] 
chang[ing] the salary, term or duty of an officer .... " !d. at 249, 13 A.2d at 639. The 
Dorsey court differentiated a law with the primary purpose of appropriating public 
funds from general legislation that may happen to contain an incidental provision for 
an appropriation, the latter of which would not defeat the law's referability. /d. at 
251, 13 A.2d at 640-41. 
125. See infra notes 127-45 and accompanying text; see also discussion supra Part I.D.2.b. 
126. See Doe, 428 Md. at 615, 53 A.3d at 1122. 
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courts generally focus on the "interdependency of the two acts." 127 
As set forth below, a litigant asserting this limitation on the right to 
referendum has a heavy burden. 
"Package analysis" appeared in Kelly v. Marylanders for Sports 
Sanity, Inc., where individuals opposing the construction of Camden 
Yards in Baltimore City undertook to petition two out of three related 
stadium bills to referendum. 128 The Secretary of State refused to 
accept the petitions, stating that the bills "fall within an exception to 
the referendum power and therefore may not be petitioned to a 
vote."129 
Suit was filed and the Kelly court analyzed each bill in tum, 
deeming one to contain both revenue and spending provisions, 
therefore rendering it an appropriation measure not subject to 
referendum; and, holding that the second neither raised revenue nor 
appropriated funds, thereby rendering it, in isolation, referable. 130 
The problem, however, was that a referendum on the referable bill 
would, if rejected by electorate, result in defeat of the appropriations 
bill as a practical matter. 131 The bills had been passed together to 
establish a common purpose and the court considered them as a 
"package" in light of "the form, the substance, [and] the legislative 
history" of the bills indicating that they were to "function in tandem 
as a unitary solution to" accomplish a singular objective. 132 The bills 
related to the same subject matter, were enacted during the same 
legislative session, and, were so mutually dependent upon each other 
that, to achieve their singular goal, they had to be read together. 133 
The end result, then, was that an otherwise referable bill came 
within the appropriations exception because it was considered as a 
part of an inseparable package of bills, one of which was an 
127. Jd. at 616, 53 A.3d at 1122. The court rejected an assertion that four municipal 
resolutions could be combined in Town of La Plata v. Faison-Rosewick, LLC, No 68, 
2013 WL 5354355 (Md. Sep. 25, 2013). 
128. 310 Md. 437,440, 44~7, 450, 530 A.2d 245, 246, 249, 251 (1987). Two separate 
petitions were circulated. 
129. Jd. at 447, 530 A.2d at 249; Camden Yards Stadium Legislative Package Not Subject 
to Referendum, supra note 35. The opponents then filed suit in the Circuit Court for 
Anne Arundel County, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of State 
to accept the petitions. Kelly, 310 Md. at 447, 530 A.2d at 249. 
130. Kelly, 310 Md. at 459-Ql, 530 A.2d at 255-57. 
131. See id. at 439-42, 472-73, 530 A.2d at 245-47, 262-Q3. 
132. Jd. at 473, 530 A.2d at 262-Q3. 
133. Id. at 473-74, 530 A.2d at 262-Q3. 
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appropriation measure. 134 The Kelly court's reasoning was that 
severing the two interdependent bills would "not just thwart the 
legislative design but ... would scuttle the entire project by fatally 
undermining its dominant purpose[.]"135 
In Doe, the court reached the opposite result (on markedly different 
facts) when it was asked to consider the Maryland Dream Act in pari 
materia with the Cade Funding Formula and future budget bills. 136 
While applying Kelly, and reiterating the need to read some bills "in 
pari materia to give the full effect to each statute[,]"137 the Doe court 
nonetheless declined to do so on the facts presented, holding that the 
three bills were not so interdependent that together, they "serve as a 
single solution to a single objective."138 The court observed that the 
three statutes "were each enacted separately, at different times, with 
different purposes, and are not in any way mutually dependent."139 
Similarly, in Citizens Against Slots at the Mall v. PPE Casino 
Resorts Maryland, LLC, 140 the court held that a local zoning 
ordinance authorizing video lottery facilities in Anne Arundel County 
could not be read in pari materia with article XIX of the Maryland 
Constitution, which "provided for licenses to operate video lottery 
terminals at five locations within the state 'for the primary purpose of 
raising revenue for"' education, public school construction, and other 
programs. 141 Again, the court observed that, unlike Kelly, the laws at 
issue "involved different 'legislative bodies, were not enacted' at the 
same time, and were never treated as a single package."142 
The court recognized that "many local zoning ordinances may have 
had a connection with a program under State law involving 
appropriations." 143 Yet, notwithstanding this potential relationship, 
the court specifically declined to permit this limited connection to 
"render a local zoning ordinance and ... [appropriations] law a single 
134. /d.; cf Town of La Plata v. Faison-Rosewick, LLC, No 68, 2013 WL 5354355 (Md. 
Sep. 25, 2013). 
135. !d. at 474, 530 A.2d at 263. 
136. Doe v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, 428 Md. 596, 607, 53 A.3d 1111, 1117 (2012). 
137. /d. at 613-16, 53 A.3d at 1121-22 (citing Whack v. State, 338 Md. 665, 673, 659 
A.2d 1347, 1350 (1995)); Applestein v. Mayor of Bait., 156 Md. 40, 54-55, 143 A. 
666,672 (1928). 
138. Doe, 428 Md. at 616, 53 A.3d at 1122. 
139. /d. at 615, 53 A.3d at 1122. 
140. 429 Md. 176, 55 A.3d 496 (2012). 
141. Citizens Against Slots at the Mall v. PPE Casino Resorts Md., LLC, 429 Md. 176, 
191-93, 55 A.3d 496, 505-07 (2012). 
142. !d. at 197, 55 A.3d at 509. 
143. !d. at 198, 55 A.3d at 510. 
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'package' for purposes of the referendum exception for appropriation 
acts."144 
3. The Emergency "Exception" 
Under article XVI, section 2 of the Maryland Constitution: 
The effective date of a law other than an emergency law 
may be extended as provided in Section 3(b) hereof. .... 
An emergency law shall remain in force notwithstanding 
such [referendum] petition, but shall stand repealed thirty 
days after having been rejected by a majority of the 
qualified electors voting thereon. No measure changing the 
salary of any officer, 145 or granting any franchise or special 
privilege, or creating any vested right or interest, shall be 
enacted as an emergency law. [emphasis added] 
The court has "consistently held that a legislative determination of 
emergency is conclusive and not reviewable."146 A finding of 
emergency, however, is not strictly a limitation on the right of 
referendum because an emergency bill "is not insulated from 
referendum ... , it simply remains in force ... until 30 days after it has 
144. /d. at 198-99,55 A.3d at 510; accord Town of La Plata v. Faison-Rosewick, LLC, No 
68, 2013 WL 5354355 (Md. Sep. 25, 2013). 
145. A person exercising "administrative non-legal duties" was deemed not to be an 
"officer." First Cont'l Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Dir., State Dep't of Assessments and 
Taxation, 229 Md. 293, 304-05, 183 A.2d 347, 352 (1962). 
146. Biggs v. Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Comm'n., 269 Md. 352, 355, 
306 A.2d 220, 222 (1973); Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. Buckley, 197 Md. 
203, 207-08, 78 A.2d 638, 641 (1951) ("We have held in a number of cases that, 
under these circumstances and under this wording of the Constitution, the courts have 
no power to pass upon the question whether there is an emergency if the Legislature 
has made the necessary declaration."); accord Hammond v. Lancaster, 194 Md. 462, 
476, 71 A.2d 474, 480 (1950) (the legislature's determination of an emergency "is not 
judicially reviewable"), quoting Norris v. Mayor and City Council of Bait., 172 Md. 
667, 686, 192 A. 531, 531 (1937). In Strange v. Levy, the court exercised the power 
to decide whether an emergency declaration was made under Maryland Constitution 
article XVI, on the one hand, or article III, section 31, and determined that it was 
made under the latter and therefore reviewable. 134 Md. 645, 107 A. 549 (1919). "If 
legislation comes within the purview of [article] XVI, it is for the Legislature and not 
for the courts to determine whether an emergency exists." First Cont'l Sav. & Loan 
Ass 'n, 229 Md. at 302, 183 A.2d at 351. 
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been rejected by a majority of the qualified voters ... voting thereon, 
should it be so rejected."147 
Certain types of laws cannot be deemed emergencies. 148 
Generically, they include those creating or abolishing an office, 
changing the term, salary, or duty of an office, granting a franchise or 
special privilege, or creating any vested right or interest. 149 · 
E. Common Law Exceptions 
The Maryland Court of Appeals has also referred to "necessarily 
implied exceptions" in article XVI, section 2, 150 and recognized a 
common law limitation on the right to referendum under the 
"redelegation prohibition."151 An article XVI referendum proceeds 
under a right "reserved" to the people; however, when the people 
have delegated legislative power to the General Assembly, the latter 
may not redelegate it to the people. 152 
147. Biggs. 269 Md. at 355, 306 A.2d at 222-23. In, Wilkinson v. McGill, the court wrote 
that "[a]rticle XVI of the [Maryland] Constitution does not apply to such [emergency] 
public local laws." 192 Md. 387, 390, 64 A.2d 266, 268 (1949). In Strange, the court 
held that article XVI did not apply to a public local law for a city, although 
subsequent to the enactment of municipal home rule that holding appears to be a dead 
letter. 134 Md. at 648, 107 A. at 550. 
148. MD. CONST., art. XVI,§ 2. 
149. /d. The exceptions apply only to laws under article XVI of the Maryland 
Constitution. Strange, 134 Md. at 645, 107 A. at 550. For an application of this 
exception to the Attorney General, see Hammond, 194 Md. at 477, 71 A.2d at 480 
(holding that additional duties placed on the Attorney General regarding the 
Subversive Activities Act of 1949 did not trigger operation of the non-referability 
provision). 
150. Bd. of Educ. v. Mayor of Frederick, 194 Md. 170, 178, 69 A.2d 912, 915 (1949) 
("These are the only specific exceptions, but this court has made a further exception. 
This exception is of those acts which, although local as distinguished from general, 
are confined in their operation to part of a county, and should, obviously, not be 
properly referred to all of the voters of a county, many of whom have no interest in 
them."); Dineen v. Rider, 152 Md. 343, 354, 136 A. 754, 758 (1927). 
151. Stop Slots MD 2008 v. State Bd. of Elections, 424 Md. 163, 186, 34 A.2d 1164, 1177 
(2012) (discussing the holding in Brawner which prohibited the General Assembly 
from requiring voter approval for a law to become effective); Smigiel v. Franchot, 410 
Md. 302, 311, 978 A.2d 687, 693 (2009) (citing Brawner v. Supervisors of Elections, 
141 Md. 586, 119 A. 250 (1922)); see also Legality of Referendum on Boundary 
Change, 67 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 279 (1982) (explaining that the General Assembly 
may not delegate power to make law). 
152. See Stop Slots, 424 Md. at 182-84, 34 A.3d at 1174-76; Smigiel, 410 Md. at 311-13, 
978 A.2d at 693-94; Legality of Referendum on Boundary Change, 67 Md. Op. Att'y 
Gen. 279, 290 (1982) ("It is firmly established that the General Assembly has the 
exclusive power to make laws in the State. That is, the power to legislate may not be 
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The United States Constitution also limits the right of 
referendum. 153 State constitutions cannot refer a proposed 
amendment of the United States Constitution to referendum. 154 In 
Leser, a man challenged the voter registration of two women on the 
grounds that U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIX, had not been 
properly ratified because some state legislatures lacked the power to 
do so. 155 The Leser court responded: "The referendum provisions of 
state constitutions and statutes cannot be applied consistently with the 
Constitution of the United States in the ratification or rejection of 
amendments to it."156 
Although home rule has rendered Strange v. Levy largely a 
historical artifact, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that article 
XVI of the Maryland Constitution does not apply to a public local 
law for a city. 157 That could also be viewed as a limitation on the 
referendum. 
F. Amendment or Repeal of a Referred Statute 
While it is not viewed as either an express or implied limitation on 
the right to referendum, the Maryland Court of Appeals has 
recognized the plenary power of the legislature to amend a referred 
bill prior to the referendum election. 158 As a practical matter, this 
delegated by the General Assembly to the people. . . . [T]he power . . . may not be 
[re]delegated.") (citations omitted). In Smigiel, the court held that the General 
Assembly "had the power to enact general legislation before, and contingent on, the 
adoption of constitutional amendment that it had proposed to the voters." Smigiel, 
410 Md. at 316, 978 A.2d at 695. The court re-affirmed this holding in Stop Slots, 
424 Md. at 169, 186,34 A.3d at 1167, 1177. At first blush, the general holding of 
Poise! v. Cash, 130 Md. 373, 375, 100 A. 364, 364 (1917), may appear to contradict 
the re-delegation doctrine, in that the court wrote that "it can not be questioned that 
the General Assembly had the power to submit the Act of 1916 to the approval of the 
voters of Carroll County," Poise!, 130 Md. at 375, 100 A. at 364. However, while not 
expressly stated, the statute prohibiting the sale of liquor in that county appears to 
have been a public local law. Id. 
153. See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221,227-29 (1920). 
154. See Leser v. Bd. of Registry, 139 Md. 46, 70-71, 114 A. 840, 847 (1921), ajf'd sub 
nom. Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922). 
155. Jd. at 52-53, 114 A. at 841. 
156. Jd. at 70-71 (quoting National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920)). 
157. Strange v. Levy, 134 Md. 645, 646, 107 A. 549, 550 (1919). 
158. First Cont'l Sav. & Loan Ass'n, Inc. v. Dir., State Dept. of Assessments and Taxation, 
229 Md. 293, 302, 183 A.2d 347, 351 (1962); Hitchins v. Mayor & City Council of 
Cumberland, 215 Md. 315, 325, 138 A.2d 359, 364 (1958) ("It has long been held that 
changes which might have the effect of defeating the purpose of a referendum are 
invalid .... [I]t is the general rule that a city may amend an ordinance pending a 
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power has to some degree impinged on the right of referendum. 159 
Thus, where a bill imposing new regulations on savings and loans 
was petitioned to referendum, and thereby suspended, the court held 
that the General Assembly had the power to enact a "bill identical in 
substance," with some variation, as an emergency measure. 160 
Because an emergency bill is not suspended by a referendum 
petition, 161 the second bill operated, as a practical matter, to suspend 
the suspension of the prior statute. 162 This was determined to be 
permissible. 163 
The court's rationale was straightforward. 164 It began with the 
proposition that the General Assembly's powers "are plenary except 
as restrained by the Federal or State Constitutions."165 It then noted 
that "[t]here is no provision in the Maryland Constitution forbidding 
the Legislature to act on the subject matter of a referred law either 
during the period between its referral and the vote thereon or after 
approval or rejection by the voters."166 Instead, article XVI, section 
2, expressly contemplates the enactment of emergency measures that 
cannot be suspended.167 
referendum under some circumstances, as . . . to avoid objections to the original 
ordinance."). Thus, an amendment that, for example, clarifies procedure is 
permissible. Hitchins, 215 Md. at 325, 138 A.2d at 364; David Potts, Strict 
Compliance, Substantial Compliance, and Referendum Petitions in Arizona, 54 ARIZ. 
L. REv. 329, 338-39 (2012) (explaining that under a provision that, unlike Maryland, 
exempts emergency legislation from the referendum, "even if legislation has been 
referred to the electorate, the legislature can effectively override a referral attempt if it 
then passes a conflicting emergency measure"). 
159. See First Cont'l Sav. & Loan Ass 'n., 229 Md. at 302, 183 A.2d at 351; Potts, supra 
note 158, at 339-39. 
160. First Cont'l Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 229 Md. at 299-303, 183 A.2d at 349-51 (discussing 
how the second bill was "identical in substance ... except that administration of the 
law was vested in the State Department of Assessments and Taxation," instead of a 
Board of Building, Savings and Loan Association Commissioners to be created by the 
suspended law). 
161. Mo. CONST. art. XVl, § 2. 
162. First Cont'l Sav. & Loan Ass 'n., 229 Md. at 302-03, 183 A.2d at 351. 
163. !d. 
164. See id. 
165. !d. at 302, 183 A.2d at 351 (citing Md. Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 228 
Md. 412, 439, 180 A.2d 656, 670 (1962)). 
166. !d. 
167. !d. The First Continental court relied in part on Hammond v. Lancaster, 194 Md. 462, 
469-70, 475-77, 71 A.2d 474, 477, 480-81 (1950), where the "Sedition and 
Subversive Activities" law was petitioned and suspended; however, the legislature's 
enactment of emergency legislation was held not to have deprived the voters of their 
right to stay the statute, and in part on Hitchins v. Mayor & City Council of 
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The court emphasized that, on the facts presented, "the right of 
referendum on the savings and loan regulatory law was not 
frustrated-only the right to suspend the operation of the law pending 
the vote thereon" was abrogated by the statutory amendment. 168 
Whether the holding would be extended beyond that context is an 
open question. A hypothetical scenario where amendments seriatim 
served to frustrate the right to referendum can, for example, be 
imagined. 169 Given the cost and difficulty of bringing a statute to 
referendum, 170 a post-referral amendment with small changes that 
would require a petition sponsor to engage in an entirely new and 
costly signature-gathering effort could be viewed as an undue burden 
on the right. 171 
After First Cant'! Sav. & Loan Ass 'n., the Attorney General issued 
a comprehensive opinion on the power of the General Assembly to 
repeal, amend, or replace a law petitioned to referendum. 172 He wrote 
that "[t]he Court of Appeals has never viewed the Referendum 
Article of the Constitution or similar provisions in municipal charters 
as creating an inflexible bar to additional legislative action with 
respect to a referred law."173 The Attorney General opined that the 
General Assembly may validly repeal a referred measure and it will 
then be removed from the ballot. 174 He concluded that the legislature 
may repeal a referred measure and reenact a law on the same matter 
"as long as it is done in good faith175 to accomplish proper and 
Cumberland, 215 Md. 315,325, 138 A.2d 359, 364 (1958), where it had held that the 
city "could effectively modify an ordinance after the filing of a referendum against it." 
First Cont'l Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 229 Md. at 303-04, 183 A.2d at 351-52. 
168. First Cont 'I Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 229 Md. at 304, 183 A.2d at 352. 
169. See id. at 299-303, 183 A.2d at 349-51. 
170. See infra Part II.A. 
171. See infra Part II.A.; supra notes158-67 and accompanying text. 
172. Power of Gen. Assembly to Repeal, Amend or Replace a Law Petitioned to 
Referendum, 62 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 405, 405 (1977). That opinion was favorably 
mentioned in Roskelly v. Lamone, 396 Md. 27, 31 n.6, 912 A.2d 658, 660 n.6 (2006) 
(discussing how if a referred statute is repealed in good faith, it should be removed 
from the ballot). 
173. Power of Gen. Assembly to Repeal, Amend or Replace a Law Petitioned to 
Referendum, 62 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 405, 406 (1977). 
174. /d. at 408 ("There would be no point in giving the opportunity to voters to kill a bill 
their elected representatives had already killed."). 
175. /d. at 406,409 (citing Hitchens v. City of Cumberland, 215 Md. 315,325, 138 A.2d 
359, 364 (1958), for the proposition that amending a referred ordinance "to avoid 
objections to the original ordinance" may be an example of good faith). The Attorney 
General cited Wicomico Cnty. v. Todd, 256 Md. 459, 467, 260 A.2d 328, 332 (1970), 
for the rule that "[g]ood faith and proper purpose have been found where the later 
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appropriate governmental ends .... " The opinion concluded, 
however, that "[t]he General Assembly may not repeal a referred law 
and reenact the same measure with the intention of frustrating the 
referendum process." 
A subsequent decision of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals 
may provide additional guidance. 176 In that case, the court held that 
an amendment to fix a significant defect in an annexation resolution 
was too substantial under annexation law and was impermissible. 177 
G. Are Advisory Referenda Permissible? 
There are two lines of authority regarding advisory referenda. 178 
One maintains that there cannot be an advisory referendum. 179 The 
other is tentative dicta that "it would appear to be constitutionally 
permissible to use a referendum to measure public opinion 
concerning a proposed Amendment .... "180 The tentative dicta was 
written in a challenge to the income tax. 181 
H Constitutional Procedures 
1. Date for Filing of a State Referendum Petition 
Under article XVI, section 2, a referendum petition must be filed 
with the Secretary of State before the first day "of June next after the 
enactment carries changes calculated to meet objections that produced the 
referendum .... " Power of Gen. Assembly to Repeal, Amend or Replace a Law 
Petitioned to Referendum, 62 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. 405, 407 (1977). He noted that 
Todd implied that an effort "merely to avoid the referendum" might fail. 
176. Town of New Market Frederick Cnty. v. Milrey, Inc.-FDI P'ship, 90 Md. App. 528, 
545-49, 602 A.2d 201, 210-12 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992). 
177. !d. The Milrey court held that the amendment was not properly enacted under the 
annexation law. !d. at 535,602 A.2d at 205. 
I 78. See infra note 179-80 and accompanying text. 
179. "Straw" votes are not authorized. Invalidity of Proposed Montgomery Cnty. Charter 
Amendment on Tax Increases, 1998 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 98-010, 1998 Md. AG 
Lexis 10 (1998); Local Straw Votes Not Permitted Absent Gen. Assemb. or Charter 
Authorization, 61 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 384, 388 (1976); accord Montgomery Cnty. v. 
Bd. of Supervisors of Elections, 311 Md. 512, 521-22, 536 A.2d 641, 646 (1986) 
(citing Levering v. Supervisors, 129 Md. 335,338-40,99 A. 360,361 (1916). 
180. Scott v. Comptroller, 105 Md. App. 215, 222,659 A.2d 341,344 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1995) (citing Spriggs v. Clark, 14 P.2d 667, 669, 673 (1932)). 
181. Scott, 105 Md. App. at 215, 218, 659 A.2d. at 341, 342; see also Pierre N. Leva!, 
Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv., 1249, 1250, 
1256-57 (2006). 
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session at which [the referred law] was passed .... " 182 Timing is 
crucial, and the time for petitioning is not extended if a statute does 
"not become fully implemented, operational, or effective" until a 
later date, even if that date is years later. 183 The court of appeals has 
deemed the June provision in section 2 "in mandatory form .... " 184 
2. Number of Signatures Required on State Referendum Petition 
The petition "shall be sufficient if signed by three percent of the 
qualified voters of the State of Maryland, 185 calculated upon the 
whole number of votes cast for Governor at the last preceding 
Gubernatorial election, of whom not more than half are residents of 
Baltimore City, or of any one County."186 Under specific 
circumstances, pages may be submitted in two "batches."187 
Signatures must be affixed after the referred act is passed. 188 
182. Mo. CONST. art. XVI, § 2. For a recent discussion of how to calculate the number of 
days, see Dan Friedman, "Counting the Days," The Daily Record, Sep. 30, 2013, 
discussing Hall v. P.G. Co. Democratic Cent. Comm., 431 Md. 108, 64 A.3d 210 
(2013). 
183. Abell v. Sec'y of State, 251 Md. 319, 327-30, 247 A.2d 258, 263-65 (1968) (holding 
that challenge to phase out of slot machines was filed five years too late) (citing Mills 
v. Agnew, 286 F. Supp. 107, 110 (D. Md. 1968); and Winebrenner v. Salmon, 155 
Md. 563, 565, 142 A. 723, 724 (1928), as well as nisi prius decisions). 
184. Abell, 251 Md. at 328-29, 247 A.2d at 264. 
185. The term "qualified voters" as used in the Prince George's County Charter was 
defined to mean persons who have the "present capacity to vote" and "therefore ... 
must be registered." Bd. of Supervisors of Elections v. Goodsell, 284 Md. 279, 285, 
396 A.2d 1033, 1036 (1979); Voter Who Meets Municipality's Qualifications For 
Voting At Time Petition Is Circulated May Sign Petition, 72 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 181, 
182 (1987) (interpreting the term "qualified voter" under MD. CONST. article 23A, 
section 19). 
186. Mo. CONST. art. XVI, § 3(a). There is a specific and different provision governing 
referenda on Public Local Laws. See Bd. of Educ. v. Mayor & Aldermen of 
Frederick, 194 Md. 170, 175, 177, 69 A.2d 912, 914-15 (1949) (describing what 
constitutes a public local law for purposes of Mo. CONST. article XVI, section 3(a)). 
187. MD. CONST. art. XVI, § 3(b); Roskelly v. Lamone, 396 Md. 27, 30-31, 912 A.2d 658, 
660-61 (2006). 
188. MD. CONST. art. XVI, § 3(d). Signatures must be affixed on a municipal annexation 
referendum petition after the referred act is passed. Koste v. Town of Oxford, 431 
Md. 14, 38, 63 A.3d 582, 597 (2013). The court noted that, if the General Assembly 
wished to permit earlier signature-gathering, it could do so by amending the 
annexation statute, article 23A, section 19. Id. 
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3. Contents of a State Referendum Petition 
The petition must contain the full text of the act or part thereof to 
be referred, or an accurate summary approved by the Attorney 
General. 189 An "affidavit of the person procuring those signatures," 
often called a "circulator's affidavit," must be "attached to each paper 
of signatures filed with a petition .... "190 The affiant must state "that 
the signatures were affixed in his [or her] presence and that, based 
upon the person's best knowledge and belief, every signature on the 
paper is genuine and bona fide and that the signers are registered 
voters at the address set opposite or below their names."191 
4. Date of the Referendum Election 
Pursuant to article XVI, section 2, a referendum question shall be 
submitted to the electorate "at the next ensuing election held 
throughout the State for Members of the House of Representatives of 
the United States."192 There has been no litigation over that timing 
provision m section 2, although an attempted legislative end run 
around the requirement for a referendum on constitutional 
189. MD. CONST. art. XVI,§ 4. It is not clear whether the Attorney General's approval is 
subject to challenge or review. The court of appeals has noted, in a different context 
"that the views of the Attorney General as to compliance with the requirements of 
[a]rticle XVI of the [Maryland] Constitution are advisory only .... " Barnes v. State, 
236 Md. 564, 575-76, 204 A.2d 787, 793 (1964) (discussing First Cont'l Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n, Inc. v. State Dep't of Assessments & Taxation, 229 Md. 293, 301, 183 A.2d 
347, 350 (1962)). 
190. MD. CONST. art. XVI, § 4. 
191. MD. CONST. art. XVI,§ 4. 
192. MD. CONST. art. XVI, § 2. U.S. CONST. Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 states: "The 
Times, Places and -Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, 
shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at 
any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing 
Senators." Pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 7 (2006): "The Tuesday next after the 1st Monday 
in November, in every even numbered year, is established as the day for the election, 
in each of the States and Territories of the United States, of Representatives and 
Delegates to the Congress commencing on the 3d day of January next thereafter." 
The Maryland provision for state and local elections mirrors the congressional 
language. MD. CONST. art. XVII, § 2 (calling for quadrennial elections "on the 
Tuesday next after the first Monday of November, in the year nineteen hundred and 
twenty-six, and on the same day in every fourth year thereafter"). See generally MD. 
CONST. Dec. of Rights, art. 7 ("That the right of the People to participate in the 
Legislature is the best security of liberty and the foundation of all free Government; 
for this purpose, elections ought to be free and frequent. ... "). 
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amendments "at the next ensuing General Election" under article 
XIV, section 1, has generated dispositive litigation. 193 
5. General Law v. Public Local Laws 
Generally, there are three classes of laws: special laws; local laws, 
and general laws. 194 Under article XVI, section 3, the number of 
signers necessary to refer a petition depends on the nature of the state 
law being petitioned: 
The referendum petition against an Act or part of an Act 
passed by the General Assembly, shall be sufficient if 
signed by three percent of the qualified voters ofthe State of 
Maryland, calculated upon the whole number of votes cast 
for Governor at the last preceding Gubernatorial election, of 
whom not more than half are residents of Baltimore City, or 
of any one County. 195 
However, any Public Local Law for any one County or the 
City of Baltimore, shall be referred by the Secretary of State 
only to the people of the County or City of Baltimore, upon 
a referendum petition of ten percent of the qualified voters 
of the County or City of Baltimore, as the case may be, 
calculated upon the whole number of votes cast respectively 
for Governor at the last preceding Gubernatorial election. 196 
193. Mo. CONST. art XIV, § I; Cohen v. Governor of Md., 255 Md. 5, 7, 255 A.2d 320, 
321 (1969). Cohen provides a comprehensive analysis of the differences between a 
special election and a general election. In Cohen, the operative constitutional 
provision, article XIV, section I, provided for the referendum at the next ensuing 
general election. The General Assembly essentially sought to create a general 
election by statute. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that referring to a special 
election as a general election did not change the function and that substance, not the 
nomenclature, was dispositive./d. at 21, 255 A.2d at 328. 
194. Funk v. Mullan, 197 Md. 192,200-01, 78 A.2d 632,637 (1951). 
195. Mo. CONST. art. XVI, § 3(a). This provision is intended to mandate geographic 
diversity. Phifer v. Diehl, 175 Md. 364, 367, I A.2d 617, 618 (1938). Its 
requirements are not met if less than half of the signatures are submitted early and the 
full amount later; half must be submitted by the deadline. !d. at 368, I A.2d at 618. 
196. Mo. CONST. art. XVI § 3(a). 
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This has led to litigation defining what constitutes a public local 
law. 197 In Cole v. Sec 'y of State, the legislature enacted a bill 
transferring jurisdiction from justices of the peace and trial 
magistrates to the Peoples Court of Cecil County, a court created by 
the act. 198 A petition was submitted with insufficient signatures to 
bring a general law to referendum but with an amount sufficient to 
bring a public local law to referendum. 199 The Secretary of State 
deemed the statute a general law and rejected the petition.200 The 
court of appeals reversed, holding that: "The classification of a 
particular statute as general or local is based on subject matter and 
substance and not merely on form."201 Although enacted under 
Maryland Constitution article IV, section 41B,202 the court deemed 
the act to be local in nature. 203 
197. Cole v. Sec'y of State, 249 Md. 425, 428, 240 A.2d 272, 274 (1968); Ness v. Ennis, 
162 Md. 529, 536-37, 160 A. 8, 11 (1932) (overruling Levering v. Bd. Of 
Supervisors, 129 Md. 335, 99 A. 360 (1916)). In Steuart Petrol. Co. v. Bd. ofCnty. 
Comm 'rs, 276 Md. 435, 445, 347 A.2d 854, 860 (1975), the court rejected an 
argument that a referendum on an environmental amendment to article 66B, section 
4.0l(e), which was applicable only to one county, was prohibited "zoning by 
plebiscite" and held that the statute in question was a public local law and, therefore, 
referable. 
198. Cole, 249 Md. at 426-27,240 A.2d at 273. 
199. !d. at 427,240 A.2d at 273. 
200. !d. at 428, 240 A.2d at 274. 
201. !d. at 433, 240 A.2d at 277. The court wrote "that local laws differ from general laws 
only in that they are confined in their operation to certain prescribed or definite 
territorial limits .... " !d. (citation omitted). The Attorney General has explained the 
distinction. Sufficiency Determination Concerning a Referendum on a Public Local 
Law Enacted by the General Assembly is to be Made by State Officials, 85 Md. Op. 
Att'y Gen. 120 nn.3--4 (2000); Steimel v. Bd. of Election Supervisors, 278 Md. 1, 2-
3, 357 A.2d 386, 387 (1976) (stating that a statute applicable only to single county 
was a public local law, even though it repealed a general law, and was therefore 
subject to referendum); Kent Island Defense League, LLC v. Queen Anne's Cnty. Bd. 
of Elections, 145 Md. App. 684, 692,806 A.2d 341, 346 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. 
denied, 371 Md. 615 (2002) (holding that environmental ordinances were not public 
local laws that were referable in code county); 67 Op. Att'y Gen. 279 (1982) 
(collecting cases holding that public local law, but not general law, may be committed 
to referendum by act of the General Assembly). 
202. Cole, 249 Md. at 426-27, 240 A.2d at 273. 
203. !d. at 435, 240 A.2d at 278. Mo. CONST. article XVI, section 3(b) provides for a two-
stage filing. If more than one-third of the signatures required to complete the petition 
are filed before June I st, the time for the statute to take effect and the date for filing 
the balance of the signatures is extended to June 30th. 
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6. Proclamation of the Result of the Election 
With the exception of emergency legislation, a referred law "shall 
not become a law or take effect until thirty days after its approval by 
a majority of the electors voting thereon .... "204 Under Maryland 
Constitution, article XVI, section 5(b ): 
The votes cast for and against any such referred law shall be 
returned to the Governor in the mariner prescribed with 
respect to proposed amendments to the Constitution under 
Article XIV of this Constitution, and the Governor shall 
proclaim the result of the election, and, if it shall appear that 
the majority of the votes cast on any such measure were cast 
in favor thereof, the Governor shall by his proclamation 
declare the same having received a majority of the votes to 
have been adopted by the people of Maryland as a part of 
the laws of the State, to take effect thirty days after such 
election, and in like manner and with like effect the 
Governor shall proclaim the result of the local election as to 
any Public Local Law which shall have been submitted to 
the voters of any County or of the City ofBaltimore.205 
I. Rules of Construction for Interpretation of Article XVI 
By its terms, article XVI is self-executing;206 and the court of 
appeals has noted that: "[h ]ow it shall be ascertained whether these 
constitutional requirements have been met by petitions filed, the 
referendum article has not prescribed."207 Curiously, although article 
204. Mo. CONST. art. XVI, § 2. 
205. Mo. CONST. art. XVI, § 5. 
206. Mo. CONST. art. XVI, § !(b). Although article XVI is "self-executing," section 4 
provides that: "The General Assembly shall prescribe by law the form of the petition, 
the manner for verifying its authenticity, and other administrative procedures which 
facilitate the petition process and which are not in conflict with this Article." Mo. 
CONST. art. XVI, § 4. Thus, even though the constitutional provision is immediately 
and directly operative, implementing statutes are mandatory. The self-executing 
provision was intended to address "the fear that the legislature would refuse to enact, 
or once enacted might repeal, the simple mechanical regulations necessary for the 
referendum." FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 270. 
207. Sun Cab Co. v. Cloud, 162 Md. 419, 422, 159 A. 922, 923 (1932). Article XVI, 
section 4, directs the General Assembly to enact implementing legislation, which it 
has done. Mo. CaNST. art. XVI, § 4 ("The General Assembly shall prescribe by law 
the form of the petition, the manner for verifying its authenticity, and other 
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XVI was ratified in 1915, the implementing legislation was not 
enacted until 1941.208 
The purpose of article XVI would "be furthered if, by proper and 
reasonable means, a referendum petition is to be put upon the ballot 
only if it has the requisite number of genuine signatures of registered 
voters."209 Thus, article XVI is to be construed "in the light of its 
origin, the purpose it was intended to serve, as well as the evils it was 
intended or supposed to remedy."210 It is presumed to contain 
"careful and measured terms .... "211 The court of appeals has 
written that a "useful key" to its interpretation is to "inquire[] [ w ]hat 
were the evils to be removed, and what remedy did the new 
instrument propose[.]"212 The court has clearly delineated those evils: 
When article 16 is examined in the light of this accepted 
principle it is not difficult to ascertain its meaning and its 
limitations. From the establishment of the first Constitution 
of Maryland-and it might be said before that date -until 
the adoption of this Article its people had lived under a well 
recognized form of representative self-government. This 
principle of representation had its beginning in the early 
legal institutions of England, and was brought to America 
by the colonists. It was incorporated in the governmental 
systems of all the colonies, and subsequently found its way 
into the constitutions of the respective States, as well as into 
the Constitution of the United States. It was for many years 
looked upon as one of the great principles of popular 
government, and as necessary and indispensable for the 
preservation of civil order and popular liberty. After the 
close of the Civil War great abuses began to creep into 
legislation and into the administration of the National and 
administrative procedures which facilitate the petition process and which are not in 
conflict with this Article."). 
208. Howard Cnty. Citizens for Open Gov't. v. Howard Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 201 Md. 
App. 605, 616-18, 30 A.3d 245, 252-53 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011) (citing 1941 Md. 
Laws 539-40). 
209. Barnes v. State, 236 Md. 564, 571, 204 A.2d 787, 791 (1964); accord Burroughs v. 
Raynor, 56 Md. App. 432,440,468 A.2d 141, 144-45 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983). 
210. Beall v. State, 131 Md. 669,676, 103 A. 99, 102 (1917); accord Doe v. Md. State Bd. 
of Elections, 428 Md. 596, 608, 53, A.3d II II, 1118 (2012); Whitley v. Md. State Bd. 
of Elections, 429 Md. 132, 149, 55 A.3d 37, 47 (2012); Kelly v. Marylanders for 
Sports Sanity, Inc., 310 Md. 437,450-51,530 A.2d 245,251 (1987). 
211. Beall, 131 Md. at 680, 103 A. at I 02. 
212. /d. at 676-77, 103 A. at 102. 
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State governments. Their greatest expansion and evil 
influences were more marked, perhaps, between the years 
1880 and 1900. They were alleged to have grown out of the 
control by corrupt methods of legislation and administration 
by great corporations and a group of individuals in each 
State who had taken into their hands the machinery of each 
of the great political parties. In this way and by these 
methods it was charged that the government, in all its 
departments, was prostituted to corrupt and selfish purposes. 
To remedy these evils it was proposed by some to abolish 
the principle of representation, and to introduce the principle 
of direct legislation by the people; by others to modify the 
principle of representation by incorporating into the organic 
law the referendum, together with certain other plans with 
which we are not here concerned. These proposals promised 
much, and found favor with a number of States which have 
adopted them in their organic law. 213 
691 
In short, article XVI was drafted as a potent anti-corruption measure 
to change or supplement the fundamental structure of government as 
to matters within its scope.214 
The court applies the same rules of construction to article XVI that 
are applicable to statutory interpretation.215 In a recent decision/16 
interpreting constitutional and statutory provisions of the election 
laws, albeit not the referendum, a plurality of the court of appeals 
outlined the parameters governing construction of those provisions. 
It is "axiomatic" that the words used "should be given the 
construction that effectuates the intent of the framers" and that "intent 
is first sought from the terminology used in the provision, with each 
213. /d. at 677-78, 103 A. at I 02. 
214. Addressing the right to referendum under a county charter, the court of appeals 
described the referendum as "a fundamental feature of the overall structure of county 
government." Ritchmount P' ship v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections for Anne Arundel 
Cnty., 283 Md. 48, 61, 388 A.2d 523, 532 (1978) ("[R]eferendum by petition [is] 
quite clearly a power affecting the form or structure of government. ... "); Doe v. Md. 
State Bd. of Elections, 428 Md. 596, 608, 53 A.3d 1111, 1118 (2012) (finding that 
referendum supplements representative government). 
215. Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604, 861 A.2d 78, 81 (2004) (citing Fish Market 
Nominee Corp. v. G.A.A., Inc., 337 Md. 1, 8, 650 A.2d 705, 708 (1994)); see also 
Whitley, 429 Md. at 149, 55 A.3d at 47. 
216. Abrams v. Lamone, 398 Md. 146, 150, 172-75, 919 A.2d 1223, 1225, 1239-40 
(2007) (plurality opinion) (concerning the constitutional qualifications for the 
Attorney General of Maryland). 
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word being · given its ordinary and popularly understood 
meaning .... "217 If those words are clear and unambiguous, they 
will be given effect as written, without the need to resort to external 
rules of construction.218 Forced and subtle constructions that limit or 
extend the provision's application are to be avoided.219 Language 
will neither be added nor deleted by the court.220 It has been 
suggested that general administrative law decisions may not be 
applicable in the context of the statutory referendum process.221 
The court has noted that, while "the principles of the constitution 
are unchangeable," when they are interpreted, they may be applied 
"to changes in the economic, social, and political life of the people 
which the framers did not and could not foresee."222 The plurality 
observed: 
In determining the true meaning of the language used, the 
courts may consider the mischief at which the provision was 
aimed, the remedy, the temper and spirit of the people at the 
217. !d. at 173, 919 A.2d at 1239 (quoting Brown v. Brown, 287 Md. 273, 277-78,412 
A.2d 396, 398-99 (1980)). 
218. !d. at 173-74, 919 A.2d at 1240 (quoting Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 537, 
873 A.2d 1122, 1134 (2005)). See generally Jack Schwartz & Amanda Starem Cone, 
The Court of Appeals at the Cocktail Party: The Use and Misuse of Legislative 
History, 54 Mo. L. REV. 432, 446-53, 461-62 (1995) (describing various ways in 
which the court of appeals uses legislative history in statutory construction). 
219. Abrams, 398 Md. at 174,919 A.2d at 1240 (quoting Price v. State, 378 Md. 378,387, 
835 A.2d 1221, 1226 (2003); Condon v. State of Md.-Univ. of Md., 332 Md. 481, 
491,632 A.2d 753,758 (1993)). 
220. !d. at 174,919 A.2d at 1240. Although home rule has rendered it a historical artifact, 
Mayor & City Council of Bait. v. Bd. of Supervisors. of Elections of Bait. City, 156 
Md. 196, 143 A. 800 (1928), is illustrative of the court's approach to constitutional 
interpretation. At that time, Mo. CaNST. article 11, section 7, provided that Baltimore 
City could create debt, if: 1) authorized by the General Assembly; 2) authorized by a 
City ordinance; and, 3) approved by a majority of the voters. !d. at 197, 143 A. at 
800-01. In an effort to avoid delay and the cost of a special election, the City passed 
a debt ordinance before the General Assembly authorized it, and the City ordinance 
provided for a referendum, subject to later action by the General Assembly. !d. at 
197-98, 143 A. at 801. While the City's approach was logical, it was rejected by the 
court, stating that the City's view "finds no support in the literal terms of the 
[constitutional] requirement." !d. at 198, 143 A. at 801. 
221. Doe v. Montgomery Co. Bd. of Elections, 406 Md. 697, 742, 962 A.2d 342, 368 
(2008) (Adkins, J., dissenting). 
222. Abrams, 398 Md. at 185, 919 A.2d at 1247 (quoting Norris v. Mayor & City Council 
ofBalt., 172 Md. 667,675, 192 A. 531,535 (1937) (voting machines are included the 
statutory term "ballot," even though the machines did not exist when the statute was 
enacted)). 
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time it was framed, the common usage well known to the 
people, and the history of the growth or evolution ... [and 
the] long continued contemporaneous construction by 
officials charged with the administration of the government, 
and especially by the Legislature.223 
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Thus, the Maryland Court of Appeals "is not averse to looking at 
the evolution in circumstances," and it is "permissible to inquire into 
the . . . contemporary history of the people, the circumstances 
attending the adoption of the organic law, as well as broad 
considerations of expediency."224 However, the court will not give a 
provision a different meaning that would make it "more workable, or 
more consistent with a litigant's view of good public policy, or more 
in tune with modem times, or [on the theory] that the framers of the 
provision did not actually mean what they wrote.'m5 Nor will it 
construe constitutional provisions "as to make that provision 'absurd 
or unworkable. "'226 If the burden imposed by a referendum provision 
is constitutional, the court will not construe it in a way to reduce the 
burden; that is the province of the General Assembly.227 
Construction is also impacted by constitutional parameters: "Once 
the right of referendum has been created, [its] exercise. . . is 
protected by the First Amendment . . . . Thus, a State may not 
impermissibly burden the exercise of the right to petition the 
government by ... referendum.''228 Obviously, however, regulation 
is permitted and the Supreme Court has stated: 
223. !d. at 185, 919 A.2d at 1247 (alteration in original); accord Doe v. Md. State Bd. of 
Elections, 428 Md. 596, 53 A.3d 1111 (2012). 
224. Abrams, 398 Md. at 186, 188, 919 A.2d at 1248 (quoting Brown v. Brown, 287 Md. 
273, 278,412 A.2d 396, 399 (1980)). 
225. !d. at 175,919 A.2d at 1241 (quoting Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 537, 873 
A.2d 1122, 1134 (2005)). 
226. !d. at 187, 919 A.2d at 1248 (quoting Montgomery Cnty. Comm'rs v. Supervisors of 
Elections of Montgomery Cnty., 192 Md. 196, 208, 63 A.2d 735, 740 (1948)). 
227. See Ferguson v. Sec'y of State, 249 Md. 510, 517, 240 A.2d 232, 236 (1968) ("If the 
burden is too heavy, the remedy is by an appropriate amendment to Article XVI."); 
Abell v. Sec'y of State, 251 Md. 319, 331, 247 A.2d 258, 265 (1968) (quoting 
Ferguson, 249 Md. at 517, 240 A.2d at 236). Roskelly v. Lamone, 396 Md. 27, 47-
48, 50, 912 A.2d 658, 670, 672 (2006), provides a recent example setting forth the 
considerations for construing the timeliness provisions of MD. CONST. art. XVI. 
228. Kendall v. Howard Cnty. Md., Civil No. JFM-09-660, 2009 WL 3418585, at *4 (D. 
Md. Oct. 20, 2009) (citation omitted), aff'd sub nom, Kendall v. Balcerzak, 650 F.3d 
515 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 402 (2011). Issues such as the right to 
sign a petition are beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., Annie Linskey, Galludet 
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Petition circulation, we held, is "core political speech," 
because it involves "interactive communication concerning 
political change." [citation omitted]. First Amendment 
protection for such interaction, we agreed, is "at its zenith." 
[citation omitted] We have also recognized, however, that 
"there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they 
are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather 
than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes."229 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE ELECTION LAW ARTICLE AND 
REGULATIONS GOVERNING STATE REFERENDA 
A. The Election Law Article and Regulations Governing Referenda 
Title 6 of the election law article of the Annotated Code of 
Maryland "applies to any petition authorized by law to place the 
name of an individual or a question on the ballot or to create a new 
political party."230 "Title 6 is the latest incarnation of a group of 
statutes that has been rewritten and/or recodified several times over 
the years, often without complete consistency or harmony .... "231 
"Sections 6-203 and 6-207 have been amended both recently and 
frequently .... "232 
Subtitle 1 contains definitions233 and general provisions. Subtitle 2 
addresses the substantive content and process of petitions.234 Both 
titles provide what are essentially mechanical checklists.235 
The court has held that the predecessor of Title 6 did not create an 
independent right to refer legislation and "[i]t was not the purpose of 
[the general provisions of the elections law] to admit indiscriminately 
Official Suspended for Signing Anti-Gay Marriage Petition, BALT. SUN, Oct. 12, 
2012, at 3. 
229. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 186-87 (1999) (citations 
omitted). 
230. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW§ 6-102(a) (LexisNexis 2010). See generally Whitely v. 
Md. State Bd. of Elections, 429 Md. 132, 141-44, 55 A.3d 37, 42-44 (2012) 
(describing relevant statutory provisions). 
231. Doe v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections, No. 293857-V, 2008 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 
7, at *13 (Jul. 28, 2008), rev'd on other grounds, 406 Md. 697, 962 A.2d 342 (2008). 
232. Doe v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 406 Md. 697, 731 n.24, 962 A.2d 342, 
362 n.24 (2008). 
233. ELEC. LAW§ 6-101 to -103. Code of Maryland Regulations (COMAR) adopts many 
of the statutory definitions of ELEC. LAW § 6-101 and incorporates them into the 
regulations verbatim. See MD. CODE REGS. 33.06.01 (2010). 
234. ELEC. LAW§§ 6-201 to -211. 
235. See id. §§ 6-101 to -103,6-201 to -211. 
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to a place on the official ballots, every issue which any county or 
municipality of the State might propose to have submitted to a vote of 
the people."236 While it applies to state and county referenda, by its 
terms, Title 6 does not directly apply to municipal petitions.237 
Section 6-103 authorizes SBE to adopt regulations "consistent with 
this title, to carry out provisions of this title"238 and regulations have 
been adopted.239 SBE is also authorized to prepare guidelines and 
instructions, and design and print sample forms.240 As set forth 
below, it has done both.241 
1. Content of Petitions 
Pursuant to section 6-201 of the election law article, a petition shall 
contain an information page and signature pages containing the total 
number of signatures mandated by law. 242 A petition that fails to 
comport with the statutory standard may be invalidated.243 
236. Levering v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections of Bait. City, 129 Md. 335, 338, 99 A. 
360, 361 (1916). 
237. ELEC. LAW§§ 1-101(v)(3), 6-102(b); Town of La Plata v. Faison-Rosewick, LLC, No 
68, 2013 WL 5354355 (Md. Sept. 25, 2013) (state law does not apply to municipal 
annexation referendum); see Culp v. Comrn'rs ofChestertown,154 Md. 620,622, 141 
A. 410, 412 (1928) (stating that the Mo. CONST. art. XVI, "makes no provision for a 
referendum to the voters of any city of the state other than Baltimore City, or any rural 
section of the state of a less extent than a county"). 
238. ELEC. LAW§ 6-103(a). 
239. CODE Mo. REGS. 33.06.01-.02, 33.08.0l.ll.B, D (regarding certification of official 
referendum returns). 
240. ELEC. LAW § 6-103(b). COMAR requires that forms be adopted. Mo. CODE REGS. 
33.06.01.02. COMAR also permits a sponsor to use its own forms, if they comply 
with the statutory and regulatory requirements, contain all of the required information, 
and are approved by the election authorities. /d. at 33.06.01.02(0). The latter 
provision, which may have free speech implications, has never been challenged in a 
Maryland appellate court. 
241. See MD. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, PROCEDURES FOR FILING A STATEWIDE ORA PUBLIC 
LOCAL LAW REFERENDUM PETITION 4-11 (20 11 ), available at 
http://www.elections.state.md.us/pdf/6-201-3a.pdf. See, e.g., Montgomery Cnty. Vol. 
Fire-Rescue Ass'n. v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 418 Md. 463,473-80, 15 
A.3d 798, 804-08 (2011) (discussing the revised "State of Maryland Petition 
Acceptance and Verification Procedures: State Wide or Public Local Law 
Referendum Petition"). 
242. ELEC. LAW§ 6-201(a). 
243. See, e.g., City of Takoma Park v. Citizens for Decent Gov't, 301 Md. 439, 449-50, 
483 A.2d 348, 354 (1984) (holding that a referendum petition was invalid because it 
did not properly advise the voters, which violated a mandatory provision under 
Maryland law). 
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a. The Information Page 
The code requires that the information page shall contain a 
description of the subject and purpose of the petition, identify the 
sponsor/44 and, if the sponsor is an organization, the person who is to 
receive notices from the election board,245 the required information 
relating to the signatures, the required affidavit executed by the 
sponsor, and any other information mandated by COMAR.246 The 
regulatory requirements are detailed.247 COMAR mandates that the 
information page indicate that "the petition satisfies all requirements 
for the: (1) Time of signing and filing, and (2) Number and 
geographic distribution of signatures."248 Obviously, one key 
function of the information page is to provide a "contact point" for 
the administrative agency. 
b. Signature Pages 
By statute, each signature page shall contain a description of the 
subject and purpose of the petition.249 A ballot question petition must 
include either a fair and accurate summary of the substantive 
provisions of the proposal or the full text of it. 250 If the sponsor elects 
to print a summary of the question, the circulator must have the full 
244. COMAR sets forth the identifying information required, such as name, mailing 
address, telephone number, fax number, and any email address. Mo. CODE REGs. 
33.06.02.03. 
245. Id. at 33.06.02.03(C)(2). 
246. COMAR provides that every petition, including the information page and signature 
page, shall conform to its requirements. Mo. CODE REGS. 33.06.01.02. Under some 
circumstances, the information page may be amended: "Subsequent to the filing of a 
petition under this subtitle, but prior to the deadline for filing the petition, additional 
signatures may be added to the petition by filing an amended information page and 
additional signature pages conforming to the requirements of this subtitle." ELEC. 
LAW§ 6-205(d). 
247. MD. CODE REGS. 33.06.02.02 (2011). 
248. ld. at 33.06.04.04(8). 
249. ELEC. LAW§ 6-20l(c)(2). 
250. ld. § 6-201(c)(2). The importance of the full-text requirement was emphasized in 
Koste v. Town of Oxford, 431 Md. 14, 37,63 A.3d 582,596 (2013) ("The law favors 
seemingly a presumption that voters will inform themselves fully of all accessible 
information before making a decision .... A corollary to the presumption that voters 
will inform themselves fully when making a decision is that voters will not be 
informed fully when making a decision without having access to all pertinent 
information."). 
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text available at the time of signing and the signature page must state 
that the full text is available.251 
The signature page must include a statement that the signer 
supports the purpose of the petition and, based on the signer's 
information and belief, the signer is a registered voter in the county 
specified on the page252 and is eligible to have his or her signature 
counted. 253 It must contain spaces for signatures and the required 
signer's information.254 The regulations mandate that the spaces be 
labeled.255 The code mandates that there be "a space for the required 
affidavit made and executed by the circulator,"256 and any other 
information required by regulation.257 
Signature pages must meet the statutory requirements before any 
signature is affixed and at all "relevant times thereafter."258 SBE has 
prepared form signature pages and made them available on its web 
site.259 
Regulations applicable to signature pages include each statutory 
requirement/60 and some "house-keeping" requirements, such as one-
sided printing, 261 and similar descriptions for the information page 
and signature pages.262 They also require a circulator to include a zip 
code, and that requirement is the subject of a pending constitutional 
challenge. 263 
251. !d. § 6-201 (d). 
252. Id. § 6-201(c)(5) (requiring that a signature page must contain a space for the name of 
the county). 
253. Id. § 6-201(c)(3). 
254. Id. § 6-201(c)(4). 
255. MD. CODE REGS. 33.06.03.06(A) (2011). 
256. ELEC. LAW§ 6-201(c)(6). 
257. Id. § 6-201(c)(7). 
258. Id. § 6-201(e). 




260. E.g., Mo. CODE REGS. 33.06.03.0l(A), .02B to .03 (specification of county), Mo. 
CODE REGS. 33.06.03.05 (statement of support and eligibility). 
261. Id. at 33.06.03.02(A). 
262. Id. at 33.06.03.04(8). 
263. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 35 v. Montgomery Cnty., No. 132 (Sept. Term 2011), 
427 Md. 522, 50 A.3d 8 (2012) (per curiam order). The issues presented in that 
appeal were: "1) Is an error in the address information in the sworn circulator 
affidavits fatal to petition pages containing that error? 2) Does Tyler v. Secretary of 
State require a circuit court to invalidate each and every signature on an 'imperfect' 
petition page? 3) Is it constitutional to invalidate petition signatures for 'imperfect' 
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The signature page must reasonably advise voters what act or part 
of an act is to be suspended pending a referendum. 264 There must be 
"a clear, unambiguous and understandable statement of the full and 
complete nature of the issues undertaken to be included in the 
proposition,"265 with sufficient clarity and objectivity to permit an 
average voter to exercise an intelligent choice in a meaningful way.266 
Representations made to the voters by the petition sponsors, even if 
made only indirectly, have been judicially enforced. 267 
2. Advance Determinations 
Pursuant to election law, section 6-202: "The format of the petition 
prepared by a sponsor may be submitted to the chief election official 
of the appropriate election authority, in advance of filing the petition, 
for a determination of its sufficiency."268 A request for such a 
determination must be made within the time prescribed.269 
The importance of an advance determination becomes apparent if 
signature pages are filed. 270 At the time of filing, as set forth in Part 
II.A.7 below, the election official must determine if the petition is 
sufficient.271 That determination "may not be inconsistent with an 
advance determination made under [section] 6-202 of this subtitle."272 
information from a circulator? 4) Is a challenge to a Board of Elections decision 
subject to the rules and tenets of judicial review of an agency decision? 5) Did the 
circuit court err in fmding that Montgomery County, Maryland, lacked standing?" 
264. City of Takoma Park v. Citizens for Decent Gov't, 301 Md. 439,450, 483 A.2d 348, 
354 (1984). 
265. Stop Slots Md. 2008 v. State Bd. of Elections, 424 Md. 163, 189, 34 A.3d 1164, 1179 
(2012) (quoting Anne Arundel Cnty. v. McDonough, 277 Md. 271, 300, 354 A.2d 
788, 805 (1976)). 
266. !d. 
267. See, e.g., Ficker v. Denny, 326 Md. 626, 633, 606 A.2d 1060, 1063 (1992) (explaining 
that petition sponsors have an obligation to put a measure on the ballot when they 
have indicated that will be the outcome if the requisite number of signatures are 
gathered). 
268. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW§ 6-202(a) {LexisNexis 2010). 
269. !d. § 6-210(a){l). The election authority must make the determination within five 
business days. !d. § 6-210(a)(2). The sponsor must be notified within two business 
days. !d. § 6-210(b). 
270. See id. § 6-206{d) (stating that determinations must be consistent with any advance 
determinations at the time of filing). 
271. !d.§ 6-206(b). 
272. !d. § 6-206(d). 
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Although the election official is bound by the advance determination, 
a private litigant challenging the form of the signature page is not.273 
3. When Can Signatures Be Gathered and Affixed? 
The Maryland Constitution provides that: "Signatures on a petition 
for referendum on an Act or part of an Act may be signed at any time 
after the Act or part of an Act is passed."274 The Attorney General 
has opined that petitions may be circulated after a bill has been 
enacted by the General Assembly, even if it has not been presented to 
the Governor.275 Thus, signature by the Governor is not a 
precondition to circulation and signing.276 The Attorney General 
concluded that once the last house of the General Assembly acts, 
signature-gathering may commence.277 
In Town of Oxford v. Koste, 278 municipal petition sponsors gathered 
petition signatures before the final enactment of the annexation 
resolution that was being ~etitioned to referendum.279 The court held 
that was impermissible.2 ° Koste presented an issue under the 
annexation statute. 281 
273. See, e.g., Ficker v. Denny, 326 Md. 626, 629-30, 635, 606 A.2d 1060, 1061-62, 1064 
(1992). 
274. Mo. CONST. art. XVI, § 3(d). 
275. Referendum Petitions May Be Circulated for Signature and Filed Before Presentment, 
63 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 157, 166 (1978); see also Mo. CONST. art. XVI, § 3(b) ("If 
more than one-third, but less than the full number of signatures required to complete 
any referendum petition against any law passed by the General Assembly, be filed 
with the Secretary of State before the first day of June, the time for the law to take 
effect and for filing the remainder of signatures to complete the petition shall be 
extended to the thirtieth day of the same month, with like effect."); Selinger v. 
Governor ofMd., 266 Md. 431,437,293 A.2d 817, 820 (1972) ("A better solution 
might be found if the constitutional provision could be modified to provide that one-
half of the required signatures be filed within 30 days from the date when the 
Governor signs a bill, the other one-half to be filed within the 30 days next 
following."). The referendum is on an act, or part, "passed" by the General Assembly 
and under article XVI, section 3(c), "passed" "means any final action upon any Act or 
part of an Act by both Houses of the General Assembly; and 'enact' or 'enacted' 
means approval of an Act or part of an Act by the Governor." Mo. CONST. art.,§ 3(c). 
276. Referendum Petitions May Be Circulated for Signature and Filed Before Presentment, 
63 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 157, 165-66 (1978). 
277. !d. 
278. No.4, 2013 WL 1197204 (Md. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2013). 
279. !d. at * 1. 
280. !d.. 
281. Mo. CODE ANN., art. 23A, § 19. 
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4. Signature Requirements 
a. The Statutory Requirements for a Verified Signature 
The right to sign a petition "is an individual one which can only be 
exercised by the signer."282 The statutorily-mandated requirements 
governing signatures by electors are precise: 
(a) In generaL-To sign a petition, an individual shall: 
(1) sign the individual's name as it appears on the statewide 
voter registration list or the individual's surname of 
registration and at least one full given name and the initials 
of any other names; and 
(2) include the following information, printed or typed, in 
the spaces provided: 
(i) the signer's name as it was signed; 
(ii) the signer's address; 
(iii) the date of signing; and 
(iv) other information required by regulations adopted by 
the State Board. 283 
Regulations require that the signer provide a "[ c ]urrent residence 
address, including house number, street name, apartment number (if 
applicable), town, and zip code."284 
"The statute affords the signer four options in signing the petition. 
The signer can: (1) sign his/her name on the petition as it appears on 
his/her voter registration card; (2) sign his/her full first, middle and 
last names; (3) sign his/her full first name, middle initial, and last 
name; or (4) sign his/her first initial, and full middle and last names. 
A signature in any of those formats is valid for purposes of being a 
qualified signature on the petition."285 
282. Ficker v. Denny, 326 Md. 626, 633, 606 A.2d 1060, 1063 (1992) (citation omitted). 
Generally, disabled signers are permitted assistance of a trusted person and, in the 
authors' experience, no issue is made of such assistance. 
283. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW§ 6-203 (LexisNexis 2010). 
284. MD. CoDE REGS. 33.06.03.06(B)(2)(c) (2011). That information is mandatory. /d. at 
33.06.03.06(B). The regulation also provides that a circulator "shall" ask for the 
signer's date of birth or, at a minimum, month and day of birth. /d. at 
33.06.03.06(C)(l). That information, however, is optional and failure to provide it 
does not invalidate the signature. /d. at 33.06.03.06(C)(2). 
285. Kendall v. Balczerak, 650 F.3d 515, 526 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 402 
(2011). Less clear is how "Luis Ramon Lopez Suarez" would be permitted to sign. 
See id. Certainly, a full signature would suffice. See id. Likely, "L. R. Lopez 
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The Maryland Court of Appeals has repeatedly defined the 
signature requirements imposed by statute.286 In Md. St. Bd. of 
Elections v. Libertarian Party of Md.,287 the court reiterated the 
holding of Doe v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections/88 and 
Montgomery Cnty. Volunteer Fire-Rescue Ass 'n v. Montgomery Cnty. 
Bd. of Elections/89 which was reaffirmed in Burruss v. Board of 
Cnty. Commissioners of Frederick Cnty.290 That quartet can be 
viewed as enunciating the following: 1) the statute means what it 
says, must be followed, and will be enforced; 2) the statute is 
constitutional; 3) legible signatures are not required;291 and 4) a 
Suarez," or "L. Ramon L. Suarez," or "Luis R.L. Suarez," would suffice. "L.R.L. 
Suarez" would not. See MD. CODE ELEC. LAW Art.§ 6-203(a)(l), infra note 351. 
286. Signatures are public records. See Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2815 (2010); 
Melody Simmons, Judge Releases Zoning Petition Signatures, DAILY RECORD, Nov. 
31, 2012, at 5A ("A list of about 86,000 signatures gathered as part of a petition drive 
to potentially overturn two new zoning maps in Baltimore County was ordered 
released . . . to a group that has plans to develop a shopping center anchored by 
Wegmans at the former Solo Cup site on Reisterstown Road. The petitions will be 
vetted for accuracy by private sources hired by the group, said Michael Paul Smith, an 
attorney for the developer, Greenberg Gibbons."); see Alison Knezevich, Judge 
Allows Release of Petition in Baltimore County Zoning Referendum Drive, BALT. 
SUN, Oct. 31, 2012, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-10-31/news/bs-md-co-
petition-hearing-20 121 031_1 _petition-partners-signature-gatherers-greenberg-
gibbons. Legislation was unsuccessfully introduced to change that. See infra Part 
VII.D. 
287. 426 Md. 488, 493,44 A.3d 1002, 1004 (2012). 
288. 406 Md. 697, 732, 962 A.2d 342, 363 (2008). 
289. 418 Md. 463, 469, 15 A.3d 798, 801 (2011) (holding "that the particular statutory 
provision at issue, i.e. section 6-203(a)(l) is clear and unambiguous, notwithstanding 
the utility of judicial gloss, and therefore we do not defer to the Board's 
interpretation"). 
290. 427 Md. 231, 241, 46 A.3d 1182, 1188 (2012); see also MARYLAND STATE BOARD OF 
ELECTIONS, PROCEDURES FOR FILING A STATEWIDE OR A PUBLIC LOCAL LAW 
REFERENDUM PETITION PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, 1-11 (2012), available at 
http://www.elections.state.md.us/pdf/6-201-3a.pdf; STATE OF MARYLAND, PETITION 
ACCEPTANCE AND VERIFICATION PROCEDURES, 1-9 (2012), available at 
http://www .elections. state.md. us/petitions/Petition_ verification_ Procedures. pdf. 
291. More precisely, an "exact match" between the petition signature and the voter 
registration signature is not required. Montgomery Cnty. Vol. Fire-Rescue Ass 'n, 418 
Md. at 473-74, 15 A.3d at 804. The fact that a signature is illegible is not dispositive. 
!d. at 478, 15 A.3d at 807. A signature is only one of many pieces of identifying 
information. !d. at 479, 15 A.3d at 808; see also Barnes v. Maryland, 236 Md. 564, 
572, 204 A.2d 787, 791 (1964) (taking judicial notice that many signatures are 
illegible). Although signatures may have been rejected for illegibility in the trial court 
in Gittings v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections for Bait. Cnty., 38 Md. App. 674, 678, 
382 A.2d 349, 351 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978) ("In the exercise of its responsibility, 
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the Board determined that 804 of the signatures were invalid; some of the signatures 
were of persons who were not qualified voters of Baltimore County; other signatures 
were illegible and therefore could not be identified as qualified voters .... "), Fire-
Rescue now provides the standard. 
Foreign cases demonstrate polar extremes applied to illegible signatures. On the one 
hand: 
It is urged also "that approximately 200 additional signatures on 
said petition are illegal and void for the reason that they are 
illegible." There is no standard of excellence in penmanship 
established by the statute qualifying a voter to sign a referendum 
petition, and besides, as before stated, the genuineness of the 
signature is not attacked. The right of a petitioner to order the 
referendum cannot be made to depend upon the ability or inability 
of any person to read the signature. Many of our best citizens 
habitually sign their names in a form illegible to anyone not 
familiar with the writing, and it would be unreasonable to deny 
such voters the right of referendum because of their 
chirographical idiosyncrasies. 
State ex rei. v. Olcott, 135 P. 902, 903 (Or. 1913) (emphasis added); accord Clark v. 
City of Aurora, 782 P.2d 771, 779 (Colo. 1989) ("When, as is often the case, a 
signature is illegible or partially legible, the printing of the name after the signature 
permits the clerk to determine the identity of the signer and to check the signature on 
the petition against the voter registration record . . . . The requirement of a printed 
name after the signature serves not only to guard against fraud in the petition process 
but also achieves the salutary goal of preventing the invalidation of an otherwise 
illegible or partially legible signature."); Austinites v. City of Austin, No. A 97-CA-
120 SS, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22593 at *13, *19 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 1997), 
subsequent decision, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22601 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 15, 1997) ("In 
some instances, deciding whether a signature belongs to a registered voter is a 
judgment call; for instance, the signer's handwriting may be somewhat illegible, or 
the signer may not have used his or her full name . . . . Aoother quarter to a third of 
the signatures had some legibility problems that could be overcome by using the 
information provided on the petition . . .. "). This view vigilantly protects the 
signatory's right to petition against abrogation by the government for a reason that is 
not expressly contained in the statutes. 
The other extreme, however, is exemplified by: "When a signature is illegible, then the 
identity of the signer cannot be determined and it is impossible to determine whether 
or not the signer was a registered voter." In re Initiative Petition No. 317, State 
Question No. 556, 648 P.2d 1207 (Okla. 1982); Thomson v. Wyoming In-Stream 
Flow Comm., 651 P.2d 1207, 1215 (Wyo. 1982); Thomson v. Wyoming In-Stream 
Flow Comm., 651 P.2d 778, 786 (Wyo. 1982) ("A signer was either a registered voter 
or not a registered voter. If it was impossible to decipher a signature, it was a nullity .. 
. . Reason tells us that an illegible name is the same as a blank line, not entitled to 
recognition and counting."); McCarthy v. Sec'y of Commonwealth, 359 N.E.2d 291, 
294, 302 & n.l9 (Mass. 1977) ("[The] burden of proof must be placed on the Secretary 
of the Commonwealth to demonstrate that there were valid reasons for noncertification 
of signatures. . . . Local registrars have no discretion to require more of signatures on 
nomination petitions than is specified in § 7 or than is necessary to carry out the clear 
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second, facially-adequate, duplicate signature will be rejected even if 
the fust has been rejected.292 The statute is silent as to use of ditto 
marks and crossed-out names.293 
A bill was introduced, but not enacted, to permit approval of 
signatures using a "reasonable certainty" standard. 294 Some of the lay 
reaction to the statutory signature requirements has been strong.295 
One person whose signature was rejected stated: 
"I dropped my middle initial on my official signature, oh, I 
don't know, probably 40 years ago," Lindstrom said. "It's 
my signature. It's acceptable to my bank and everybody 
else. But not the Board ofElections."296 
"Lindstrom, known as Dick to his friends, signed the ambulance fee 
petition as Richard Lindstrom, leaving out his middle initial, M. His 
signature was thrown out."297 One activist, Mr. Robin K. Ficker, 
"said his own signature was thrown out. He signs his name Robin K. 
Ficker. But his full name is Robin Keith Annesley Ficker. He was 
dinged for the missing A. " 298 
legislative intent of § 7. . . . Of course, the signature on the petition must be 
sufficiently legible to allow a comparison to be made . . . . [R]easons for 
noncertification might include, for example, ... that the signature is too illegible to 
enable comparison .... ");Whitman v. Moore, 125 P.2d 445, 445 (Ariz. 1942) ("The 
next class is those where the address of the signer is illegible. We think the same rule 
should apply in this case and the signature should be stricken unless it be affirmatively 
shown that the signer is in all respects a qualified elector."). These cases emphasize 
the need to ensure strict compliance with petition requirements so that the will of the 
legislature is not frustrated by bogus signatures. 
292. The Libertarian Party decision rejected the argument that Fire-Rescue created a 
"sufficient cumulative information" standard for name-related defects. 426 Md. at 
493, 44 A.3d at 1004-05. 
293. Doe v. Montgomery. Cnty. Bd. of Elections, No. 293857-V, 2008 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 
7 at *27-28 (Jul. 28, 2008), rev'd on other grounds, 406 Md. 697, 962 A.2d 342 
(2008). 
294. The bill was introduced by Senator Edward Kasemeyer in an emergency session in 
2009. See Larry Carson, Assembly Delegation Conflicted over Change in Petition 
Rules, BALT. SUN, Mar. 29, 2009, at 2 (Howard County section). 
295. See, e.g., notes 296-98 and accompanying text. 
296. Michael Laris, Lawsuits Seek to Restore Md. Ballot Petitions, WASH. POST, Sep. 1, 
2010, at Bl, B5. 
297. !d. 
298. !d. 
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Nevertheless, the court has correctly made clear that "[t]he issues 
before the court are of statutory interpretation."299 
b. Computer-assisted or web-based signatures pages are 
permissible 
In Whitley, the petition sponsor created a website that generated a 
signature page, complete with the voter's relevant identifying 
information, which could then be printed, signed, and mailed to the 
sponsor.300 One issue was whether the autofilled301 information was 
statutorily permitted. The court held that it was.302 In contrast, 
"walking petitions" that are pre-filled with blocks of voters' names 
and addresses in street order are barred by administrative policy.303 
The court noted that computer-generated petitions properly prioritize 
citizen convenience and permit citizens to seek out a petition, rather 
than waiting to be sought out by circulators.304 
c. The Statutory Requirements Are Constitutional 
Every constitutional challenge to the statutory signature 
requirements has been rejected.305 Succinctly put, the court has 
determined that requiring a signatory to provide specified information 
is not unduly burdensome. 
5. The Right to Remove a Signature 
Under limited circumstances, a signature may be removed by a 
signer, circulator, or sponsor. 306 Pursuant to section 6-203( c), a 
299. Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Local 1715 Cumberland Firefighters v. Mayor and City 
Co. of Cumberland, 407 Md. 1, 8, 962 A.2d 374, 378 (2008). 
300. Whitley v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, 429 Md. 132, 141, 55 AJd 27,43 (2012). 
301. The software was linked to a database containing voter registration information. Jd at 
143, 55 A.3d at 43. Voter registration rolls are public records. Id. at 146, 55 A.3d at 
46. 
302. Id. at 145-47, 55 A.3d at 45-46. 
303. I d. at 151 n.27, 55 A.3d at 49 n.27. 
304. ld. at 155, 55 A.3d at 51 (citing Mo. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW§ 1-201(5) (LexisNexis 
2010)). This discussion appears to be the first mention of citizen convenience as a 
factor. 
305. Md. State Bd. of Elections v. Libertarian Party ofMd., 426 Md. 488,518,44 A.3d 
1002, 1119-20 (2012); Barnes v. Maryland, 236 Md. 564, 571, 204 A.2d 787, 791 
(1964). 
306. Libertarian Party of Md., 426 Md. at 521, 44 A.3d at 1021 ("[W]e note that § 6-
203(c) places the onus on the signer, sponsor, and circulator of the petition to correct 
2013] Referenda in Maryland 705 
signature may be removed by the signer upon written application to 
the election authority, "if the application is received by the election 
authority prior to the filing of that signature."307 
A signature may be removed by the petition sponsor, or, prior to 
filing of the signature by the circulator who attested to it, or by the 
sponsor, "if it is concluded that the signature does not satisfy the 
requirements ofthis title."308 
6. Circulator's Affidavif09 
Article XVI, the election law article, and COMAR provide that 
each page must contain a circulator's affidavit.310 The affidavit must 
be "made and executed by the individual in whose presence all of the 
signatures on that page were affixed and who observed each of those 
signatures being affixed."311 It also "shall contain the statements, 
required by regulation, designed to assure the validity of the 
signatures and the fairness of the petition process."312 The 
the error of a potentially improper signature by removing the signature from the 
petition before it is submitted."). 
307. ELEC. LAW§ 6-203(c)(l)(i). 
308. !d. § 6-203(c)(2). This power is an exception to the duty of the circulator and 
sponsor, as agents of the signers, to submit a petition once signed. Ficker v. Denny, 
326 Md. 626, 633, 606 A.2d 1060, 1063 (1992). Under the statute, however, it 
appears to be a discretionary power, because the circulator or sponsor "may" remove 
the defective signature. See ELEC. LAW§ 6-203(c)(1)(ii). The motivation for them to 
do so could be provided by Tyler v. Sec y of State, 229 Md. 397, 184 A.2d 101 ( 1962). 
Under Tyler, where submitted signatures demonstrate that a circulator's affidavit is 
false, the presumption of validity evaporates. 229 Md. at 403-04, 184 A.2d at I 04-
05. A cautious sponsor might choose to remove invalid signatures in an effort to 
attempt to preserve the presumption. See nn. 306-07, supra. 
309. In Barnes, the court of appeals upheld a statutory provision making it unlawful to give 
or receive money or other consideration for signing a petition or securing signatures 
on it. 236 Md. at 573, 204 A.2d at 792. Subsequently, in Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 
414, 424, 428 (1988), the Supreme Court held that it is unconstitutional to preclude 
the use of paid circulators, and State v. Brookins, 380 Md. 345, 373-76, 844 A.2d 
1162, 1179-80 (2004), struck down the ban on "walk around" money. That portion of 
Barnes likely is no longer valid to the extent it conflicts with Brookins. 
310. Mo. CONST. art. XVI, § 4; ELEC. LAW § 6-201(c)(6), 6-204(a); Mo. CODE REGS. 
33.06.03.08. The validity of part of the circulator information provision of Mo. CODE 
REGs. 33.06.03.07 is currently being litigated in the court of appeals. Fraternal Order 
of Police Lodge 35 v. Montgomery Cnty., No. 132 (Sept. Term 2011) (challenging 
requirement of correct zip code). 
311. ELEC. LAW § 6-204(a). 
312. !d.§ 6-204(b). 
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requirement of a circulator's affidavit "does not go to the form of the 
petition to which the affidavit is to be attached."313 
A signatory may "self-circulate," or, in other words, be the 
circulator on a page that he or she signed as voter.314 In Whitley, the 
argument against self-circulation was that it defeated the purpose315 
and intent of the circulator's affidavit, impeded validation, and 
increased the possibility offraud?16 The court, however, held that the 
constitutional and statutory language was unambiguous and the 
General Assembly "did not require expressly that the signer and 
circulator be different persons."317 
The regulations define the contents of the circulator's affidavit.318 
They provide that the circulator shall provide a printed or typed 
name, telephone number, residence, including house number, street 
name, apartment number, if any, town and zip code.319 The latter 
requirement has been challenged in the court of appeals. 320 
The circulator "is the agent of the signers."321 In a referendum 
under Maryland Constitution, article XI-A, section 5, the court of 
appeals held that the circulator "has no greater or lesser right of 
313. Barnes, 236 Md. at 570,204 A.2d at 790. 
314. Whitley, 429 Md. at 157, 161,55 A.3d at 51, 52, 54. 
315. !d. at 160, 55 A.3d at 54 ("[T]he purpose of the affidavit is to confirm that the 
signature of the individual appearing on the petition in fact belongs to the person that 
it purports to represent."). The dissent in Whitley ascribed two purposes to the 
affidavit: "It is designed to prevent fraud in the first place and second, if executed 
correctly, the affidavit creates a presumption that there is no fraud." !d. at 166, 55 
A.3d at 58 (Adkins, J., dissenting). 
316. !d. at 157, 55 A.3d at 52 (majority opinion). 
317. !d. at 158, 159, 55 A.3d at 53. The dissent wrote: "The existence of the separate 
circulator provides an independent check on the signer. The circulator is able to 
vouch that the signer did in fact appear before the circulator and did in fact sign the 
petition." !d. at 166, 55 A.3d at 58 (Adkins, J., dissenting). 
318. MD. CODE REGS. 33.06.03.08(8) ("The affidavit shall state that: (1) All of the 
information given by the circulator under Regulation .07 of this chapter is true and 
correct; (2) The circulator was 18 years old or older when each signature was affixed 
to the page; (3) The circulator personally observed each signer as the page was signed; 
and (4) To the best of the circulator's knowledge and belief, all: (a) Signatures on the 
petition are genuine, and (b) Signers are registered voters in the State."). 
319. MD. CODE REGS. 33.06.03.07(8). 
320. See supra note 263 and accompanying text (citing Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 35 
v. Montgomery Cnty., MD, No. 132 (Sept. Term 2011) (challenging requirement of 
correctly stating zip code)). 
321. Ficker v. Denny, 326 Md. 626, 633, 606 A.2d 1060, 1063 (1992); Tyler v. Sec'y of 
State, 229 Md. 397, 403, 184 A.2d 101, 104 (1962). 
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control over the petition than any other signer."322 This has important 
consequences, at least in the context of a referendum under Maryland 
Constitution, article XI-A, section 5.323 If sufficient signatures are 
gathered, the circulator has a duty to submit the petition,324 subject to 
certain exceptions.325 Additionally, the agency relationship imposes 
an "implicit" duty of truthfulness on the circulators. 326 
In Ferguson,321 the court re-emphasized328 that the affidavit 
requirement will be strictly enforced by its literal terms. "[T]he 
affidavit is an integral part of the referendum petition."329 When a 
circulator's affidavit is false, the presumption that the signatures on 
322. Ficker, 326 Md. at 632, 606 A.2d at 1063. The court held th~t, based on article XI-A 
and the terms of the particular signature pages, the sponsor had a duty to submit the 
signed pages. !d. at 633, 606 A.2d at 1063. 
323. See id. 
324. Ficker, 326 Md. at 632, 606 A.2d at 1063. Filing is a ministerial task. !d. at 632, 606 
A.2d at 1063. The sponsor argued that changed circumstances excused filing and, 
essentially, that a post-collection agreement rendered filing contrary to the wishes of 
the signatories. !d. at 630-31, 606 A.2d at 1062. The court rejected the argument. 
!d. at 632-33, 606 A.2d at 1063. 
325. Ficker, 326 Md. at 635 n.5, 606 A.2d at 1064 n.5 (nonexhaustive list of exceptions). 
The dissent suggested that sponsors have the discretion to refrain from filing if they 
determine that they lack sufficient signatures. !d. at 640, 606 A.2d at I 067 
(Chasanow, J., dissenting). It is not suggested in this article, nor in the authors' view 
is it suggested in Ficker, that a sponsor that determines that the number of signatures 
are insufficient must nevertheless submit the pages. See generally nn. 306-07, supra, 
and Md. State Bd. of Elections v. Libertarian Party of Md., 426 Md. 488, 521, 44 
A.3d I 002, 1021 (20 I2) ("[W]e note that § 6-203( c) places the onus on the signer, 
sponsor, and circulator of the petition to correct the error of a potentially improper 
signature by removing the signature from the petition before it is submitted."). 
326. Ficker, 326 Md. at 633, 606 A.2d at I063. The duty has also been described by the 
court as an "implicit pledge .... " !d. 
327. Ferguson v. Sec'y of State, 249 Md. 510,515,240 A.2d 232,234-35 (1968). 
328. Tyler v. Sec'y of State, 229 Md. 397,402, I84 A.2d I01, 104 (I962). 
329. Ferguson, 249 Md. at 516,240 A.2d 235 (quoting Tyler, 229 Md. at 403, I84 A.2d at 
104). In Montanans for Justice v. Montana, the Supreme Court of Montana wrote that 
"it is evident that the circulator's role in a citizen's initiative is pivotal. Indeed, the 
integrity of the initiative ... process in many ways hinges on the trustworthiness and 
veracity of the circulator." 334 Mont. 237, 263, I46 P.3d 759, 777 (2006)(quoting 
Maine Taxpayers Action Network v. Sec. of State, 2002 Me. 64, 80 (2002).) In San 
Francisco Forty-Niners v. Nishioka, the court wrote that "when presented with a 
petition by a circulator, voters have a right to rely on the integrity of the initiative 
process and the accuracy of the petition .... " 75 Cal. App. 4th 637, 648 (1999). The 
court further commented that "the people also have a right to rely on the integrity of 
the initiative process from beginning to end. Because the initiative process bypasses 
the normal legislative process, safeguards are necessary to prevent abuses and provide 
for an informed electorate." !d. at 649. 
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the page are valid fails. 330 In Ferguson, an affidavit on knowledge, 
information, and belief was held insufficiene31 ; in Tyler,332 an 
affidavit that falsely stated that all of the signatories were registered 
in the jurisdiction was rejected.333 
7. Filing 
After signature pages are circulated and signed, they are filed334 
pursuant to election law, section 6-205, "by or on behalf of the 
sponsor, in the office of the appropriate election authority."335 SBE 
has the power to promulgate regulations providing that pages be sent 
"to the appropriate local board or boards for verification and counting 
of signatures."336 It has done so.337 
The sponsor has a duty to file a proper petition338 and must sort the 
pages "[b ]y county" before filing and, "[i]f applicable, by ... district 
or geographic area .... "339 If a petition fund statemene40 is required, 
330. !d. at 516-17, 240 A.2d at 235; Tyler, 229 Md. at 405-06, 184 A.2d at 105-06. Tyler 
was remanded and one may assume that evidence in support of the challenged 
signatures could have been offered. !d. at 406, 184 A.2d at 105-06 ("[T]he burden is 
cast upon the proponents to affirmatively show that the remaining signatures on such 
petition or sheet thereof are genuine and bona fide and that the signers are registered 
voters as required by law."). 
331. Ferguson, 249 Md. at 517, 240 A.2d at 235-36. 
332. Tyler, 229 Md. at 405--06, 184 A.2d at 105-06. 
333. In an unreported circuit court decision, Dwight Sullivan, Esquire, formerly of the 
American Civil Liberties Union, deposed circulators and demonstrated that one had 
not personally observed signatures being affixed, despite the contrary statements in 
the circulator's affidavit. Gelbman v. Willis, No. C-2001-7340.0C (Cir. Ct. Anne 
Arundel Cnty. 2001) (Lerner, J.). 
334. Under some circumstances, there may be more than one filing: "Subsequent to the 
filing of a petition under this subtitle, but prior to the deadline for filing the petition, 
additional signatures may be added to the petition by filing an amended information 
page and additional signature pages conforming to the requirements of this subtitle." 
MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 6-205(d) (LexisNexis 2010); MD. CODE REGS. 
33.06.04.05 (2011). 
335. ELEC. LAW§ 6-206(a)-{c). 
336. !d. § 6-205(b ). 
337. MD. CODE REGS. 33.06.04.02-.07. COMAR governs local board's reports to the state. 
Id. at 33.06.05.04. 
338. See Ficker v. Denny, 326 Md. 626, 633, 606 A.2d 1060, 1063 (1992). 
339. MD. CODE REGS. 33.06.04.03. 
340. A petition fund statement is required for every petition filed under Mo. CONST. art. 
XI-A or XVI. MD. CODE REGS. at 33.06.04.07. 
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the petition will not be accepted without it.341 It appears that, like the 
circulator, the sponsor may be viewed as the agent of the signers.342 
8. Secretary of State 
The official receiving the pages plays an important gatekeeper role: 
"A petition may not be accepted for filing unless the information 
page indicates that the petition satisfies any requirements established 
by law for the time of filing and for the number and geographic 
distribution of signatures."343 Pursuant to election law, section 6-206, 
the receiving official makes a number of key decisions: 
(a) Review by chief election officiaL-Promptly upon the 
filing of a petition with an election authority, the chief 
election official of the election authority shall review the 
petition. 344 
(b) Determinations.-Unless a determination of deficiency 
is made under subsection (c) of this section, the chief 
election official shall: 
(1) make a determination that the petition, as to matters 
other than the validity of signatures, is sufficient; or 
(2) defer a determination of sufficiency pending further 
review. 
(c) Declaration of deficiency.-The chief election official 
shall declare that the petition is deficient if the chief election 
official determines that: 
(1) the petition was not timely filed; 
(2) after providing the sponsor an opportunity to correct any 
clerical errors, the information provided by the sponsor 
indicates that the petition does not satisfy any requirements 
of law for the number or geographic distribution of 
signatures; 
341. MD. CODE REGS. at 33.06.04.04. 
342. Tyler v. Sec'y of State, 229 Md. 397, 403, 184 A.2d 101, 104 (1962). The court 
wrote that "the one procuring the petitions or circulating them is the agent of the 
signers." Id. If it intended to point only to the circulators, the court would not have 
written "the one procuring the petitions or." Jd. 
343. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW§ 6-205(c) (LexisNexis 2010). 
344. The election official must provide a receipt to the sponsor. MD. CODE REGS. 
33.06.04.06. 
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(3) an examination of unverified signatures indicates that the 
petition does not satisfy any requirements of law for the 
number or geographic distribution of signatures; 
(4) the requirements relating to the form of the petition have 
not been satisfied; 
(5) based on the advice of the legal authority: 
(i) the use of a petition for the subject matter of the petition 
is not authorized by law; or 
(ii) the petition seeks: 
1. the enactment of a law that would be unconstitutional or 
the election or nomination of an individual to an office for 
which that individual is not legally qualified to be a 
candidate; or 
2. a result that is otherwise prohibited by law; or 
(6) the petition has failed to satisfy some other requirement 
established by law.345 
Although the Secretary of State's role is ministerial,346 it is 
significant. The court has squarely held that the Secretary has the 
power to reject a petition.347 
9. Validation and Verification 
If the receiving election official does not reject the submitted pages 
under election law, section 6-206, the election board must engage in a 
two-step process consisting of validation and verification.348 The 
court of appeals has emphasized that these are different processes and 
that they have different purposes. 349 
345. ELEC. LAW§ 6-206(a)-{c). 
346. Referendum Petitions-Filing-Duties of Secretary of State-Public Inspection, 50 Md. 
Op. Att'y Gen. 328 (1965) ("We have several times advised that your authority does 
not go beyond the purely ministerial act of determining whether petitions submitted to 
you (a) contain the requisite number of signatures, (b) are in the form required by 
Article XVI, Section 4, of the Constitution and the statutes adopted pursuant to 
Section l(b) of that Article ... and (c) bear valid affidavits which meet the specific 
constitutional requirements.") (citations omitted). 
347. Barnes v. State ex rei. Pinkney, 236 Md. 564, 570, 573, 204 A.2d 787, 790, 792 
(1964). 
348. ELEC. LAW§ 6-207(a)(1). 
349. Doe v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 406 Md. 697, 732 n.27, 962 A.2d 342, 
362 n.27 (2008); Howard Cnty. Citizens for Open Gov't. v. Howard Cnty. Bd. of 
Elections, 201 Md. App. 605, 619-20, 30 A.3d 245, 254-55 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2011). The distinction between the two processes is based on the statute: "Upon the 
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a. Validation and counting 
"The purpose of validation, relating to whether the signature is 
sufficient, is to 'provide additional means by which fraudulent or 
otherwise improper signatures upon a referendum petition may be 
detected. "'350 Validation and counting of affixed signatures are 
governed by election law, section 6-203(b). 
The signature of an individual shall be validated and 
counted if: 
(1) the requirements of subsection (a)351 of this section have 
been satisfied; 
(2) the individual is a registered voter assigned to the county 
specified on the signature page and, if applicable, in a 
particular geographic area of the county; 
(3) the individual has not previously signed the same 
petition; 
(4) the signature is attested by an affidavit appearing on the 
page on which the signature appears; 
( 5) the date accompanying the signature is not later than the 
date of the affidavit on the page; and 
(6) if applicable, the signature was affixed within the 
requisite period of time, as specified by law.352 
b. Verification 
Verification is mandated by election law, section 6-205(b) and 
defined in section 6-207 and COMAR 33.06.05.02.353 "The purpose 
filing of a petition, and unless it has been declared deficient under § 6-206 of this 
subtitle, the staff of the election authority shall proceed to verify the signatures and 
count the validated signatures contained in the petition." ELEC. LAW § 6-207(a)(l) 
(emphasis added). 
350. Doe, 406 Md. at 732, 962 A.2d at 362-63 (quoting Barnes, 236 Md. at 574, 204 A.2d 
at 793). 
351. The first part of section 6-203(a) requires "the individual's name as it appears on the 
statewide voter registration list or the individual's surname of registration and at least 
one full given name and the initials of any other names." ELEC. LAW§ 6-203(a)(l). 
The second part of section 6-203(a) requires "(i) the signer's name as it was signed; 
(ii) the signer's address; (iii) the date of signing; and (iv) other information required 
by regulations adopted by the State Board." !d. at § 6-203(a)(2). 
352. !d. at § 6-203(b ). 
353. !d. at § 6-205(b) ("The regulations adopted by the State Board may provide that the 
signature pages of a petition required to be filed with the State Board be delivered by 
the sponsor, or an individual authorized by the sponsor, to the appropriate local board 
or boards for verification and counting of signatures.") (emphasis added); MD. CODE 
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of signature verification under paragraph (1) of this subsection is to 
ensure that the name of the individual who signed the petition is 
listed as a registered voter."354 The statute authorizes SBE to 
establish by regulation the process to be followed for verification and 
counting of signatures.355 "[V]erification and counting of validated 
signatures ... shall be completed within [twenty] days after the filing 
of the petition."356 
The election director is required to review all names and 
accompanying information on each signature page, determine which 
signers are registered voters who meet petition and criteria and which 
are not or do not, 357 and indicate next to each name the results of that 
determination, using uniform codes.358 
c. Petition processing by the Board of Elections 
The Attorney General has provided an overview of referendum 
processing.359 When petitions are filed, the election board will review 
each page, signature-by-signature, placing a code next to each.360 
Acceptance codes include OK, for valid names, CG, for an internet or 
computer-generated page, INV, for a valid inactive voter, WA-OK 
for a valid name at a valid new address, WA-INV, for an inactive 
REGs. 33.06.05.02(8) (2011) (verification requires that the election director: "(!) 
Review all names and accompanying information on each signature page; (2) 
Determine which signers are registered voters who meet the petition criteria and 
which are not registered voters or do not meet the petition criteria; and (3) Indicate 
next to each name the results of that determination, using for that purpose uniform 
codes specified in the State Board's guidelines and instructions .... "). 
354. ELEC. LAW§ 6-207(a)(2). 
355. ELEC. LAW § 6-207(b). The statute also permits verification through a process of 
random sampling. !d. at§ 6-207(c); Mo. CoDE REGs. 33.06.05.03. 
356. ELEC. LAW§ 6-210(c); see also MD. CODE REGS. 33.06.05.04. 
357. Statutes are generally silent as to when the number of registered voters is to be 
determined. Doe v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 2008 Md. Cir. Ct. Lexis 7, at 
*3 (July 28, 2008), rev'd on other grounds, 406 Md. 697, 962 A.2d 342 (2008). 
Generally, a date at or near the signature-page filing date is selected. !d. The voter 
registration list is "conclusively presumed to be the list[] of all qualified voters at any 
given point," with an exception not relevant here. Gisriel v. Ocean City Bd. of 
Supervisors of Elections, 345 Md. 477,505,693 A.2d 757,771 (1997). 
358. MD. CODE REGS. 33.06.05.02(8). 
359. Sufficiency Determination Concerning a Referendum on a Pub. Law Enacted by the 
Gen. Assembly is to be Made by State Officials, 85 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 120, 121-23 
(2000). 
360. See supra note 353; MD. STATE Bo. OF ELECTIONS, PETITION ACCEPTANCE AND 
VERIFICATION PROCEDURES (2012), available at http://www.elections.state.md.us/ 
petitions/Petition_ verification _Procedures.pdf. 
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voter at a valid new address, and OK-CT, for a registered signer who 
provided an out-of-county address.361 Rejection codes include CI, for 
circulation issue, PF, for petition format issue, T A, for failure to print 
text on the back of the signature page, NR, for not registered, DUP, 
for duplicate signatures, DI, for signer date issues, SI, for signature 
issues, NS for legibility issues, and W A, for addresses that do not 
meet petition criteria. 362 It has been argued that these are factual 
findings, constituting the administrative record, and that on judicial 
review they must be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence on 
the record. 363 
Notably, no statutory provision calls for, authorizes, or mandates 
handwriting analysis. 364 Thus, there is no provision that suggests that 
the signature on a petition page be compared to or with the signature 
on the voter registration records. 365 
d. There Is No Right to Observe Petition Processing 
State law calls for open and transparent local board procedures in 
elections processes.366 Nevertheless, participants do not have a 
constitutional right to observe petition processing by boards of 
election. 367 The rationale is that an election board must complete 
361. /d. 
362. !d. 
363. See PPE Casino Resorts Md., LLC v. Anne Arundel Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors of 
Elections, No. 02-C-10-149479, slip. op. at 9-10, 28-31 (June 3, 2010), rev'd on 
other grounds sub nom. Citizens Against Slots at the Mall v. PPE Casino Resorts 
Md., LLC, 429 Md. 176, 55 A.3d 496 (2012). One of the authors presented this 
argument. The circuit court conducted signature-by-signature review. 
364. In Doe v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 2008 Md. Cir. Ct. Lexis 7, *24 (July 28, 
2008), rev'd on other grounds, 406 Md. 697, 962 A.2d 342 (2008), the circuit court 
cited the Department of Legislative Services' Fiscal and Policy Note to MD. CODE 
ANN., ELEC. LAW § 6-207(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2010), for the proposition that 
verification is not designed "to verify the authenticity of the signature." FISCAL & 
POLICY NOTE, S.B. 101, Gen. Assemb., 2006 Sess. (Md. 2006). 
365. See ELEC. LAW§ 6-207; FISCAL & POLICY NOTE, S.B. 101. 
366. ELEC. LAw § 2-202(b) states: "Each local board, in accordance with the provisions of 
this article and regulations adopted by the State Board, shall: (1) oversee the conduct 
of all elections held in its county and ensure that the elections process is conducted in 
an open, convenient, and impartial manner. ... " 
367. Howard Cnty. Citizens for Open Gov't. v. Howard Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 201 Md. 
App. 605, 630-32, 30 A.3d 245, 255 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011). SBE Policy 2001-
001 addresses public observation of petition verification and considers verification 
under ELEC. LAw § 6-207 to be a staff function that is not subject to the Open 
Meetings Act, Title 10, Subtitle 5 of the State Government article. It provides that 
"therefore, members of the public are not legally entitled to be present during the 
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verification within twenty days and the election board's "limited 
resources should be focused on the 'large and difficult' task of 
validating and verifying thousands of signatures in this compressed 
time-frame.368 Because a sponsor may present challenges to a court 
sitting in judicial review, it has been held that there is no prejudice as 
the result of closed processing.369 
Unlike the statutory provisions for poll watchers and challengers, 
the election law article does not provide the sponsor, or anyone else, 
with the right to observe processing of the petition. 370 The safeguard 
verification process. . . ." SBE suggested that, in the interest of uniformity: 
"Accordingly, the State Board adopted a strong policy against any local board 
voluntarily permitting members of the public to witness the verification process." The 
version of the policy that is available online is unsigned. 
368. !d. (citing Doe v. Reed, 130 S.Ct. at 2820). 
369. !d. 
3 70. In contrast to the petition verification process, ELEC. LAW § 10-311 provides for 
"challengers and watchers" in connection with registration and voting. It states: 
(1) The following persons or entities have the right to designate a 
registered voter as a challenger or a watcher at each place of 
registration and election: 
(i) the State Board for any polling place in the State; 
(ii) a local board for any polling place located in the county of 
the local board; 
(iii) a candidate; 
(iv) a political party; and 
(v) any other group of voters supporting or opposing a 
candidate, principle, or proposition on the ballot. 
(2) A person who appoints a challenger or watcher may remove 
the challenger or watcher at any time. 
(b) Rights of challengers and watchers. --Except as provided in § 
1 0-303( d)(2) of this subtitle and subsection (d) of this section, a 
challenger or watcher has the right to: 
(1) enter the polling place one-half hour before the polls open; 
(2) enter or be present at the polling place at any time when the 
polls are open; 
(3) remain in the polling place until the completion of all tasks 
associated with the close of the polls under § 10-314 of this 
subtitle and the election judges leave the polling place; 
(4) maintain a list of registered voters who have voted, or 
individuals who have cast provisional ballots, and take the list 
outside of the polling place; and 
(5) enter and leave a polling place for the purpose of taking 
outside of the polling place information that identifies registered 
voters who have cast ballots or individuals who have cast 
provisional ballots. 
(c) Certificate.--
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is the coding process that creates an administrative record for judicial 
review.371 
Whether the closed statutory process is good policy is a matter for 
the legislature. Boards of election are comprised of humans and 
errors have occurred. In one case, for example, the Secretary of State 
(1) (i) A certificate signed by any party or candidate shall be 
sufficient evidence of the right of a challenger or watcher to be 
present in the voting room. 
(ii) The State Board shall prescribe a form that shall be 
supplied to the challenger or watcher by the person or entity 
designating the challenger or watcher. 
(2) A challenger or watcher shall be positioned near the election 
judges and inside the voting room so that the challenger or 
watcher may see and hear each person as the person offers to vote. 
(d) Prohibited activities. --
(1) A challenger or watcher may not attempt to: 
(i) ascertain how a voter voted or intends to vote; 
(ii) converse in the polling place with any voter; 
(iii) assist any voter in voting; or 
(iv) physically handle an original election document. 
(2) An election judge may eject a challenger or watcher who 
violates the prohibitions under paragraph (1) of this subsection. 
(e) Individuals other than accredited challengers or watchers. --
(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this 
subsection, an election judge shall permit an individual other than 
an accredited challenger or watcher who desires to challenge the 
right to vote of any other individual to enter the polling place for 
that purpose. 
(2) A majority of the election judges may limit the number of 
nonaccredited challengers and watchers allowed in the polling 
place at any one time for the purpose of challenging the right of 
an individual to vote. 
(3) A nonaccredited challenger or watcher shall leave the 
polling place as soon as a majority of the election judges decides 
the right to vote of the individual challenged by the challenger or 
watcher. 
(4) In addition to restrictions provided under this subsection, all 
restrictions on the actions of an accredited challenger or watcher 
provided under this subtitle apply to a nonaccredited challenger or 
watcher. [emphasis added]. 
371. COMAR 33.06.05.01, et seq., implements a verification process. SBE has established 
detailed "Petition Acceptance and Verification Procedures" that specify acceptance 
and rejection codes. Petition Acceptance and Verification Procedures, SBE 
http://www .elections. state.md. us/petitions/Petition_ verification_ Procedures.pdf Each 
line of each signature page is coded by the local election board, providing a detailed 
record of administrative fmdings of fact. 
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"misplaced in his office" a box containing 5,000 signatures.372 Thus, 
in some instances, election officials communicated with sponsors 
during that process, correcting errors.373 It would, however, appear 
that the problems inherent in creating a fully open process during a 
compressed time frame would be close to insurmountable. Whether a 
process similar to, but more limited than, poll watching and 
challenging is viable would be worthy of study. Despite the high 
level of professionalism, integrity, and competence of Maryland's 
election officials, persons interested in the referendum process often 
express a desire to observe petition processing. If it is possible to 
accommodate that desire without compromising the speed and 
integrity of petition processing, it would be a beneficial modification. 
e. Inactive voters 
It is well-settled that inactive voters must be included in the 
calculation of whether or not sufficient signatures have been 
gathered. 374 Of course, including inactive voters increases the 
number of signatures that must be gathered by a petition sponsor;375 
however, inactive voters are permitted to sign petitions.376 
f Criminal penalties 
Election law, section 6-211 proscribes by incorporation a number 
of offenses and penalties for violation of the petition laws.377 
Specifically, election law, section 16-401 criminalizes a number of 
372. Sec'y of State v. McLean, 249 Md. 436, 439-40, 239 A.2d 919 (1968) ("One of 
Taxpayers' signature gatherers promptly convinced the Secretary that he had 
overlooked 5,000 signatures . . . by fmding them in a box in a cabinet in the 
Secretary's office"). 
373. I d.; Md. State Bd. of Elections v. Libertarian Party of Md., 426 Md. 488, 501, 44 A. 
3d 1002, 1009 (2012) ("constructive discussions between the parties" resulted in the 
board of elections crediting additional signatures); Kendall v. Balczerak, 650 F.3d 
515, 519 (4th Cir. 2011) (the Board "sent an email to several persons involved in the 
referendum process requesting their presence at a meeting of the County Board the 
following evening."). 
374. Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters v. Mayor of Cumberland, 407 Md. I, 14, 962 A.2d 374, 
382 (2008) (citing Doe v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 406 Md. 697, 724--26, 
962 A.2d 342, 358-59 (2008); Md. Green Party v. Md. Bd. of Elections, 377 Md. 127, 
152-53, 832 A.2d 214, 229 (2003)). 
375. See Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 406 Md. at 723,962 A.2d at 357. 
376. See PETITION ACCEPTANCE AND VERIFICATION PROCEDURES, supra note 360. 
3 77. Mo. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 6-211 (LexisNexis 20 I 0). 
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actions.378 Obviously, the presence or absence of criminal penalties is 
a significant anti-fraud measure.379 
10. Certification 
At the conclusion of verification and counting, the chief election 
official shall determine whether the validated signatures are sufficient 
to satisfy all legal requirements relating to the number and 
geographical distribution of signatures. 380 If the official has not 
previously done so, he or she shall determine whether all other 
requirements of law have been met "and immediately notify the 
sponsor81 of that determination, including any specific deficiencies 
found. "382 
If the official determines that all requirements have been met, "the 
chief election official shall certify that the petition process has been 
completed."383 The certification places the issue on the ballot.384 
378. ELEC. LAW§ 16-401 provides that: 
(a) In general. - A person may not willfully and 
knowingly: (I) give, transfer, promise, or offer anything of value 
for the purpose of inducing another person to sign or not sign any 
petition; (2) request, receive, or agree to receive, anything of 
value as an inducement to sign or not to sign any petition; (3) 
misrepresent any fact for the purpose of inducing another person 
to sign or not to sign any petition; (4) sign the name of any other 
person to a petition; (5) falsify any signature or purported 
signature to a petition; (6) obtain, or attempt to obtain, any 
signature to a petition by fraud, duress, or force; (7) circulate, 
cause to be circulated, or file with an election authority a petition 
that contains any false, forged, or fictitious signatures; (8) sign a 
petition that the person is not legally qualified to sign; (9) sign a 
petition more than once; or (1 0) alter any petition after it is filed 
with the election authority. (b) Each violation a separate offense. 
- Each violation of this section shall be considered a separate 
offense. (c) Penalty. - A person who violates this section is 
guilty of a misdemeanor and is subject to the penalties provided in 
Subtitle 10 of this title. 
Mo. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW§ 16-401. 
379. See Whitely v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, 429 Md. 132, 160, 163,55 A.3d 37,55-56 
(2012). 
380. /d. § 6-208(a)(l); MD. CODE REGS. 33.06.05.05(A)(l) (2010). 
3 81. The "sponsor" is the person or organization identified on the information sheet. ELEC. 
LAW§ 6-IOI(j). 
382. /d. § 6-208(a)(2). 
383. /d. § 6-208(b). 
384. !d. ("If the chief election official determines that a petitiOn has satisfied all 
requirements established by law relating to that petition, the chief election official 
718 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
A certification decision triggers the right to judicial review.385 
Statutory judicial review is defined by election law, section 6-209, 
and discussed in Part IV below. The time limits for seeking review 
are short. 386 
11. Drafting a Ballot Question 
Maryland Constitution, article XVI, section 5, provides that: 
(a) The General Assembly shall provide for furnishing the 
voters of the State the text of all measures to be voted upon 
by the people; provided, that until otherwise provided by 
law the same shall be published in the manner prescribed by 
Article XIV of the Constitution for the publication of 
proposed Constitutional Amendments. 
(b) All laws referred under the provisions of this Article 
shall be submitted separately on the ballots to the voters of 
the people, but if containing more than two hundred words, 
the full text shall not be printed on the official ballots, but 
the Secretary of State shall prepare and submit a ballot title 
of each such measure in such form as to present the purpose 
of said measure concisely and intelligently. The ballot title 
may be distinct from the legislative title, but in any case the 
legislative title shall be sufficient. Upon each of the ballots, 
following the ballot title or text, as the case may be, of each 
such measure, there shall be printed the words "For the 
shall certify that the petition process has been completed and shall: (1) with respect to 
a petition seeking to place the name of an individual or a question on the ballot, 
certify that the name or question has qualified to be placed on the ballot; (2) with 
respect to a petition seeking to create a new political party, certify the sufficiency of 
the petition to the chairman of the governing body of the partisan organization; and 
(3) with respect to the creation of a charter board under Article XI-A, § lA of the 
Maryland Constitution, certify that the petition is sufficient.") Notice is provided 
pursuant to ELEC. LAW § 6-208(c), which incorporates ELEC. LAW § 6-210. 
385. Doe v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 406 Md. 697, 716, 962 A.2d 342, 353 
(2008); Roskelly v. Lamone, 396 Md. 27, 44, 912 A.2d 658, 669 (2006); see also Stop 
Slots MD 2008 v. State Bd. of Elections, 424 Md. 163, 178, 34 A.3d 1164, 1172 
(2012). 
386. ELEC. LAW§ 6-210(e); Liddy v. Lamone, 398 Md. 233, 245, 919 A.2d 1276, 1284 
(2006); Ross v. State Bd. of Elections, 387 Md. 649,665,876 A.2d 692,701 (2005); 
see Canavan v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, 430 Md. 533, 61 A.3d 828 (2013) (per 
curiam); Anne Arundel Cnty. Taxpayers Ass'n, Inc. v. Anne Arundel Cnty. Bd. of 
Elections, 415 Md. 433, 2 A.3d 1095 (20 1 0) (per curiam). 
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referred law" and "Against the referred law," as the case 
b 387 may e .... 
After a ballot question is drafted, it can be challenged.388 "There is 
a small but significant distinction between the standards that govern 
submission of a proposed constitutional amendment to the electorate 
for approval under to MD Const. art. XIV, and the General 
Assembly's authority to submit a law to voters for a referendum 
pursuant to Art. XVI."389 The rules governing review also differ.390 
Under the election law article, a ballot question must contain a brief 
description of the type or source of the question, a brief descriptive 
title in bold typeface, a condensed statement of purpose, and the 
choices being put to the voters.391 The legislature is permitted, but 
not required, to enact the ballot language.392 If no language is 
directed by the General Assembly, the Secretary of State prepares the 
question.393 The question is then certified to the State Board of 
Elections for inclusion on the ballot. 394 
Questions for constitutional amendments, as opposed to ballot 
questions, must "be prepared in clear and concise language and 
devoid of technical and legal terms[, and] [t]he Department of 
Legislative Services must prepare the 'non-technical summary' 
which must be submitted to the Attorney General for approval."395 
The court of appeals has repeatedly enunciated the governing 
statutory standard.396 Post-election challenges are decided under a 
more forgiving standard than pre-election challenges.397 
387. Mo. CONST. art. XVI, § 5. 
388. Smigiel v. Franchot, 410 Md. 302, 319-20, 978 A.2d 687, 698-99 (2009) (holding 
that a challenge is not ripe until question is drafted). 
389. Stop Slots, 424 Md. at 191 n.16, 34 A.3d at 1180 n.I6. As to the standard for 
annexation ballots, see Town of La Plata v. Faison-Rosewick, LLC, No 68, 2013 WL 
5354355 (Md. Sep. 25, 2013). 
390. Id. at 191-93, 34 A.3d at 1180-81. 
391. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW§ 7-l03(b) (LexisNexis 2010). 
392. Id., § 7-105(b)(3)(i); Stop Slots, 424 Md. at 172, 34 A.3d at 1169. 
393. ELEC. LAw § 7 -I 03( c )(1 ); Stop Slots, 424 Md. at 172, 34 A.3d at 1169. 
394. Stop Slots, 424 Md. at 172, 34 A.3d at 1169. Local boards must give notice of the 
question by mailing or publication. I d. 
395. /d. at 172-73, 34 A.3d at 1169-70; accord ELEC. LAW§ 7-105(b). There are also 
other technical requirements. Stop Slots, 424 Md. at 189-92, 34 A.3d 1179-81. 
396. Stop Slots, 424 Md. at 189-92, 34 A.3d 1179-81 (finding that standards "are clearly 
set forth in the Constitution, the Maryland Election Law article, and firmly addressed 
and established by our precedents") (citing Kelly v. Vote Know Coal. of Md., Inc., 
331 Md. 164, 171-72, 626 A.2d 959,963-64 (1993) (abortion); Anne Arundel Cnty. 
v. McDonough, 277 Md. 271, 300, 354 A.2d 788, 805 (1976) (land use)). 
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B. Structure of the Boards of Election and Petition Review 
1. State Boards/Local Boards 
[Vol. 42 
Both the state and local boards of election are created by state 
law.398 The latter are "local" in name only.399 They are subject to 
"the direction and authority" of the state and are "accountable" to 
it.400 The State Administrator of Elections shall "supervise the 
operations of the local boards .... "401 Although their essential 
operations are funded by counties,402 local boards are bound by state 
397. See Lexington Park Volunteer Fire Dep't. v. Robidoux, 218 Md. 195, 200, 146 A.2d 
184, 186 ( 1958); see generally infra Part V. While not squarely a ballot challenge, 
Heaton v. Mayor & City Council of Bait., 254 Md. 605,255 A.2d 310 (1969), presents 
a fascinating throw-back to yesteryear. Baltimore City had placed thirty-nine 
questions on the ballot and, at that time, "lever" machines were still used. !d. at 614, 
255 A.2d at 315. In order to make voting simpler, the machines were set up so that a 
voter could select each question separately, or alternatively, pull a "master lever" and 
vote "for" or "against" all thirty-nine measures. The court held that, because a master 
lever was neither permitted nor prohibited by the code, and because adequate 
measures were provided for a question-by-question vote, the master lever was 
permissible. !d. at 608-09, 614-15, 255 A.2d at 312, 315. Maryland has since 
adopted a uniform state-wide system of electronic voting. Schade v. Md. State Bd. of 
Elections, 401 Md. 1, 7, 930 A.2d 304, 308 (2007). 
398. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW§ 2-101 (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2012) (State Board); 
id. § 2-20l(a)(l) (Local Board); Mo. CODE REGS. 33.01.01.01(19), 33.01.01.01(27) 
(2011). 
399. See State Bd. of Elections v. Snyder, No. 122, 2013 Md.Lexis 607 *34-35 (county 
school boards are State agencies) (Md. Sep. 27, 2013) (quoting Chesapeake Charter, 
Inc. v. Anne Arundel Co. Bd. of Educ., 358 Md. 129, 136-37, 747 A.2d 625, 629 
(2000)); Rucker v. Harford Cnty., 316 Md. 275, 558 A.2d 399 (1989). Rucker 
involved a deputy sheriff, not an election board. !d. at 277, 558 A.2d at 400. The 
court held that "particular agencies or officials are State agencies or officials despite 
the fact that local governments are wholly or substantially responsible for funding 
those agencies or officials." !d. at 283, 558 A.2d at 403. After reviewing a number of 
cases, the court concluded: "These and other cases teach that the question of whether 
sheriffs and their deputies are State or local officials primarily depends on whether the 
creation and ultimate control of the offices of sheriff and deputy lie with the State or 
with local government." !d. at 285, 558 A.2d at 404. While not precisely parallel to 
boards of election, the court determined that the deputy sheriff was a state official. !d. 
at 302, 558 A.2d at 412. 
400. ELEC. LAW§ 2-20l(a)(2). 
401. !d.§ 2-103(b)(4). 
402. !d. § 2-203. Counties must appropriate funds for personnel expenses, polling place 
operation expenses, and prescribed supplies and equipment. !d.; see also Election 
Bds. & Judges-Cntys.-Obligation to Fund Essential Bd. Functions, 76 Md. Op. Att'y 
Gen. 194, 199 (1991); Kenneweg v. Cnty. Comm'rs of Allegany Cnty., 102 Md. 119, 
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regulations.403 They must use a uniform, statewide voting system and 
a statewide voter registration database.404 In some instances, their 
employees are part of the state personnel system; in others they are 
county merit system employees.405 Their hours of operation are set 
by state law.406 
2. By Statute, Membership on the Boards of Elections Is Limited to 
Members of the Principal Political Parties, i.e .. Democrats and 
Republicans 
Maryland is a diverse state with a number of political parties.407 
Recently, for example, both the Libertarian and Green parties have 
litigated to enforce their perceived or actual rights.408 Neither, 
however, is permitted to sit on the state or local boards of election 
that evaluate their petitions.409 That may present constitutional 
questions.410 
a. Composition of SBE 
The State Board of Elections is comprised of five members.411 The 
"political party412 affiliation" of the members is prescribed by 
statute.413 "Each member of the State Board shall be a member of 
129, 62 A. 249, 252 (1905). Board members receive salary and expense 
reimbursement under the county budget. ELEC. LAW § 2-204(a). Local boards are 
permitted to retain counsel, paid by the county, who are not Assistant Attorneys 
General. See id. § 2-205(a). 
403. ELEC. LAW§ 2-202(b). 
404. !d.§§ 3-IOI(a), 9-lOl(b). 
405. !d. § 2-202(b)(2). ELEC. LAW§ 2-207 provides personnel system requirements. 
406. !d. § 2-302(b). 
407. Maryland Political Parties, MD. STATE ARCHIVES (Feb. 19, 2013), 
msa.maryland.gov/msalmdmanual/40party/html/parties.html. 
408. Md. State Bd. of Elections v. Libertarian Party of Md., 426 Md. 488, 518, 44 A.3d 
1002, 1020 (2012) (signature requirements); Green Party v. Md. Bd. of Elections, 365 
Md. 472, 781 A.2d 778 (2001), reconsideration granted in part and denied in part, 
377 Md. 127, 137, 832 A.2d 214, 220 (2003) (ballot access). 
409. See ELEC. LAW§§ 2-l01(e), 2-201(b)(2). 
410. This issue was presented, but not decided, in Massey v. Harford Cnty. Bd. of 
Elections, No. SPMS-ELEC-10-11-45651, and the text and citations draw heavily 
from the parties' briefs in that case. 
411. ELEC. LAW § 2-101(a) ("There is a State Board of Elections consisting of five 
members."). 
412. '"Political party' means an organized group that is qualified as a political party in 
accordance with Title 4 of this article." !d. § l-101(hh). 
413. !d. § 2-101 (e) ("Political party affiliation"). 
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one of the principal political parties.'"'14 "'Principal political parties' 
means the majority party and the principal minority party."415 
"Majority party means the political party to which the incumbent 
Governor belongs, if the incumbent Governor is a member of a 
principal political party.'"'16 The "principal minority party" is "the 
principal political party whose candidate for Governor received the 
second highest number of votes of any party candidate at the last 
preceding general election.'"'17 
Appointments to SBE are made by the Governor, who chooses an 
"individual whose name is submitted to the Governor by the State 
Central Committee of the principal political party entitled to the 
appointment.''418 A person "may not be appointed" if it will result in 
the Board "having more than three or fewer than two members of the 
same principal political party.'"'19 
b. Composition of Local Boards of Election 
By state law, local election boards are comprised of three regular 
and two substitute members.420 State law provides that: "Two regular 
members and one substitute member shall be of the majority party, 
and one regular member and one substitute member shall be of the 
principal minority party.'"'21 
Nominations to local boards are made by political party affiliation: 
"The Governor shall request the county central committee 
representing the majority party or the principal minority party, as 
appropriate, to submit a list of at least four eligible individuals from 
which the Governor may make an appointment of a regular member 
or a substitute member of the local board.'"'22 
414. Id. § 2-201(e)(l). 
415. Jd. § 1-IOI(kk). 
416. I d. § 1-10 I ( dd). "If the incumbent Governor is not a member of one of the two 
principal political parties, 'majority party' means the principal political party whose 
candidate for Governor received the highest number of votes of any party candidate at 
the last preceding general election." I d. 
417. ld. § 1-IOI(jj). 
418. ld. § 2-101(c)(2). 
419. Jd. § 2-!0l(e)(2). 
420. Jd. § 2-201(b)(l). 
421. Jd. § 2-201(b)(2). 
422. Jd. § 2-201(g)(l). The code makes "special provisions" for Baltimore City and 
several counties. Jd. § 2-201(j), (k), (I). In Prince George's County: 
Four regular members and two substitute members shall be of the 
majority party, and one regular member and one substitute 
member shall be of the principal minority party .... If a vacancy 
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The Governor cannot appoint a member of any other party: "If a 
list containing the names of four eligible nominees is not submitted 
within 20 days of a request or if all the nominees on three lists are 
rejected, the Governor may appoint any eligible person who is a 
member of the appropriate political party."423 Vacancies must be 
filled based on political party affiliation.424 
c. Effective duopoly 
Because Maryland has historically been a duopoly,425 in practice all 
board members must be Democrats or Republicans.426 The court of 
appeals has recognized that they historically are the two principal 
parties.427 Indeed, it has taken note of the duopoly: 
In Maryland since 1896, the two major political parties 
have had equal representation among election judges and 
clerks, and unequal representation on Boards of Supervisors. 
In primary elections a faction of a party or an individual 
candidate, as such, has no representation at all on Boards of 
Supervisors or among judges or clerks.428 
There is disarray, however, as to whether "bipartisan" statutes are 
permissible, and there is no Maryland decision on point.429 When the 
occurs on the local board among the members from the majority 
party, the Governor shall designate one of the substitute members 
from that party to fill the vacancy. 
!d. § 2-201(j)(2)-(3). Similar party affiliation requirements are contained in 
subsections (k) and (I) for the remaining counties. Section 2-201 will be amended 
effective June I, 2015. The party affiliation provisions remain in the amended statute. 
!d. § 2-201 (effective Jan. I, 2015). 
423. !d. § 2-20 I (g)(3). 
424. !d. § 2-20 I (h)(l )(i)-(ii). 
425. The majority and principal minority parties have, in Maryland's modem history, been 
the Democratic and Republican parties. See John J. Walters, The Two-Party System, 
Pol'y Blog, MD. PUB. POL'Y INST. (Apr. 19, 2011), http://mdpolicy.org/policyblog/ 
detail/the-two-party-system ("At a time when American citizens are fighting and 
dying around the world to promote the spread of democracy, is it right for the state of 
Maryland to rule that the Green and Libertarian parties are no longer considered 
official?"); Julie Bykowicz, Rejected as Official, Third Parties Sue, BALT. SUN 
WEBLOG (Apr. 15, 2011 11:12 AM), http://weblogs.baltimoresun.com/news/ 
local/politics/2011/04/rejected_as_official_third_par.html. 
426. See ELEC. LAW§ 2-201(b)(2). 
427. Suessmann v. Lamone, 383 Md. 697,707,862 A.2d I, 7 (2004). 
428. Hammond v. Love, 187 Md. 138, 148,49 A.2d 75, 79 (1946). 
429. See infra Parts II.B.2.d-e. 
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court is "without [the] benefit of any case law," as is often the case, 
the answer should be found by "reasoning from first principles."430 
d. Decisions Holding "Bipartisan" Boards to Be Permissible 
A number of courts around the nation have upheld what they call 
"bipartisan composition of ... election boards."431 For instance, in 
Werme v. Merrill, members of a minority third political party, the 
Libertarian party, filed suit against the Governor and Secretary of 
State of New Hampshire, alleging "that the statutes governing 
appointment of election inspectors and ballot clerks abridged 
[plaintiffs'] constitutional rights to free association, due process, and 
equal protection."432 Specifically, they "sought an order commanding 
the appointment of Libertarians to [election related] positions on the 
430. Mandel v. O'Hara, 320 Md. 103, 125, 576 A.2d 766, 777 (1990). 
431. Vintson v. Anton, 786 F.2d 1023, 1025 (lith Cir. 1986) (Tjoflat, J., concurring) 
("Appellants admit that Alabama constitutionally may, as all states do, so far as we 
are aware, follow the practice of requiring bipartisanship in the composition of 
election boards. Such adversary partisan confrontation is universally regarded as an 
effective means of preventing fraud and ensuring honest elections."); Werme v. 
Merrill, 84 F.3d 479, 481-82 (1st Cir. 1996) (rejecting Libertarian challenge to 
bipartisan selection for election officials); Gill v. Rhode Island, 933 F. Supp. 151, 
155-56 (D.R.I. 1996) (holding that facially neutral statutes governing bipartisan local 
canvassing authority did not violate constitutional rights despite the fact that the 
statutes conditioned political party's right to nominate members based on prior 
success at polls), aff'd by unpublished opinion, 107 F.3d I (1st Cir. 1997); Coal. for 
Sensible & Humane Solutions v. Wamser, 590 F. Supp. 217, 218 (E.D. Mo. 1984) 
(voter registration teams); Pirincin v. Bd. of Elections of Cuyahoga Cnty., 368 F. 
Supp. 64 (N.D. Ohio 1973) (county school boards), afl'd, 414 U.S. 990 (1973); 
Bishop v. Lomenzo, 350 F. Supp. 576, 588 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (holding constitutional 
state statute providing for voter registration by bipartisan teams consisting of one 
member of each of the state's two largest political parties); MacGuire v. Houston, 717 
P.2d 948, 954-55 (Colo. 1986) (upholding law restricting election judges to two 
major political parties); State ex rei. Lockhart v. Rogers, 61 S.E.2d 258, 263 (W.Va. 
1950) (citing Hasson v. City of Chester, 67 S.E. 731 (W.Va. 1910)); State ex rei. 
Buttz v. Marion Circuit Court, 72 N.E.2d 225, 231-32 (Ind. 1947); State ex rei. State 
Cent. Comm. of Progressive Party v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs of Milwaukee, 3 
N.W.2d 123, 126 (Wis. 1942) (stating that the purpose of the statute providing for 
appointment of election officials from the two dominant political parties is "not 
distribution of offices among political parties . . . but merely the maintenance of 
honest and uncorrupted elections."); see, e.g., Dovel v. Bertram, 34 S.E.2d 369, 370 
(Va. 1945) (noting that Virginia's statute requires that the appointment of the electoral 
board "shall be given to each of the two political parties which, at the general election 
next preceding their appointment, cause the highest and next highest number of 
votes"). 
432. 84 F.3d at 481. 
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same basis as members of the Democratic and Republican parties."433 
The United States District Court upheld New Hampshire's statutory 
scheme, ultimately "conclud[ing] that the [State's] interest in the 
efficient management of election activities justified the small 
restriction on the plaintiffs' rights that the challenged statutes 
entailed."434 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, 
recognizing that "each state retains the authority to regulate state and 
local elections and to prescribe the duties and qualifications of 
persons who work at the polls."435 The First Circuit noted that this 
authority is not unfettered; however, it concluded that, because the 
regulation at issue was "justified by legitimate state interests and 
impose[ d) only a modest burden" on plaintiffs rights, the regulation 
was constitutional.436 The court of appeals utilized the Supreme 
Court's "flexible framework for testing the validity of election 
regulations."437 Quoting the Supreme Court in Burdick v. Takushi, 
the First Circuit wrote: 
Under this standard, the rigorousness of [the] inquiry into 
the propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent 
to which a challenged regulation burdens First and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Thus, as we have recognized 
when those rights are subject to severe restrictions, the 
regulation must be narrowly drawn to advance a state 
interest of compelling importance. But when a state election 
law provision imposes only reasonable, nondiscriminatory 
restrictions upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights 
of voters, the state's important regulatory interests are 
generally sufficient to justify the restrictions.438 
In analyzing the plaintiffs' arguments within the Burdick 
framework, the court of appeals first concluded that the New 
Hampshire regulation was nondiscriminatory; second, that the 
regulation had no direct impact on ballot access, the right to vote, or 
the right to have one's vote counted; third, that the regulation had 
indiscernible effects on ballot access and the right to vote and that 
433. /d. at 481-82. 
434. /d. at 482. 
435. /d. at 483, 487. 
436. /d. 
437. /d. at 483. 
438. /d. at 483-84 (citations omitted) (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 
(1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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there was "no showing of systematic discrimination against minority 
parties in the casting and tallying of votes[;]" and fourth, that the 
burden claimed by plaintiffs was purely conjectural.439 The court 
then applied the rational basis test to the regulation, finding that the 
state had a "valid interest in preserving the integrity and reliability of 
the electoral process" and that the state's method of achieving that 
valid interest was rational. 440 Thus, the court held that "New 
Hampshire's grant of a monopoly over the appointment of election 
inspectors and ballot clerks to the two most popular political parties 
[wa]s justified by legitimate state interests and impose[d] only a 
modest burden on the plaintiffs ... rights."441 
e. Decisions Prohibiting "Bipartisan" Boards 
On the other hand, an Iowa statute limiting the governmental office 
of mobile deputy registrar to nominees of the two principal parties 
was declared unconstitutional in Iowa Socialist Party v. Stockett. 442 
In the court's words, "[p]laintiffs contend that appointment of mobile 
deputy registrars from persons nominated by the county chairmen of 
the two major political parties violates plaintiffs' rights to freedom of 
association, due process, and equal protection under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution."443 In 
effect, the plaintiffs argued that the statute violated the right of non-
association. 444 The court reasoned that: 
Given the unlikelihood of unseating either of the 
traditionally dominant parties, the fate of minor party 
members or supporters, and also of independents, who 
desire to serve as mobile deputy registrar lies in the 
unfettered discretion of the Democratic and Republican 
chairmen. One can easily imagine the reluctance chairmen 
439. !d. at 483-85. 
440. !d. at 486-87. 
441. !d. at 487. 
442. 604 F. Supp. 1391, 1398 (S.D. Iowa 1985). 
443. !d. at 1392. 
444. See id. The constitutionally protected freedom to associate encompasses the freedom 
not to associate. See Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1, 17 (1990) 
(declining to answer the question of whether individuals can be compelled to associate 
in an organization). 
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of the dominant parties might have nominating members or 
supporters of rival parties. 445 
727 
Because this burden "falls unequally on new or small political 
parties or on independent candidates, [it] impinges, by its very nature, 
on associational choices protected by the First Amendment. It 
discriminates against those candidates and-of particular 
importance-against those voters whose political preferences lie 
outside the existing political parties.'..w; The court concluded: "It 
cannot be said that the only practical way to limit the number of 
mobile deputy registrars is to deny consideration to all but nominees 
of the two major [political] parties."447 It held the statute 
unconstitutional.448 Unlike the Maryland statute, the Iowa law "does 
not require nominees for mobile deputy registrar to be members of a 
party. •>449 
A Missouri statute that compelled selection of school 
commissioners from the two major political parties was enjoined in 
State of Missouri ex rei. Preisler v. Woodward. 450 There, a 
nonpartisan candidate wanted to run for election. 451 State law 
mandated that six of the twelve board members belong to the 
majority party and the remainder come from the next highest party. 
In the court's words, "[t]hese provisions are challenged as 
"impinging upon the constitutional guaranty 'That all elections shall 
be free and open. "'452 The court struck down the statute because: 
If the Legislature has the power to attach as a condition of 
eligibility that members of an elective body, such as the 
board of education, shall be selected from the two major 
political parties, then it necessarily follows that it would 
have the power to prescribe that all the members shall be of 
one political party, or that its membership be made up of 
individuals belonging to the political parties casting, 
respectively, the highest and third highest vote at the last 
445. Slockett, 604 F. Supp. at 1395. 
446. !d. at 1396. 
447. !d. at 1397. 
448. !d. at 1398. 
449. !d. at 1395; MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW§ 2-201(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2010). 
450. State ex rei. Preisler v. Woodward, 105 S.W.2d 912, 913-14 (Mo. 1937). 
451. !d. at 913. 
452. /d. at 914. Maryland has a similar provision. Article 7 of the Declaration of Rights 
provides that "elections ought to be free and frequent." Mo. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. 
art. 7. 
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preceding general election, thus, in both instances, making 
ineligible members of the numerically strongest minority 
party. To so restrict eligibility would, we think, constitute a 
violation of the constitutional guaranty mentioned.453 
In another Missouri case, Preisler v. Calcaterra, the court declared 
that statutes permitting only the two largest and most dominant 
political parties in the state to have challengers and watchers at the 
poll unconstitutional as violative of the Equal Protection Clause.454 
While acknowledging the lack of space at polling places and the need 
to regulate the number of election challengers and watchers, the court 
nonetheless determined that the "difference in treatment of political 
parties appear[ ed] to be arbitrary and without reasonable basis."455 
Specifically, the court wrote: 
We do not doubt the authority of the Legislature to control 
this by fixing reasonable standards to be met by parties to be 
entitled to challengers and watchers or even to get their 
candidates on the ballot. The validity of such limitations on 
the basis of requiring more than a small minimum 
percentage of the vote cast at the last election for such 
privileges, ... has become well established.456 
Yet, given that challengers and watchers are present to secure the 
purity and fairness of elections on behalf of their political parties, and 
serve a purely partisan function, the court found that the statute 
limiting the challengers and watchers to the two dominant political 
parties only was unconstitutional and an arbitrary violation of the 
Equal Protection provisions of the state and federal constitutions.457 
To the same effect is Rathbone v. Wirth,458 where a statute limiting 
the police board to four commissioners, not more than two of whom 
could belong to the same party, was held unconstitutional.459 The 
purpose of the statute was to equalize power between the two 
principal parties.460 Just like Preisler, the court wrote that "if the 
453. Woodward, 105 S.W.2d at 915 (emphasis added). 
454. Preisler v. Calcaterra, 243 S.W.2d 62, 63, 66 (Mo. 1951). 
455. !d. at 65. 
456. !d. 
457. !d. at 65-66. 
458. 40 N.Y.S. 535 (1896). 
459. !d. at 537, 561. 
460. !d. at 540. 
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object sought can be accomplished in regard to the police department, 
it can be in relation to all departments of city, village, county and 
town governments."461 It held: "This is in violation of the 
fundamental laws of a republican form of government.'>%2 
In the words of the Supreme Court in the context of admission to 
the bar:463 
The First Amendment's protection of association prohibits a 
State from excluding a person from a profession or 
punishing him solely because he [or she] is a member of a 
particular political organization or because he holds certain 
beliefs. Similarly, when a State attempts to make inquiries 
about a person's beliefs or associations, its power is limited 
by the First Amendment. Broad and sweeping state 
inquiries into these protected areas, as Arizona has engaged 
in here, discourage citizens from exercising rights protected 
by the Constitution. 
When a State seeks to inquire about an individual's beliefs 
and associations a heavy burden lies upon it to show that the 
inquiry is necessary to protect a legitimate state interest. ... 
And whatever justification may be offered, a State may not 
inquire about a man's views or associations solely for the 
purpose of withholding a right or benefit because of what he 
[or she] believes. 464 
f Statutory Powers of the State and Local Boards 
By statute, SBE's powers and discretion are substantial.465 Pursuant 
to Election Law, Section 2-102: 
(a) In general. - The State Board shall manage and 
supervise elections in the State and ensure compliance with 
the requirements of this article and any applicable federal 
law by all persons involved in the elections process. 
(b) Specific powers and duties. - In exercising its authority 
under this article and in order to ensure compliance with this 
461. !d. at 537. 
462. !d. at 540. 
463. Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1971) (discussing admission to practice 
law). 
464. !d. (citations omitted). 
465. See MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW§ 2-102 (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2012). 
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article and with any requirements of federal law, the State 
Board shall: 
(1) supervise the conduct of elections in the State; 
(2) direct, support, monitor, and evaluate the activities of 
each local board; 
(3) have a staff sufficient to perform its functions; 
( 4) adopt regulations to implement its powers and duties; 
(5) receive, and in its discretion audit, campaign finance 
reports, independent expenditure reports filed under § 13-
306 of this article, and electioneering communication 
reports filed under§ 13-307 of this article; 
(6) appoint a State Administrator in accordance with § 2-
103 of this subtitle; 
(7) maximize the use of technology in election 
administration, including the development of a plan for a 
comprehensive computerized elections management system; 
(8) canvass and certify the results of elections as prescribed 
bylaw; 
(9) make available to the general public, in a timely and 
efficient manner, information on the electoral process, 
including a publication that includes the text of this article, 
relevant portions of the Maryland Constitution, and 
information gathered and maintained regarding elections; 
. (10) subject to § 2-106 of this subtitle and§ 13-341 of this 
article, receive, maintain, and serve as a depository for 
elections documents, materials, records, statistics, reports, 
certificates, proclamations, and other information prescribed 
by law or regulation; 
(11) prescribe all forms required under this article; and 
(12) serve as the official designated office in accordance 
with the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting 
Act for providing information regarding voter registration 
and absentee ballot procedures for absent uniformed 
services voters and overseas voters with respect to elections 
for federal office. 
(c) Majority vote required. - The powers and duties 
assigned to the State Board under this article shall be 
exercised in accordance with an affirmative vote by a 
supermajority of the members of the State Board.466 
466. ld. 
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Similarly, by statute a local board's powers and discretion are 
substantial. Pursuant to election law, section 2-202(b): 
Each local board, in accordance with the provisions of this 
article and regulations adopted by the State Board, shall: 
(1) oversee the conduct of all elections held in its county 
and ensure that the elections process is conducted in an 
open, convenient, and impartial manner; 
(2) pursuant to the State Personnel and Pensions Article, or 
its county merit system, whichever is applicable, appoint an 
election director to manage the operations and supervise the 
staff of the local board; 
(3) maintain an office and be open for business as provided 
in this article, and provide the supplies and equipment 
necessary for the proper and efficient conduct of voter 
registration and election, including: 
(i) supplies and equipment required by the State Board; and 
(ii) office and polling place equipment expenses; 
( 4) adopt any regulation it considers necessary to perform its 
duties under this article, which regulation shall become 
effective when it is filed with and approved by the State 
Board; 
( 5) serve as the local board of canvassers and certify the 
results of each election conducted by the local board; 
(6) establish and alter the boundaries and number of 
precincts in accordance with § 2-303 of this title, and 
provide a suitable polling place for each precinct, and assign 
voters to precincts; 
(7) provide to the general public timely information and 
notice, by publication or mail, concerning voter registration 
and elections; 
(8) make determinations and hear and decide challenges and 
appeals as provided by law; 
(9) (i) aid in the prosecution of an offense under this article; 
and 
(ii) when the board finds there is probable cause to believe 
an offense has been committed, refer the matter to the 
appropriate prosecutorial authority; 
(10) maintain and dispose of its records in accordance with 
the plan adopted by the State Board under § 2-106 of this 
title; and 
(11) administer voter registration and absentee voting for 
nursing homes and assisted living facilities in accordance 
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with procedures established by the State Administrator, 
subject to the approval of the State Board.467 
3. Unsuccessful Efforts to Amend the Membership Requirement 
Introduced in the 2012 session, H.B. 908 would have provided that 
the five members of the State Board of Elections include three 
majority and two non-majority party members.468 The latter term was 
defined as "a registered voter who was not affiliated with the 
majority party."469 Further, appointments would not be made from 
names provided by a central committee.470 This would have opened 
the door to persons who were not part of the duopoly.471 The Bill did 
not make it out of the Ways and Means Committee.472 
4. Political Party Affiliation May Not Be a Legitimate Requirement 
for Membership on an Election Board 
While, in an earlier time, the requirement that both major parties be 
represented on the boards was an effort to preclude a monopoly, 
ensure diversity, and foster fairness, times have changed and the 
political scene is more diverse. As such, the requirement may have 
become unduly restrictive. The General Assembly may wish to 
consider whether political party affiliation is an appropriate 
qualification for office, particularly on boards of election that have 
broad powers over the electoral process.473 Abraham Lincoln was a 
member of a third, minority political party; he was a Republican.474 
467. !d. § 2-202(b) (emphasis added). 
468. H.B. 908, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012). 
469. !d. 
470. See id. 
471. See id. 
472. See id. Question Lon the Baltimore City ballot was a Charter Amendment providing 
"for the purpose of allowing voters registered as unaffiliated or as third party 
members to sit on City boards and commissions as minority party representatives; 
defming a certain term; generally relating to minority party representation on City 
boards and commissions." The question passed. See Election Results, 
BALTIMORECITY.Gov, http://apps.baltimorecity.gov/elections/electionresults/. 
473. See MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW§ 5-203(a)(2)(i) (LexisNexis 2010). 
474. "The last successful third party in American politics elected its first President in 1860. 
The party of course was the Republicans and the President was Abraham Lincoln." 
J.C. Adamson, The Last Successful American Third Party, THE MUSER, 
http://www.greatreality.com/3p/minority/last3rd.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2013). 
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If he were alive today, he could have been precluded from sitting on a 
state or local board of elections.475 
Each election board is required to be "impartial."476 In the court's 
words, however, "[t]he Supervisors of Elections, while presumed to 
be impartial, are, in fact, political appointees, a majority of whom 
always belong to one or the other of the two major parties.'>477 
Maryland has historically discriminated against minor parties in 
violation of the state constitution.478 The exclusion of all except 
Democrats and Republicans from participation in an important part of 
the electoral process may not serve a valid or legitimate state interest 
and can be characterized as discrimination based on political belief 
and association, designed to protect the monopoly or duopoly.479 A 
voter who chooses to exercise the constitutional right to be a member 
of a third-party, or a non-affiliated independent, becomes, per se, a 
political outcast, statutorily-barred from participation in the 
governmental body charged with impartially conducting elections.480 
If this statute is permissible, it would be equally permissible (albeit 
hypothetical and implausible) to limit the boards to members of the 
majority party and the party receiving the third or fourth highest 
number of votes at the prior election.481 That would exclude, on the 
current record, Republican participation.482 It is, on its face, an 
absurd proposition and the statute is therefore likely impermissible.483 
475. See ELEC. LAW§§ 1-lOl(dd), (jj), (kk), 2-lOl(e)(l), 2-20l(b)(l)-(2) (stating that the 
members of the state and local boards must be from the two principal political 
parties). 
4 76. !d. § 2-202(b )(1 ). 
477. Tawney v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections, 198 Md. 120, 129, 81 A.2d 209, 213 
(1951). 
478. See Md. Green Party v. Md. Bd. of Elections, 377 Md. 127, 135-37, 152-53, 832 
A.2d 214, 218-20, 229 (2003). 
479. Benjamin D. Black, Note, Developments in the State Regulation of Major and Minor 
Political Parties, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 109 (1996) ("America's courts recognized 
early the conflict of interest inherent in providing politicians the power to create the 
electoral laws by which they are elected .... "). "[B]arriers to entry created by the 
major parties in state legislatures contribute to the monopoly enjoyed by the 
Democrats and Republicans. It is therefore useful to ask whether this disparate 
treatment is necessary." !d. 
480. See id. at 111-14. 
481. See ELEC. LAW§ 5-203(a)(2)(1) (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2012) (requiring only that 
an individual be a member of a "political party" and not one of the "majority political 
parties"). 
482. See id. § 1-lOl(dd); Governor, Mo. STATE ARCHIVES, http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/ 
mdmanual/08conofflhtml/msal3090.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2013). 
483. Cf ELEC. LAW§ 2-202(b)(l). 
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The statute is arguably promoting self-entrenchment and power 
preservation, goals that are not permissible in a democracy.484 
Individual merit is a more appropriate qualification for office and a 
number of legislative modifications are available.485 
III. COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL REFERENDA 
Article XVI, is not the sole source of the referendum power at the 
State, county, or municipal level. For example, article XIX, section 
1 (e), created a right to referenda on state statutes expanding 
commercial gaming486 and, under article XIV, section 1, the people 
have "retain[ ed] the sovereign power to rewrite their constitution" 
and have not delegated that power to the General Assembly.487 
A. Referenda in Counties 
In code counties, under article XI-F, section 7 of the Maryland 
Constitution, public local laws are subject to petition.488 In addition, 
484. This situation is distinct from ballot access restrictions where the state may have 
legitimate interests to protect in limiting ballot access. Even in that context, however, 
the Supreme Court has struck down limits that impose a substantially unequal burden 
and are not supported by a compelling state interest. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 
23, 24-26, 31 (1968). Because the statute in question gave the Democrats and 
Republicans a "complete monopoly," it was fatally flawed. ld. at 32. Silencing third 
parties is not a lawful governmental purpose. See id. at 39, 41 (Douglas, J., 
concurring). 
485. For example, one less restrictive alternative would be to form a board comprised of 
the top four parties plus an independent representative. 
486. Laurel Racing Assoc., Inc. v. Video Lottery Facility Location Comm'n, 409 Md. 445, 
448 n.2, 975 A.2d 894, 896 n.2 (2009) (quoting constitutional provision). That 
provision was unsuccessfully challenged in Canavan v. Maryland State Bd. of 
Elections, 430 Md. 533, 61 A.3d 828 (2013) (per curiam). 
487. Smigiel v. Franchot, 410 Md. 302, 314, 978 A.2d 687, 694 (quoting Bd. of 
Supervisors of Elections for Anne Arundel Cnty. v. Atty Gen., 246 Md. 417,439,229 
A.2d 388, 400 (1967)); Bait. Cnty. Coal. Against Unfair Taxes v. Bait. Cnty., Md., 
321 Md. 184, 189, 582 A.2d 510, 512 (1990) (noting that section 309 of the Baltimore 
County Charter was promulgated under Mo. CONST. article XI-A, and describing 
differences between Charter§ 309 and MD. CONST. article XVI). 
488. MD. CONST. art. XI-F, § 7 provides: 
Any action of a code county in the enactment, amendment, or repeal of a 
public local law is subject to a referendum of the voters in the county, as in 
this section provided. The enactment, amendment, or repeal shall be effective 
unless a petition of the registered voters of the county requires that it be 
submitted to a referendum of the voters in the county. The General Assembly 
shall amplify the provisions of this section by general law in any manner not 
inconsistent with this Article, except that in any event the number of 
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people in code counties have a statutory right to referendum under 
article 25-B, section 10(h).489 
Under article XI-A, a charter county may, by charter, confer on its 
citizens the right to petition ordinances to referendum.490 
"Interestingly, the Constitution guarantees the right of referendum 
over local legislation to the residents of all counties except those 
opting for a charter form of government. ... "491 Thus, for charter 
counties, the right to referenda is established implicitly in article XI-
A and explicitly in a county charter.492 Charter counties, however, 
may not amend their charter to provide for the initiative.493 
signatures required on such a petition shall not be fewer than five percentum 
(5%) of the voters in a county registered for county and State elections. 
Article XI-F, section 2, makes creation of a code county subject to referendum. 
!d. at§ 2. 
489. Kent Island Def. League, LLC v. Queen Anne's Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 145 Md. App. 
684, 689, 806 A.2d 341, 344 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002), cert. denied, 371 Md. 615, 
810 A.2d 962 (2002), citing Mo. CONST. art. XI-F, § 7, and art. 258, § IO(h); Howard 
Cnty. Citizens for Open Gov't v. Howard Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 201 Md. App. 605, 
617, 30 A.3d 245, 253 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011). For commissioner counties, article 
258, section 10(h), creates a right of referendum on public local laws. Mo. CODE 
ANN., art. 258, § 1 O(h). A number of statutes create rights to referendum. Mo. CODE 
ANN., AGRIC. §§8-308, 8-401, 10-104; Mo. CODE ANN., ENVIR. §§9-7ll(c), 9-934(a); 
MD. CODE ANN., HOUS. & CMTY. DEY. §4-232(b); LAND USE §20-607; Art. 28, §2-
202(a)(2); Art. 23A, §13(g, h); Art. 23A, §14; Art. 23A, §16; Art. 23A, §19; See 
county attorney's letter attached to Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 1982 WL 195056 (1982) 
(citing to Mo. CONST. art. XI-F, art. 33, § 23-3, art. 43, § 425, art. 23A, §§ 14, 19, 25, 
34, and 40, as well as § 2(30)). For a listing of various authorities providing for 
referenda, see, HB 493, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013) (Appendix to Dept. of 
Legislative Servs. Fiscal and Policy Note) 
http:/ /mgaleg.maryland.gov /20 13 RS/fnotes/bil_ 0003/hb0493. pdf. 
490. 63 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 291 (1978) (citing Ritchrnount P'ship v. Board of Supervisors, 
283 Md. 48, 388 A.2d 523 (1978)). In Scull v. Montgomery Citizens League, the court 
suggested that where a county council acted in an executive, as opposed to legislative 
role, the charter could not provide for a referendum. 249 Md. 271, 282, 239 A.2d 92, 
98 (1968). 
491. Ritchmount P'ship., 283 Md. at 55 n.6, 388 A.2d at 528 n.6 (citing Mo. CONST. art. 
XI-A, Xl-F, § 7, and XVI, § 3). 
492. Kent Island Def League, 145 Md. App. at 692 n.2, 806 A.2d at 346 n.2 ("We note 
that Article XI-A of the Constitution does not contain an express referendum 
provision. While speculation, a possible reason is that charter counties can include 
the right to referendum in their charter."); Howard Cnty. Citizens for Open Gov 't, 20 I 
Md. App. at 616, 30 A.3d at 253 ("[T]he right of referendum is also conferred by 
implication to voters in charter counties by Art. XI-A, §1."). "Each of Maryland's 
eight charter counties also permits referendums as well as provisions for direct 
amendments of their charters." Survey-Developments in Maryland Law 1988-89, 49 
Mo. L. REv. 509, 579 (1990) (citation omitted). In 1976, article 25A, section 8, was 
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Counties do not have the right to veto an annexation of their 
territory; however, they do have the right to put an annexation 
resolution to referendum.494 The Attorney General has stated: "[O]n 
enactment of the annexation resolution, the county governing body, 
by at least a two-thirds vote, may petition the municipality for a 
referendum to be held in the territory to be annexed [sections 19(h) 
and 19(j)]. "495 
B. Referenda in Home Rule Municipalities 
Generally, the right to a municipal referendum is a delegated, not a 
reserved, power.496 The Attorney General has noted that "[t]he 
possibilities for litigation in the area of municipal/county annexation 
are virtually inexhaustible, especially in the face of legislative 
silence."497 The legislature's power to define municipal referenda 
appears to be plenary.498 One significant referendum provision is 
article 23A, section 19, creating a right to petition on municipal 
annexations.499 Municipal zoning ordinances may be put to 
amended "in an attempt to give statutory support to the exercise of the right of 
referendum by citizens of chartered counties." City of Takoma Park v. Citizens for 
Decent Gov't, 301 Md. 439,441 n.l, 483 A.2d 348,350 n.l (1984) (per curiam). The 
court of appeals has "recognized that by a county charter provision, the people [of a 
charter county] may reserve the right of referendum on public local laws enacted by 
its local legislative body, created pursuant to Article XI-A of the Constitution." Anne 
Arundel Cnty. v. McDonough, 277 Md. 271, 287, 354 A.2d 788, 797-98 (1976). The 
McDonough court noted that "[i]t is not uncommon for people to write into their basic 
charter a restriction upon the powers of their legislative body." /d. (citations omitted). 
As of 1995, the Attorney General noted that "every charter subdivision has such a 
general referendum provision in its charter, except for Baltimore City." 80 Md. Op. 
Att'y Gen. 151 n.IO (1995). 
493. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections of Anne Arundel Cnty. v. Smallwood, 327 Md. 220, 
235, 608 A.2d 1222, 1229 (1992) (citations omitted). "We reiterate that the voters of 
a charter county cannot reserve to themselves the power to initiate legislation because 
such initiative conflicts with the terms of Art. XI-A, §3, of the Maryland 
Constitution." !d. at 236, 608 A.2d at 1230. 
494. Md. Op. Att'y Gen., 1981 WL 163980, at *1 (Sep. 18, 1981) (unpublished). 
495. !d. at *2. 
496. See id. at *I. 
497. 67 Md. Op. Att'y. Gen. 279 (1982). 
498. See McGraw v. Merryman, 133 Md. 247, 248, 104 A. 540, 541 (1918). The court 
reasoned that the legislature need not delegate the right to referendum and therefore 
"this court has no right to call in question the wisdom or even justice of it." !d. 
499. Art. 23A, §19. See supra note 33 (re: re-codification of Art. 23A). The 
constitutionality of article 23A, section 19, has not been challenged. Former 
subsection 19(u) was held unconstitutional under Mo. CONST. art. XI-E, § 1. Mayor 
and Alderman of Annapolis v. Wimbleton, Inc., 52 Md. App. 256, 447 A.2d 509 (Md. 
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referendum.500 Municipal charter amendments are subject to 
referendum by petition. 501 
C. The Municipal and County Initiatives Exception 
As noted above, the initiative does not exist at the state level. 502 
Recent efforts to create a right to initiative have failed in the General 
Assembly.503 
1. Initiative at the Municipal Level 
There is a small exception at the municipal level: "The Maryland 
Constitution explicitly provides for an initiative process for amending 
a municipal or county charter."504 
Ct. Spec. App. 1982). Subsection (u) gave Anne Arundel County the power to 
disapprove of annexation resolutions enacted by its municipalities. I d. at 261, 44 7 
A.2d at 511-12. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that the disapproval 
power in the state code violated the uniformity provisions of Mo. CONST. article XI-E, 
section I. ld. at267-68,447 A.2dat515. 
500. Md. Op. Att'y Gen., 1982 WL 195056 (1982) (relying on the home rule provisions in 
Art. 23A, § 2(30)). 
501. Mayor and City Council of Ocean City v. Bunting, 168 Md. App. 134, 140 n.lO, 895 
A.2d 1068, 1071 n.IO (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006). 
502. E.g., Town May Amend Charter to Allow for Legislation by Ballot Initiative, 88 Md. 
Op. Att'y Gen. 156, !57 (2003). 
503. See H.B. 871, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess (Md. 2013). 
504. Town May Amend Charter to Allow for Legislation by Ballot Initiative, 88 Md. Op. 
Att'y Gen. 156, 158 (2003) (citing MD. CONST. art. XI-A. § 5; MD. CONST. art. XI-E, 
§ 4); see also George Liebmann, Curbing Legislative and Executive Abuse: 
Referendum and Initiative in Maryland, 33 MD. B.J. 34, 34 (2000) ("Maryland, to be 
sure, has the initiative in one limited context.") (citing Mo. CONST. art. XI-A,§ 5; Mo. 
CONST. art. XI-E, § 4)). The power to initiate a charter amendment cannot be abused 
or converted into the power to initiate detailed legislation. Save Our Streets v. 
Mitchell, 357 Md. 237, 249-53, 743 A.2d 748, 755-57 (2000). It is limited and the 
subject-matter must be "charter material," and not legislative. Cheeks v. Cedlair 
Corp., 287 Md. 595, 607-09,415 A.2d 255,261-62 (1980) (rent control could not be 
accomplished by initiative for charter amendment; citizens cannot exercise the police 
power through plebiscite). Thus, under Cheeks, charter amendments are limited to 
amendments to the form or structure of government. I d. at 607, 415 A.2d at 261. A 
charter amendment "cannot transcend its limited office and be made to serve or 
function as a vehicle through which to adopt local legislation. Jd.; accord Wicomico 
Cnty. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge Ill v. Wicomico Cnty., Md., 190 Md. App. 
291, 300, 988 A.2d 555, 560 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010), overruled by Atkinson v. 
Anne Arundel Cnty., 428 Md. 723, 750, 53 A.3d 1184, 1200 (2012) (Charter 
amendment was a prohibited citizen initiative, not a permissible referendum). While 
Cheeks limited the scope of a charter amendment, Town of Glenarden v. Bromery, 257 
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Nevertheless, a wider initiative door is open at the municipal 
level.505 The Attorney General has opined that, subject to some 
restraints, a town may amend its charter to provide for the 
initiative.506 In brief summary, the Attorney General's analysis is that 
there is no prohibition to such an amendment and home rule was 
intended to authorize towns to determine the form and structure of 
their municipal government.507 The opinion carefully distinguished 
this municipal power from county governments, which cannot create 
the initiative.508 Similarly, in dicta, the court of appeals has suggested 
that the municipal authorization under the grant of express powers 
may be sufficient to adopt "a method for exercising the express 
powers other than by ordinance. "509 
2. Initiative at the County Level 
Md. 19, 24, 262 A.2d 60, 63 (1970), made clear that, if an amendment is proper, the 
fact that it removes elected officials from office, effectively "recalling" them, is of no 
moment. In Int 'I Assoc. of Fire Fighters, Local 1715 Cumberland Firefighters v. 
Mayor and City Council of Cumberland, 407 Md. 1, 15, 962 A.2d 374, 382 (2008), 
the court reviewed an initiative effort and remanded for, among other things, a 
determination of whether the scope of the proposal was within the purview of an 
amendment to a city charter. Thus, while the initiative power exists in that context, it 
is circumscribed. 
505. See supra note 504 and accompanying text. 
506. Town May Amend Charter to Allow for Legislation by Ballot Initiative, 88 Md. Op. 
Att'y Gen. 156, 164 (2003). 
507. !d. at 158-59 (municipal power derives from article XI-E of the Maryland 
Constitution and article 23A of the Annotated Code of Maryland). 
508. !d. at 158-61 (municipal power to create the initiative stems from article XI-E of the 
Maryland Constitution, which does not apply to counties). 
509. Cheeks, 287 Md. at 609 n.8, 415 A.2d at 262 n.8. The Cheeks court also noted 
precedent to the effect that "the people, in adopting a home rule charter, 'have the 
right to make provision therein for any form of government they deem suitable for 
their needs, so long as they do not in the process run afoul of the letter and spirit of the 
Federal and State Constitutions."' !d. at 611, 414 A.2d at 263 (quoting Ritchmount 
P'ship v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections for Anne Arundel Cnty., 283 Md. 48, 59, 
388 A.2d 523, 530 (1978)). 
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Amendment of county charters by initiative is permissible under 
Maryland Constitution, article XI-A, section 5.510 Amendments to 
home rule charters may be proposed by a petition signed by twenty 
percent of the registered voters.511 The Talbot County charter 
authorized "voter-initiated legislation upon petition of ten percent of 
the County's registered voters ... "; however, it was held 
unconstitutional. 512 
At the end of the day, even if one supported it, one may question 
the value of the initiative: "As with legislation passed by the Town 
Council, legislation enacted by means of an initiative is subject to 
future amendment or repeal by the Town Council."513 
IV. WHO CAN CHALLENGE A DECISION TO CERTIFY OR 
REJECT A REFERENDUM? 
The court of appeals has generally rejected technical, pleading 
challenges in referendum cases.514 Substantive pleading challenges 
are, however, viewed more stringently.515 
A. Who May Bring Suit? 
Under section 6-209(a) of the election law article "[a] person 
aggrieved by a determination made under [sections] 6-202, 6-206, or 
6-208(a)(2) ... may seek judicial review."516 "[A]ny registered 
510. Pickett v. Prince George's Cnty., 291 Md. 648, 650, 436 A.2d 449, 451 (1981 ); see 
also Ficker v. Denny, 326 Md. 626, 628 & n.l, 606 A.2d 1060, 1061 & n.l (1992); 
Note, Interaction and Interpretation of the Budget and Referendum Amendments of 
the Maryland Constitution - Bayne v. Secretary of State, 39 Mo. L. REV. 558, 573 
n.127 (1980). 
511. Pickett, 291 Md. at 650, 436 A.2d at 451 (quoting Mo. CONST. art. XI-A, § 5). 
512. Md. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws v. Talbot Cnty., 316 Md. 332, 336,558 A.2d 
724, 726 (1988). In Talbot County, a new detention center was authorized by the 
county council. The citizens initiated a bill that would effectively provide that no 
such facility could be constructed at that location. /d. at 337 & n.2, 558 A.2d at 726 
&n.2. 
513. Town May Amend Charter to Allow for Legislation by Ballot Initiative, 88 Md. Op. 
Att'y Gen. 156, 163 (2003). 
514. See Sun Cab Co. v. Cloud, 162 Md. 419, 431, 159 A. 922, 926 (1932) (rejecting the 
argument that complaint was "multifarious"). 
515. Cf Read Drug & Chern. Co. v. Colwill Constr. Co., 250 Md. 406, 412-14,243 A.2d 
548, 552-53 (1968). 
516. Mo. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW§ 6-209(a) (LexisNexis 2010). Venue is rarely an issue. 
For a discussion of common-law venue over the state, see Sun Cab, 162 Md. at 429, 
159 A. at 926 ("But we find no ground for a court's declaring that the public interest 
always demands that suits against the Secretary of State in his official capacity be 
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voter" may seek declaratory relief under election law, section 6-
209(b).517 
Thus, petition signatories have brought suit,518 and a person whose 
signature was rejected may be able to do so.519 Petition sponsors520 
and registered voters have maintained referendum lawsuits.521 It is 
common to join registered voters and a ballot committee or other 
organizational sponsor as plaintiffs.522 Taxpayers have been 
permitted to file suit, and the court has noted that "taxpayers 
interested in avoiding the waste of funds derived from taxation, 
which would be involved in conducting a referendum, have a right to 
bring such action in representation of all other taxpayers who may be 
involved."523 The court has permitted a Mayor and Aldermen to file 
brought in Anne Arundel County .... "). Nevertheless, the "regular venue for a suit 
against a public officer or body is ... the seat of that branch of the government of 
which the officer or body is a part." Jd. at 428, 159 A. at 925. The Maryland Court of 
Appeals also noted that a local election board is often joined as a defendant and that 
joinder impacts venue. !d. at 430, 159 A. at 926. 
517. ELEC.LAW§6-209(b). 
518. Ficker v. Denny, 326 Md. 626,630, 606 A.2d 1060, 1062 (1992); Doe v. Montgomery 
Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 406 Md. 697, 707, 962 A.2d 342, 348 (2008) (suit filed by 
twelve county citizens). 
519. Kendall v. Howard Cnty., No. JFM-09-660, 2009 WL 3418585, at *9 (D. Md. Oct. 
20, 2009) ("As Plaintiff signed the HCCOG petition, and as his signature was, he 
claims, invalidated by HCBE's final determination, he would be considered 'a person 
aggrieved by [the] determination' that HCCOG's petition was deficient under Section 
6-209, and accordingly, he could have sought state court review of HCBE's 
determination."). While conceptually logical, to our knowledge no single-signatory 
suit has been brought and it may be difficult for a single voter to assert injury unless 
that disqualification was a "swing" vote. The district court was affirmed in Kendall v. 
Balcerzak, 650 F.3d 515, 5f8 (4th Cir. 2011). 
520. City of Takoma Park v. Citizens for Decent Gov't, 301 Md. 439,444,483 A.2d 348, 
351 (1984) ("Citizens for Decent Government and two individuals, all sponsors of the 
petitions in question, filed a complaint .... "). 
521. Howard Cnty. Citizens for Open Gov't v. Howard Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 201 Md. 
App. 605,608 n.1, 30 A.3d 245,247 n.1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011). 
522. !d. at 608 & n.l, 30 A.2d at 24 7 & n.1. 
523. Bd. of Educ. v. Mayor & Aldermen of Frederick, 194 Md. 170, 176, 69 A.2d 912, 
914-15 (1949) (citing Sun Cab Co. v. Cloud, 162 Md. 419, 159 A. 922 (1932)); see 
also Ness v. Supervisors of Elections, 162 Md. 529, 538, 160 A. 8, 16 (1932) ("A 
question of the right of the plaintiffs to maintain the suit has been raised, but it is not 
necessary to dwell upon it. All appear as citizens and taxpayers, and, so long as the 
individuals may sue in their own right, an objection that they profess to appear as a 
committee, and by doing so violate the rule against suits at common law by agents or 
representatives, seems unimportant."); Citizens Planning & Housing Ass'n v. Cnty. 
Exec., 273 Md. 333, 345, 329 A.2d 681, 687-88 ( 1974) (taxpayer has standing; 
however, organizations do not); Sun Cab, 162 Md. at 426-27, 159 A. at 925 
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suit to bar a referendum.524 "John Doe" suits have been permitted525 
and the challengers often select colorful and descriptive names. 526 
In one case in which a class action suit on behalf of all Maryland 
citizens, taxpayers, registered voters, signatories, circulators, and 
proponents was filed,527 the court did not comment on that aspect of 
(taxpayers have standing to avoid "the waste of funds derived from taxation which 
would be involved in conducting the void referendum."); Bd. of Supervisors of 
Elections of Anne Arundel Co. v. Smallwood, 327 Md. 220, 233 n.7, 608 A.2d 1222, 
1228 n.7 (1992) (same) (collecting cases); Md. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws v. 
Talbot Cnty., 316 Md. 332, 342, 558 A.2d 724, 729 (1988); Hammond v. Lancaster, 
194 Md. 462, 475, 71 A.2d 474, 480 (1950) ("[W]e have recognized the right of 
taxpayers and voters to raise a question of referability."). In Hammond, however, the 
court was faced with the Subversive Activities Act of 1949 and concluded: "We think, 
however, that none of the other provisions of the Act are properly before us. The only 
alleged waste of public funds, except in regard to the referendum, is in the expense of 
enforcing and administering the Act. But we are referred to no Maryland case holding 
that to be a sufficient interest." /d. at 4 77, 71 A.2d at 481. 
524. Mayor & Aldermen of Frederick, 194 Md. at 176, 69 A.2d at 914-15. 
525. Doe v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, 428 Md. 596, 598-99, 53 A.3d 1111, 1112 (2012) 
(challenge to the Dream Act); Doe v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 406 Md. 
697, 705, 962 A.2d 342, 344-45 (2008) (challenge to bill prohibiting discrimination 
based on sexual orientation). The Dream Act court rejected a standing challenge in a 
footnote. Maryland State Board of Elections, 428 Md. at 606 n.4, 53 A. 3d at 1117 n.4. 
526. Petition sponsors often choose colorful names. The "Fighting Taxpayers 
Association," was one of the sponsors in Ferguson v. Sec'y of State, 249 Md. 510, 
511, 240 A.2d 232, 232 (1968). Marylanders for Fair Elections, Inc., petitioned in 
Roskelly v. Lamone, 396 Md. 27, 30, 912 A.2d 658, 659-60 (2006). The Baltimore 
County Coalition Against Unfair Taxes brought Bait. Cnty. Coal. Against Unfair 
Taxes v. Bait. Cnty., Md., 321 Md. 184, 188, 582 A.2d 510, 512 (1990). "Fairness in 
Taxation" filed one petition, Ficker v. Denny, 326 Md. 626, 629,606 A.2d 1060, 1061 
(1992), and "TRIM" filed another, Pickett v. Prince George's Cnty., 291 Md. 648, 
650,436 A.2d 449,451 (1981). Other groups use less colorful names. E.g., Md. State 
Bd. of Elections, 428 Md. at 599, 53 A.3d at 1112 (MDPetitions.com was the 
sponsor); Sec'y of State v. McLean, 249 Md. 436, 438, 239 A.2d 919, 920 (1968) 
(Maryland Petition Comm., Inc., and Maryland Taxpayers Ass'n). 
527. Bayne v. Sec'y of State, 283 Md. 560, 564, 392 A.2d 67, 69 (1978). Similarly, in 
Mayor & Aldermen of Frederick, 194 Md. at 175, 69 A.2d at 914, the Mayor, 
Aldermen, and two resident taxpayers "brought on behalf of all other taxpayers 
desiring to become complainants," a suit to enjoin placement of a referendum 
question on the ballot. The court held that "proper parties brought the suit." /d. at 
176, 69 A.2d at 915; accord Citizens Planning & Hous. Ass'n, 273 Md. at 334-35, 
329 A.2d at 682 (suit was filed by civic organizations, individual residents, citizens, 
taxpayers, and property owners, "and on behalf of all other residents, citizens, 
taxpayers and property owners of Baltimore County who are similarly situated and on 
behalf of similarly situated nonindividual Plaintiffs, as a class action and as a 
representative thereof of all their claims in accordance with, and as provided in Rule 
209 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure."). The court concluded that taxpayers could 
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the case and it does not appear from the decision that the class was 
certified.528 Where a class action is not brought, the plaintiff must 
show that he or she would suffer irreparable injury in order to obtain 
equitable relief. 529 Given the complexities of class certification and 
the accelerated pace of many referendum lawsuits, the General 
Assembly may wish to consider specifying whether it is necessary or 
appropriate to file a class action. 
The court of appeals has assumed without deciding that a decision 
not to certify a referendum to the ballot may be challenged in an 
enforcement action.530 In Barnes v. State ex rei. Pinkney, a restaurant 
refused to serve an African-American customer, who then filed a 
complaint with the Commission on Interracial Problems and 
Relations under the state public accommodations law.531 In the 
enforcement action, the restaurant owner admitted to the 
discrimination; however, he claimed that the public accommodations 
law should have been suspended under Maryland Constitution, article 
XVI, because the Secretary of State had erred in refusing to certify a 
referendum for the ballot.532 He also challenged the constitutionality 
of the implementing election code, claiming that the public 
accommodations law should not have gone into effect. 533 The state 
argued that "the only proper manner in which this question could 
have been raised was by a mandamus action, rather than by a 
collateral attack in enforcement proceedings," and that the attack was 
invoke equity, that the organizational plaintiffs lacked standing, and, likely because 
the circuit court had dismissed, did not reach class certification when it reversed in 
part and remanded the action. Citizens Planning & Hous. Ass 'n, 273 Md. at 338-40, 
345, 329 A.2d at 684-85, 687-88. In Sun Cab, 162 Md. at 427, 159 A. at 925, the 
court also suggested that a referendum lawsuit can be "instituted by one or more 
taxpayers in representation of all .... " Hammond, 194 Md. at 469, 71 A.2d at 476-
77, was a class action to enjoin the Subversive Activities Act of 1949. It was 
amended to add a referendum count. !d. at 469-70, 71 A.2d at 477. The allegation 
was that the emergency declaration deprived citizens of their right to referendum. Jd 
at 476, 71 A.2d at 480. The court held that emergency declarations are unreviewable, 
id., and thus the opinion does not shed light on the viability of class actions to 
challenge referenda in general. 
528. See generally Bayne, 283 Md. at 575, 392 A.2d at 75 (holding against petitioners 
based on the fact that state constitutional grant of referendum is superseded by 
constitutional exemption from such referenda of budgetary appropriations allocated 
for "primary function[s] of the State."). 
529. Ficker, 326 Md. at 636, 606 A.2d at 1065 (Chasanow, J., dissenting). 
530. Barnes v. State ex rei. Pinkney, 236 Md. 564, 568, 204 A.2d 787, 789 (1964). 
531. !d. at 576, 204 A.2d at 788. 
532. Id at 567--68, 204 A.2d at 788-89. 
533. !d., 204 A.2d at 789. 
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barred by laches.534 The court did not decide these questions and, 
because the challenge was substantively without merit, simply 
assumed that the restaurant owner could mount it.535 
A cautionary note was recently sounded regarding registered voter 
standing. 536 There, citizens sought a declaration that a panoply of 
county resolutions, ordinances, and zoning decisions was the result of 
invalid efforts to circumvent a referendum provision in the county 
charter.537 Plaintiff Kendall was a taxpayer, property owner, resident, 
and registered voter.538 Nevertheless, the plaintiffs/appellants 
"disavowed their taxpayer status as a basis for standing in this 
litigation."539 Instead, appellants "ground their standing to sue in 'the 
right to referendum and vote granted to the People of Howard 
County," arising out of associational and free speech rights "attached 
to a referendum effort."540 The intermediate court noted: "For 
standing purposes, the Kendall appellants have placed all their eggs 
in a single basket labeled referendum and voting."541 The court, 
however, rejected that assertion. "Contrary to the authorities Kendall 
cites, where, generally, alleged failures in the petition process were at 
issue, or electoral issues were in the forefront, voting and referendum 
is decidedly in the background of appellants' action."542 The 
intermediate court noted that Kendall had not initiated the 
referendum process for any of the challenged ordinances, held that 
appellants' generalized interest in enforcing compliance with the 
county charter was insufficient to confer voter standing, and the court 
of appeals affirmed, holding that a "generalized interest" in enforcing 
the right, inter alia, to referendum is insufficient. 543 
534. Id. at 568, 204 A.2d at 789. 
535. Id. 
536. Kendall v. Howard Cnty., 204 Md. App. 440, 453, 41 A.3d 727, 735 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 2012), aff'd, 431 Md. 590, 66 A.3d 684 (2013). 
537. Id. at 442-43,41 A.3d at 729. 
538. Id. at 445,41 A.3d at 730. 
539. /d. at 445 n.2, 41 A.3d at 730 n.2. 
540. Id. at 447,41 A.3d at 731-32. 
541. Id. at 450, 41 A.3d at 733. 
542. /d. at 451, 41 A. 3d at 734. 
543. Id. at 453, 41 A.3d at 735; 431 Md. at 615, 66 A.3d at 698. The Kendall plaintiffs did 
not assert taxpayer standing, perhaps based on the unique issues being raised in that 
complaint. One might suggest that the Kendall plaintiffs were unsuccessfully 
attempting to act as private attorney generals. 
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The court of appeals has declined to reach the issue of whether a 
county may sue to challenge its own charter provision providing for 
the initiative. 544 
B. Who May Intervene? 
Intervention in a circuit court proceeding is governed by Rule 2-
214.545 A petition sponsor has been granted the right to intervene.546 
Moreover, county governments have been allowed to intervene,547 
and denied permission to intervene.548 Persons "who were interested 
in bringing the matter to referendum"549 were allowed to intervene, 
while the proponent of a county referendum was denied leave to 
intervene, and relegated to amicus status, because its interests were 
identical to the governmental defendants and it failed to provide 
"sworn facts" sufficient to demonstrate that the proponents were 
voters in the county.550 
In allowing a private corporation to intervene as a defendant, 
however, the court of appeals wrote that the State defendants were 
merely "that of a passive medium; and it is appropriate that in such a 
controversy the private individuals or corporations making the claim 
to the referendum should be admitted as parties defendant."551 
Similarly, the court noted in passing that, in connection with a 
lawsuit to enjoin a referendum on a statute prohibiting discrimination, 
"appellants City of Takoma Park, Robert M. Coggin, and the 
Suburban Maryland Lesbian/Gay Alliance were permitted to 
intervene as defendants. "552 
544. Md. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws v. Talbot Cnty., 316 Md. 332, 337, 342, 558 
A.2d 724, 726, 729 (1988). 
545. MD. RULE 2-214. 
546. Save Our Streets v. Mitchell, 357 Md. 237, 245, 743 A.2d 748, 753 (2000); Phifer v. 
Die!, 175 Md. 364, 366, 1 A.2d 617, 617 (1938). 
547. Montgomery Cnty. Volunteer Fire-Rescue Ass'n v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of 
Elections, 418 Md. 463,476 n.6, 15 A.3d 798, 800 n.6 (2011). 
548. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 35 v. Montgomery Cnty., 427 Md. 522, 50 A.3d 8 
(2012), see supra note 264 (presenting issue of "[d]id the circuit court err in finding 
that Montgomery County, Maryland, lacked standing?"). Montgomery County orally 
argued that there was a need to clarify whether a local government, by itself, had 
standing to prevent suspension of its law. /d. 
549. Tyler v. Sec'y of State, 229 Md. 397, 400, 184 A.2d 101, 102 (1962). 
550. Doe v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections, No. 293857-V, 2008 Md. Cir. Ct. Lexis 7, 
at *1-2 (Jul. 24, 2008), rev'd on other grounds, 406 Md. 697, 962 A.2d 342 (2008). 
551. Sun Cab Co. v. Cloud, 162 Md. 419,424, 159 A. 922,924 (1932). 
552. City of Takoma Park v. Citizens for Decent Gov't, 301 Md. 439,445, 483 A.2d 348, 
351 (1984). 
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Referendum litigation would be simplified by a statutory 
amendment defining the indispensable and permissible parties.553 
V. WHEN MUST A CHALLENGE BE MADE? 
At common law, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that a 
challenge must be mounted early, because "stopping a false 
pretension to a right to a referendum is obviously better done at the 
start than at some later stage in its career. Not only would expense 
then be saved, but wrongful immediate suspension of the legislative 
enactment, awaiting the time for an election, would be avoided."554 
With one exception, the election law article expressly sets the 
deadline for requesting judicial review as "the 1Oth day following the 
determination to which it relates."555 The sole exception is that, "if 
[a] petition seeks to place the name of an individual or a question on 
the ballot at any election, judicial review shall be sought by the day 
specified in paragraph (1) of this subsection or the 63rd day 
preceding that election, whichever day is earlier."556 The time-bar 
has proven to be a fertile ground for litigation.557 The court of 
appeals has, however, recently summarily affirmed two circuit court 
decisions that plaintiffs had waited too long to file suit.558 
A. Not Too Early; and, Not Too Late 
Essentially, a referendum challenge must be filed in court no more 
than ten days after the board of elections certifies the question for the 
ballot.559 In an older decision, however, a challenge mounted ten 
months after an election was entertained and rejected on the merits.560 
The court applied the post-modal stringent review analysis and it 
553. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
554. Sun Cab, 162 Md. at 425-26, 159 A. at 924. 
555. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW§ 6-210(e)(1) (LexisNexis 2010). 
556. Id. § 6-210(e)(2). 
557. See, e.g., Nader For President 2004 v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, 399 Md. 681, 691-
92 & n.14, 926 A.2d 199, 205 & n.14 (2007); Montgomery Cnty. Volunteer Fire-
Rescue Ass'n v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 418 Md. 463, 467, 15 A.3d 798, 
800 (2011); Howard Cnty. Citizens for Open Gov't v. Howard Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 
201 Md. App. 605, 632, 30 A.3d 245, 262 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011); Canavan v. Md. 
State Bd. of Elections, 430 Md. 533, 61 A.3d 828 (2013) (per curiam). 
558. Canavan, 430 Md. at 533, 61 A.3d at 828; Anne Arundel Cnty. Taxpayers Ass'n v. 
Anne Arundel Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 415 Md. 433, 2 A.3d 1095 (2010) (per curiam). 
One of the authors was one counsel of record in both cases. 
559. See discussion supra Part II.A.lO. 
560. Pickett v. Prince George's Cnty., 291 Md. 648, 650-51, 436 A.2d 449, 451 (1981). 
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does not appear that either a statutory or common-law time bar was 
argued or decided. It is doubtful that such an untimely challenge 
would be entertained today.561 
1. Roskelly Was Too Late 
In Roskelly v. Lamone,562 the court rejected a challenge as untimely 
because it was filed more than ten days after the election official 
determined it was deficient. 563 The facts were complex and perhaps 
unique. Roskelly petitioned, in relevant part, one of the "early 
voting" provisions. It was enacted in 2005, vetoed, and after the veto 
was overridden in 2006, it became law on February 16, 2006.564 
Then, a modified early voting bill was enacted as an emergency 
measure in 2006, vetoed, and after the veto was overridden, it became 
law.565 
On April 19, 2006, Marylanders for Fair Elections, Inc. (MFFE), 
and Mr. Roskelly, its chair, initiated the referendum process, by 
requesting an advance determination. 566 That determination was 
561. See ELEC. LAW§ 6-201(e)(1) ("(b) Place and time of filing.- A registered voter may 
seek judicial relief under this section in the appropriate circuit court within the earlier 
of: (1) 10 days after the act or omission or the date the act or omission became known 
to the petitioner; or (2) 7 days after the election results are certified, unless the 
election was a gubernatorial primary or special primary election, in which case 3 days 
after the election results are certified."); Liddy v. Lamone, 398 Md. 233, 245, 919 
A.2d 1276, 1284 (2006) ("[T]his Court has recognized that in the context of election 
matters, 'any claim against a state electoral procedure must be expressed 
expeditiously' .... ")(quoting Ross v. State Bd. of Elections, 387 Md. 649, 671, 876 
A.2d 692, 705 (2005)); Ross, 387 Md. at 667, 876 A.2d at 703 ("Thus, under the 
operation of the ten-day time period in Section 12-202, Ross should have filed his 
petition at least a week before the election, that is, by October 23rd. Instead, he 
waited until November 5th, a full three days after the election occurred. Therefore, 
we fmd that it is barred as a matter of Jaw by the common Jaw doctrine of laches as 
argued by Respondents in the Circuit Court and before this Court."). "Ross's decision 
to 'wait and see' until after the election, prejudiced Branch, the State Board of 
Elections, and the residents of the Thirteenth Councilmanic District." !d. at 672, 876 
A.2d at 706. See Doe v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections, No. 293857-V, 2008 
Md. Cir. Ct. Lexis 7, at *1-2 (Jul. 24, 2008) (ten-day limit ofELEC. LAW§ 6-210(e)), 
rev'd on other grounds, 406 Md. 697 (2008). 
562. 396 Md. 27, 912 A.2d 658 (2006). 
563. !d. at 47-48, 912 A.2d at 670. 
564. !d. at 28-29, 912 A.2d at 659. 
565. Id at 29-30, 912 A.2d at 659. That bill was successfully petitioned; however, it was 
an emergency measure and therefore not suspended by the petition. !d. at 36 n.13, 
912 A.2d at 663 n.12. 
566. Id at 30, 912 A.2d at 659-60. For a discussion of the advance determination 
procedure see supra Part II.A.2. 
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provided, however, the Attorney General advised that it was the 
"office's conclusion 'that a petition drive for referendum must occur 
immediately after the session of the Legislature at which the bill is 
initially passed by the Legislature."567 In short, the Attorney 
General's letter suggested that Mr. Roskelly should have initiated the 
referendum process after the 2005 session, even though the bill to be 
referred had been vetoed and the veto not yet overridden. 568 
MFFE proceeded to gather signatures and submitted 20,221 
signatures. 569 On June 8, 2006, however, the SBE responded that the 
"petition relating to Senate Bill 4 78 is deficient and may not be 
referred to referendum," citing the Attorney General's letter.570 In 
short, although the timing question was an issue of "first 
impression,"571 the petition was deemed to be "too late."572 
Because of the uncertainly, SBE proceeded with signature 
verification, determined that the first tier submittal fell 13 8 signatures 
short, and, on June 21, 2010, so notified MFFE and called 
"Roskelly's attention to its [June 8th] deficiency determination ... 
pointing out that it had not been challenged within ten days, as 
required by [section] 6-210(e)(l) ofthe Election Law Article."573 
Nineteen days after the SBE's June 8th determination and six days 
after its June 21letter, Roskelly sought judicial review.574 He argued 
that the veto override was the act that was to be referred and that the 
June 8, 2006, decision was incorrect. 575 
The court noted that it was undisputed that Roskelly did not seek 
judicial review within ten days of the June 8th letter. 576 The court 
analyzed the timeliness issue as a matter of Constitutional 
interpretation,577 holding that Roskelly's petition for judicial review 
was filed too late. 
567. Roskelly, 396 Md. at 31,912 A.2d at 660 (citing 62 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 405 (1977)). 
568. See id. at 46, 912 A.2d at 669-70. 
569. !d. at 32, 912 A.2d at 661. 
570. !d. at 32-33, 912 A.2d at 661. 
571. !d. at 35, 912 A.2d at 662. 
572. !d. at 46, 912 A.2d at 669-70. 
573. !d. at 35-36, 912 A.2d at 663. 
574. !d. at 36, 912 A.2d at 663. 
575. !d. at 37, 912 A.2d at 664. 
576. !d. at 46, 912 A.2d at 669. 
577. !d. at 47-50, 912 A.2d at 670-72 ("A common sense reading of Article XVI,§§ 2 and 
3 leads to the unmistakable conclusion that a submission containing more than one 
third, but less than all, of the full number of signatures necessary to complete a 
referendum petition, submitted to the Secretary of State before June 1 for the purpose 
of extending the time for filing the signatures to complete the referendum petition 
748 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
While the court of appeals did not reach the substance of the June 
8, 2006 determination, and did not decide whether MFFE and 
Roskelly were required to, as the Attorney General opined, petition 
the vetoed bill to referendum, that issue may be juxtaposed against 
Maryland-Nat'/ Capital Park & Planning Comm 'n v. Randall.578 If 
the Attorney General's view was correct, Roskelly was too late 
because he did not challenge the vetoed statute, even though the veto 
had not been overridden.579 In Randall, the Secretary of State sued to 
have a vetoed bill declared null and void, asserting that the veto 
"probably" would be overridden. 580 The court affirmed denial of 
relief, noting that "there was no such thing as an unconstitutional bill. 
The court could not deal with the question constitutionally until a law 
had been duly enacted and some person had been deprived of his [or 
her] constitutional rights by its operation."581 It concluded that 
granting relief would be an interference with legislative power, 
violative of separation of powers.582 Thus, the Secretary's pre-
override challenge in Randall was a premature request for an 
advisory opinion, while Roskelly arguably should have petitioned the 
vetoed statute to referendum. 583 In any event, the question left 
undecided presents a potential danger to a sponsor wishing to 
challenge a vetoed bill and Roskelly counsels great diligence in 
determining when a challenge need be commenced. 
2. Doe Was Not Too Late 
The right to judicial relief does not accrue until there is 
aggrievement by a final decision of the election board. 584 That occurs 
within the meaning and contemplation of the Election Law Article, is, indeed, a 
petition."). Principles of construction are discussed supra Part I. I. 
578. Cf Roskelly, 396 Md. at 47, 912 A.2d at 670 (court need not decide if June 8, 2006, 
determination was correct), with Maryland-Nat'! Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. 
Randall, 209 Md. 18, 120 A.2d 195 (1956). 
579. See supra notes 562--67 and accompanying text. 
580. 209 Md. at 20-21, 120 A.2d at 196. 
581. !d. at 25, 120 A.2d at 198-99. 
582. !d. at 26-27, 120 A.2d at 199. 
583. Roskelly v. Lamone, 396 Md. 27, 47, 912 A.2d 658, 670 (2006). 
584. Howard Cnty. Citizens for Open Gov't. v. Howard Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 201 Md. 
App. 605, 621, 30 A.3d 245, 255 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011) (citing Doe v. 
Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 406 Md. 697, 718, 962 A.2d 342, 354-55 
(2008)). In Doe, an argument was presented that the ten-day requirement did not 
apply to a declaratory action. 406 Md. at 713, 962 A.2d at 351. The court did not 
reach that argument, assuming without deciding that the requirement applied. /d. 
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upon determination that all legal requirements have been satisfied, 585 
or upon rejection.586 In Doe, for example, plaintiffs did not file suit to 
challenge interlocutory determinations of the election officials.587 
Defendants contended that the claims were time-barred; however, the 
court of appeals held that the interlocutory decisions did not trigger 
the time-bar.588 Final certification was the trigger.589 
B. The Postmodal Challenge Rule and Early Voting 
1. The Postmodal Challenge Rule 
In Stop Slots, the Maryland Court of Appeals reiterated the 
distinction between the standard of review governing pre-election and 
post-election challenges to electoral acts or omissions: 
We must also highlight the distinction, when there is a 
challenge raised in the courts with regard to election 
procedures, "between the effect given to modal provisions 
of the election law before election and the effect of the same 
provisions after election." .... Specifically, the rule is, when 
election procedures are challenged before the election is 
held, election officials being required to "do what the law 
tells them to do," a court will require compliance with their 
statutorily and constitutionally imposed duty. If a challenge 
is raised after an election has already been held, however, 
the courts will not disturb the results of said election in the 
absence of a showing "that the failure of the officials to 
follow the law has interfered with the full and fair 
expression of the will of the voters. "590 
Thus, challenges mounted before an election are decided under a 
different standard than those raised after polling has closed. 591 Before 
585. Doe, 406 Md. at 718, 962 A.2d at 354-55. 
586. Notably, however, in Howard Cnty. Citizens for Open Gov 't, the court stated that Doe 
"did not identify the point at which the right to judicial review accrues when an 
election board determines that a petition effort lacks sufficient valid signatures." 201 
Md. App. at 621 n.17, 30 A.2d at 255 n.l7 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011). It wrote: 
"This issue is not before us and we express no opinion on the matter." !d. 
587. See Doe, 406 Md. at 707-08, 962 A.2d at 348. 
588. /d. at 713-14,718,962 A.2d at 351-52,354-55. 
589. /d. at 718, 962 A.2d at 354-55. 
590. Stop Slots MD 2008 v. State Bd. of Elections, 424 Md. 163, 193-94, 34 A.3d 1164, 
1181-82 (20 12) (internal citations omitted). 
591. /d. See also MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW§ 6-210(e) (LexisNexis 2010). 
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an election, public agents must do their duty, and after an election if 
an election "has been honestly and fairly conducted" it will not be set 
aside "by mere failure to follow the statute precisely unless the result 
is shown to have been affected or the statute expressly states that 
such failure renders the election void."592 In sum, in a post-election 
challenge, "statutes giving direction as to the mode and manner of 
conducting it are generally construed as directory unless the deviation 
[is] so vital" that it "probably ... prevented a free and full expression 
of the popular will. "593 
The court's rationale is that "it would be unjustifiable to defeat the 
expressed will of the electorate if the irregularity did not frustrate or 
tend to prevent a free expression of the electors' intention or 
otherwise mislead them."594 Alternatively, where a procedural defect 
in the petition process brings into question whether there were 
sufficient signatures, but voter approval at the polls demonstrates 
more than adequate support, it would be senseless to void the election 
based on the defect. 595 Although not in the referendum context, the 
court has held that it "shall not disturb the results of the direct and 
energetic participation by the voting citizens" where there was no 
impact on the outcome of the election.596 In short, courts are not 
592. Lexington Park Volunteer Fire Dep't Inc. v. Robidoux, 218 Md. 195, 200, 146 A.2d 
184, 186 (1958). 
593. /d.; accord Dutton v. Tawes, 225 Md. 484,491,494, 171 A.2d 688,690-92 (1961) 
(holding that substantial achievement of pre-election purpose of notice in post-
election challenge was sufficient). The court noted that "[w]e cannot assume that the 
almost 450,000 people who voted on the [interstate] compact, or any substantial 
proportion of them, did not understand the issue on which they voted." /d. 
594. Lexington Park Volunteer Fire Dept., 218 Md. at 200, 146 A.2d at 186. 
595. Pickett v. Prince George's Cnty., 291 Md. 648, 659, 436 A.2d 449, 455-56 (1981) 
("The evident and only purpose of the constitutional provision was that there be 
substantial public support for a proposed charter amendment before it was submitted 
to the voters of a county. The people by their vote have demonstrated that support. 
Thus, the purpose was satisfied. The challenge here not coming until about ten 
months after the electorate approved the charter amendment, we have no difficulty in 
saying the charter amendment was validly adopted."). 
596. Town of Glenarden v. Bromery, 257 Md. 19, 21, 29, 262 A.2d 60, 61, 66 (1970) 
(municipal charter amendment effectively recalling elected officials). On the other 
hand, a post-election challenge by taxpayers to a special taxing bill was sustained 
where a serious defect in the pre-election notice did affect the outcome of the election. 
Grafv. Hiser, 144 Md. 418,421, 125 A. 151, 152 (1924) ("The evidence in the case 
proved the facts we have recited, and tended to show that the mistake of the 
committee in the preparation of the notice, and in the reception and exclusion of votes, 
had a probably decisive influence upon the election."). 
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favorably inclined to requests to upset the will of the voters as 
expressed at the ballot box. 597 
2. The McDonough Anomaly 
In one older decision, although careful to analyze the issue under 
both pre-election and post-election standards, the court of appeals 
apparently accepted--over a strong dissent-the practice of 
postponing a pre-election challenge until after the election. 598 There, 
plaintiffs sued thirty-two days before the election, and the court 
wrote: 
Since the lower court, pursuant to our holdings in Tyler v. 
Secretary of State, ... in continuing the case for trial to a 
post-election date, preserved the issues 'as if heard and 
decided prior to the election,' and adjudicated the matter as 
if tried prior to the election, we shall make our appraisal of 
compliance with the modal provisions in ss 16-6(a) and 23-
l(a) of Article 33 in the same context. 
The dissent, however, expressed "serious reservations about the 
efficacy of the procedure indicated in Tyler," noting that the rationale 
of the post-modal challenge rule is inconsistent with the procedure 
employed. It is suggested that, if the postponement process is a 
viable doctrine, which it should not be, it be reserved for only the 
most unusual situations. Instead, the more recent decisions indicate 
that a challenger must timely mount a challenge or be time-barred.599 
3. Early Voting and the Post-Modal Challenge Rule 
597. See supra notes 590-596 and accompanying text. 
598. Anne Arundel Cnty. v. McDonough, 277 Md. 271, 279-80, 292, 295, 307-08, 354 
A.2d 788, 793-94, 800-02, 809 (1976) (citing Tyler v. Sec'y of State, 230 Md. 18, 22, 
185 A.2d 385, 387 (1962)) ("Even if we were to review this case as one where the 
litigation was instituted after the election ... we still could not ... uphold the validity 
of the referendum."); McDonough, 277 Md. at 312, 354 A.2d at 812 (Levine, J., 
dissenting) ("[T]o stay a challenge until after the election is held and then treat the 
action as a pre-election challenge is inconsistent with that distinction."). 
599. See Canavan v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, 430 Md. 533, 61 A.3d 828 (2013) (per 
curiam); Anne Arundel Cnty. Taxpayers Ass'n v. Anne Arundel Cnty. Bd. of 
Elections, 415 Md. 433, 2 A.3d 1095 (2010) (per curiam); Liddy v. Lamone, 398 Md. 
233, 245, 919 A.2d 1276, 1284 (2007); Ross v. State Bd. of Elections, 387 Md. 649, 
673, 876 A.2d 692, 706 (2005). 
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A recent lawsuit could have posed the novel issue of how the post-
modal challenge rule is applied to early voting.600 Early voting 
permits electors to cast their ballot prior to election day.601 In 
Canavan, plaintiffs filed suit a few days before election day, but after 
430,570 electors had cast their early ballots. 602 The case was heard 
after the election.603 Defendants asserted that the post-modal 
challenge standard applied; however, the case was decided under 
time-bar principles.604 It remains to be seen whether a lawsuit filed 
after a substantial number of electors have voted, but prior to the 
general election, and heard prior to the close of voting, will proceed 
under the strict post-modal challenge standard. 
VI. MARYLAND DOES NOT FOLLOW THE MAJORITY OF 
STATES BY LIBERALLY CONSTRUING REFERENDUM 
PROVISIONS; INSTEAD, STRICT COMPLIANCE IS 
REQUIRED, AT LEAST IN PRE-ELECTION CHALLENGES 
While in pre-election challenges605 the court of appeals has directed 
strict compliance with the requirements for a referendum, other states 
call for liberal construction of similar provisions.606 In fact, Maryland 
is one of only two states that use the strict compliance standard.607 
The applicable standard is significant, because there is "no second 
chance ... for a failed referendum petition."608 There are two 
competing canons of construction, liberal construction versus strict 
compliance. 609 
600. Canavan, 430 Md. at 533, 61 A.3d at 828. 
601. MD. CONST. art. I,§ 3(b). 




605. See supra Part V.B.l. 
606. DAN FRIEDMAN, THE MARYLAND STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 270 
(2011). 
607. David Potts, Strict Compliance, Substantial Compliance, and Referendum Petitions in 
Arizona, 54 ARIZ. L. REv. 329, 332 (2012). Arizona mandates "absolute compliance." 
!d. at 332. 
608. /d. at 338. 
609. See infra Part IV .A.l-2. 
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A. The Power Reserved by the People Should be Liberally Construed 
to Effectuate the Right to Referendum 
"While the principle that provisions governing referendum 
petitions are to be liberally construed is generally accepted," it does 
not appear to have force in Maryland.610 Nevertheless, in Kelly v. 
Marylanders for Sports Sanity,611 the dissent argued that the 
referendum amendment612 should be liberally construed to effectuate 
its purposes. The Attorney General has stated that doubts should be 
resolved in favor of a referendum.613 A long-time supporter of the 
referendum movement recently wrote that: 
Marylanders will soon have an opportunity common in a 
country other than their own: the right to veto a legislature's 
product. This tool, the voter referendum, is an important 
right, since two cure-alls of the 1970s, campaign finance 
"reform" and strict reapportionment, have delivered the 
legislature into the hands of reliable partisans and the 
"bundlers" of interest-group campaign contributions. "614 
Proponents of the liberal construction principle assert that the 
"great power" of the referendum should not be "undermined by a 
technical failure."615 
610. See City of Takoma Park v. Citizens for Decent Gov't, 301 Md. 439, 448, 483 A.2d 
348, 353 (1984) (quoting Tyler v. Sec'y of State, 229 Md. 397, 402, 184 A.2d 101, 
103 (1962)); cf Town of La Plata v. Faison-Rosewick, LLC, No 68, 2013 WL 
5354355 (Md. Sep. 25, 2013). 
611. Kelly v. Marylanders for Sports Sanity, Inc., 310 Md. 437, 479, 530 A.2d 245, 266 
(1987). 
612. ld. 
613. Const. Law-Referendum, 73 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 78, 88 (1988); Const. Law-
Referendum Petitions, 63 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 157, 163 (1978). 
614. George Liebmann, Marylanders Get a Taste of Veto Democracy, THE BALTIMORE 
SUN, Oct. 30, 2012, available at http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-10-30/news/bs-
ed-referendums-20 121030 _I_ maryland-live-casino-casino-bill-foreign-policy 
(Liebman asserted that "Maryland voters will confront four laws. The casino bill and 
congressional redistricting are striking manifestations of what a notable federal judge 
recently called 'the culture of corruption in Annapolis.' Gay marriage and the Dream 
Act are exercises in 'culture warfare' and partisan pandering- trivial in themselves, 
but of un-discussed larger import."). Liebmann argued that the referendum involves 
all in civic life. George Liebmann, Curbing Legislative and Executive Abuse: 
Referendum and Initiative in Maryland, 33 Mo. B.J. 34, 35 (2000) ("Referenda are 
seen as a means of combatting civic apathy."). 
615. Potts, supra note 607, at 342. 
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B. Persons Seeking a Referendum Must Strictly Comply With the 
Procedural Requisites of the Constitution and Election Law 
Article 
While the principle of liberal construction is "generally accepted," 
Maryland has "adopted the view that the referendum is a concession 
to an organized minority and a limitation upon the rights of the 
people" and requires strict compliance, at least in a pre-election 
challenge.616 There are many sound reasons for the strict compliance 
rule.617 
The referendum is "drastic in its effect," and "[t]he very filing of a 
petition, valid on its facel suspends the operation of any of a large 
class of legislative enactments and provides for an interim in which 
the evil designed to be corrected by the law may continue unabated, 
616. Tyler v. Sec'y of State, 229 Md. 397, 402, 184 A.2d 101, 103 (1962) ("We believe 
that it is clear that ... those seeking the exercise the right of referendum ... must, as a 
condition precedent, strictly comply with the conditions prescribed."); See City of 
Takoma Park v. Citizens for Decent Gov't, 301 Md. 439, 450, 483 A.2d 348, 354 
(1984). See e.g., Burress v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Frederick Co., 427 Md. 231, 
237, 46 A.3d 1182, 1185 (2012) (finding that petition signature requirements pursuant 
to § 6-203(a) are mandatory); Montgomery Cnty. Volunteer Fire-Rescue Ass'n v. 
Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 418 Md. 463,476 n.14, 15 A.3d 798,805 n.14 
(2011) ("We have also consistently stated that constitutional and statutory provisions 
related to referendum petitions should be followed strictly."); Doe v. Montgomery Co. 
Bd. of Elections, 406 Md. 697, 962 A.2d 342 (2008) (holding that the statutory 
provision establishing requirements for valid signatures on referendum petitions was 
mandatory and not suggestive); Gittings v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections, 38 Md. 
App. 674, 382 A.2d 349 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978) (stating that the constitutional 
provisions governing referendum petitions are mandatory and "must be strictly 
complied with"); Ferguson v. Secretary of State, 249 Md. 510, 515, 240 A.2d 232, 
235 (1968) ("Stringent language employed in constitutional provision on referendum 
procedure shows intent that those seeking to exercise right of referendum must, as 
condition precedent, strictly comply with conditions prescribed."); Bell v. Bd. of 
Comm'rs of Prince George's Co., 195 Md. 21, 33-34, 72 A.2d 746, 752 (1950); 
Const. Law-Referendum, 72 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 43, 48 (1987) (quoting Tyler); but 
cf Koste v. Town of Oxford, 431 Md. 14, 41, 63 A.3d 582, 598-99 (2013) (Adkins, J., 
dissenting) (suggesting that the court "took a most lenient view of the statutory 
requirements" in Whitley v. State Bd. of Elections, 429 Md. 132, 55 A.3d 37 (2012)). 
The dissenting opinion suggested: "This Court should provide consistent guiding 
principles for interpretation, not act on an ad hoc basis. If we interpret referendum 
statutes liberally, to favor referendum, as in Whitley, let us do that consistently. If we 
interpret referendum statutes strictly, to favor the legislative will over that of the 
people, as the majority does here, let us do that consistently. It is not fair to citizens 
and their legal advisors, for us to hop from one rationale to the other." !d. at 41-42, 63 
A.3d at 599. 
617. See infra Part VI.A.2. 
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or m which a need intended to be provided for, may continue 
unsatisfied."618 The referendum has been viewed as anti-
democratic619 and has been described as "a useful veto device by 
which sufficiently agitated and interested minorities can thwart 
progressive legislation of increasingly responsible and responsive 
politicalleaders."620 Thus, those supporting strict construction reason 
that, "[r]eferendum by petition, to be sure, is a negative device-that 
is, a law enacted by the [legislature] becomes effective unless the 
voters act negatively, by rejecting it at referendum."621 
Instituted as a Populist and Progressive check and balance to 
prevent corruption, the referendum has often been a vehicle to 
challenge social reform legislation.622 In the late 1960s, Maryland's 
618. Tyler, 229 Md. at 402, 184 A.2d at 103-04 (1962). 
619. FRIEDMAN, REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 606, at 270. 
620. Dan Friedman, Magnificent Failure Revisited: Modern Maryland Constitutional Law 
From 1967 to 1998, 58 Mo. L. REv. 528, 549 n.lll ( 1999). 
621. Local Gov't-Charter Cntys., 67 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 300, 304 (1982). The 
referendum has been called a "final veto .... " Mayor of Rockville v. Brookeville 
Turnpike Constr. Co., 246 Md. 117, 128-29, 228 A.2d 263, 270 (1967). 
622. Friedman, Magnificent Failure Revisited, supra note 620, at 549 ("The referendum 
power was ... [o]riginally conceived in the Progressive era as a way to check 
conservative legislatures, by the 1960s the referendum had become identified largely 
as a tool of conservatives to oppose progressive legislation. For example, in 1964, a 
referendum to repeal an act strengthening state protection against racial discrimination 
received forty-seven percent of the vote and carried thirteen counties.") (citations 
omitted); Liebmann, Curbing Legislative and Executive Abuse, supra note 614, at 36. 
Curiously, it appears that "[t]he Progressives also had a racist agenda" and sought to 
disenfranchise African-Americans and Asian Americans. B. Kruse, Comment: The 
Truth in Masquerade: Regulating False Ballot Proposition Ads Through State Anti-
False Speech Statutes, 80 CALIF. L. REv. 129 n.24 (2001) (citing H. Scheiber, 
Forward: The Direct Ballot and State Constitutionalism, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 787, 794-
95 (1997)). It has been argued that "an element of this tradition continues today .... " 
1d. 
Nevertheless, the benefits of referenda also cannot be underestimated. See supra, note 
37. Referenda have given voice to the disadvantaged and disenfranchised. The 
concept of petitioning the government preceded the Populists. In December 1725 a 
letter containing 428 signatures of "people of all ranks and social strata, including day 
laborers and shoemakers," was presented to the Prince of East Fisia, a Prussian state. 
CHRIS HAWKINS, A HISTORY OF SIGNATURES 35 (2011). Hawkins also describes a 
petition by "neoliterate" women in Tamil, India, seeking access to grounds for 
cremation of their dead. !d. at 37 (citing Francis Cody, Inscribing Subjects to 
Citizenship: Petitions, Literary Activism, and the Performativity of Signature in Rural 
Tamil India, 24 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 247-380 (2009)). "Cody argues that 
signatures create the modem citizen" and permitted the signatories to "create their 
own political power where before they had none. In signing the petition, they took a 
defmitive step towards obtaining a political agency .... " !d. at 38. Hawkins also 
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open housing bill was the subject of a referendum petition.623 
Opponents gathered 37,000 signatures.624 In City of Takoma Park v. 
Citizens for Decent Government,625 a county anti-discrimination in 
employment, housing, and public accommodations statute was 
petitioned. A State bill to prohibit discrimination based on sexual 
orientation was subject to a referendum attempt,626 as was a county 
measure.627 The Dream Act628 and the Civil Marriage Protection Act 
providing for marriage equality629 were both brought to 
referendum. 630 
Because of its drastic impact, at least in a referendum under 
Maryland Constitution, article XVI, a petition sponsor "must, as 
condition precedent, strictly comply with the conditions 
prescribed."631 There is no general equitable power to excuse 
compliance in a pre-election challenge and a sponsor is not 
suggests that, "[i]n the early nineteenth century, women realized that they could 
express their political views by petitioning" describing "Women's Antislavery 
Petitions." Jd. at 39. "By affixing their signatures to abolition petitions, women defied 
prescriptions against female public activisim .... " Id. at 40 (quoting Susan Zaeske, 
Signatures of Citizenship: The Rhetoric of Women's Antislavery Petitions, 88 
QUARTERLY J. OF SPEECH,l48 (2002)). 
623. See Sec'y of State v. McLean, 249 Md. 436,437,239 A.2d 919,919-20 (1968). 
624. /d. at 438, 239 A.2d at 920-21. 
625. City of Takoma Park v. Citizens for Decent Gov't, 301 Md. 439,441,483 A.2d 348, 
349 (1984). 
626. Gelbman v. Willis, No. C-2001-734030.0C (Cir. Ct. Anne Arundel Co. 2001) 
(Lerner, J.). One of the authors represented the State in Gelbman. 
627. Doe v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 406 Md. 697, 702,962 A.2d 342, 344-45 
(2008). 
628. Doe v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, 428 Md. 596, 598-99, 53 A.3d II II, 1112 (2012). 
In the 2012 general election, three constitutional amendments, three petitions, and a 
referendum on gaming were on the ballot. Associated Press, Secretary of State 
Certifies Ballot Language, THE DAILY RECORD, Aug. 20, 2012, 
http:/ /thedailyrecord. corn/20 12/08/20/md -secretary-of-state-certifies-ballot -language/. 
629. Editorial, For Question 6, BALT. SUN, Oct. 30, 2012, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/ 
2012-1 0-30/news/bs-ed-question-6-20 121030 _l_gay-marriage-maryland-marriage-
alliance-marriage-equality. 
630. In the initiative arena, citizens may not be well-suited to drafting legislation. In 
Colorado, for example, citizens passed an ethics in government measure that 
prohibited gifts of more than fifty dollars to public officers. DuVivier, supra note I, at 
1050-51. The goal was to impose high ethical standards; however, the Colorado 
Attorney General concluded that it led to "an absurd result" by, for example, 
prohibiting professors from accepting Nobel prize money and barring scholarships for 
children of state employees. /d. 
631. Tyler v. Sec'y of State, 229 Md. 397, 402, 184 A.2d 10 I, I 04 ( 1962). 
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"permitted another shot at compliance."632 The court of appeals has 
repeatedly held that "there must be a strict compliance with the 
mandatory provisions of [s]ection 4 of [a]rticle XVI."633 It has been 
held that non-compliance with pre-election requirements "divested 
the electorate of its right to veto by referendum .... "634 Thus, both 
appellate courts have stated: 
It is understandably disappointing to the residents of 
Baltimore County who sought to petition this issue to 
referendum that they are foreclosed by this decision from an 
opportunity to submit the issue to the electorate of the 
county. However, where a group of the citizens of the 
county seek to challenge a decision made by the lawfully 
designated representatives of the entire body politic, they 
must strictly adhere to those provisions of the law which 
grants to them the concession of the referendum. Where, as 
in this case, they fail to meet the constitutional and statutory 
requirements which authorize the exercise of the privilege 
granted, the proposed referendum must fail. 635 
632. Gittings v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections for Baltimore Cnty., 38 Md. App. 674, 
678-79, 382 A.2d 349, 351 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978). 
633. Ferguson v. Sec'y of State, 249 Md. 510, 515,240 A.2d 232,235 (1968) (citing Tyler, 
229 Md. at 402, 184 A.2d at 104 (1962)); accord City of Takoma Park v. Citizens for 
Decent Gov't, 301 Md. 439, 448, 483 A.2d 348, 353 (1984) (quoting Tyler, 229 Md. 
at 402, 184 A.2d at 104). 
634. City of Takoma Park, 301 Md. at 448, 483 A.2d at 353 (form of petition); Blackwell 
v. City Council of Seat Pleasant, 94 Md. App. 393, 397 & n.2, 404, 406, 617 A.2d 
1110, 1112 & n.2, 1115, 1116 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (explaining how resolutions 
stated that they were effective before the voters were notified of passage and could 
petition them to referendum and that "the electorate was clearly misled"). 
635. City of Takoma Park, 301 Md. at 449, 483 A.2d at 353-54 (quoting Gittings, 38 Md. 
App. at 680-81, 382 A.2d at 353) (emphasis added). In a related context, the court of 
appeals wrote: 
It is unfortunate that voters should lose their votes by oversight of 
election officials-and by their own failure to notice that they 
have not been given authenticated ballots. But, as has often been 
said, it would be a greater evil for the courts to ignore the law 
itself by permitting election officials to ignore statutory 
requirements designed to safeguard the integrity of elections, i.e., 
the rights of all the voters. 
City of Seat Pleasant v. Jones, 364 Md. 663, 682, 774 A.2d 1167, 1178 (2001) 
(denying relief in an election that was decided by a single vote, and holding that 
"innocent voters may be adversely impacted and without recourse, by the actions and 
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In short, in a pre-election challenge, a failure of compliance 
"render[s] . . . the petition nugatory and prevents a referendum on 
it .... "636 The strict compliance rule is premised on the view that the 
referendum process was not intended to be easy.637 A requirement 
may be difficult to meet, however, "[i]f the burden is too heavy," the 
remedy is legislative.638 
C. Can Pre-Election Publicity Cure a Defect in Signature Pages? 
One issue that has sporadically arisen is the question of whether 
extensive publicity regarding a referendum can cure defects in a 
signature page. Sponsors may assert that publicity corrects a petition 
defect by supplying missing information. While not squarely 
decided, it appears that such arguments will be rejected, especially in 
a pre-election challenge analyzed under the strict compliance 
doctrine. For example, in City of Takoma Park, the Board of 
Supervisors of Elections for Montgomery County found that a 
petition for referendum did "not comply with relevant legal 
requirements as to form."639 The court held that the petition "fail[ed] 
to inform the voters precisely what portions of the act the petition 
sponsors proposed for deletion. " 640 Thus, the court concluded that 
voters were "left to [their] imagination" to determine the precise 
details of the petition and what exactly they are signing their name to 
accomplish,641 despite clear statutory authority requiring "that 
potential voters be reasonably advised of what act or part of an act 
enacted by the County Council is to be suspended in its operation 
pending decision of the voters at the succeeding general election."642 
In response to arguments pointing to extensive publicity, the court 
conduct of election officials" (emphasis added)) (citing Hammond v. Love, 187 Md. 
138, 149, 49 A.2d 75, 80 (1946)). 
636. Phifer v. Diehl, 175 Md. 364, 365-66, 1 A.2d 617, 617 (1938) (interpreting Mo. 
CONS I. art. XVI). 
637. Town of Oxford v. Koste, 204 Md. App. 578, 588-89,42 A.3d 637,643-44 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 2012), ajf'd, 431 Md. 14,63 A.3d 582 (2013). 
638. Ferguson, 249 Md. at 517, 240 A.2d at 236; Gittings, 38 Md. App. at 678-79, 382 
A.2d at 351 (explaining why the request for referendum "for reasons of equity" was 
rejected); see Town of La Plata v. Faison-Rosewick, LLC, No 68, 2013 WL 5354355 
(Md. Sep. 25, 2013). 
639. 301 Md. 439,444,483 A.2d 348,351 (1984). 
640. !d. at 449, 483 A.2d at 353. 
641. !d. at 449-50,483 A.2d 354. 
642. !d. at 450, 483 A.2d 354. 
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stated that "no amount of publicity could supply" the reqms1te 
information to cure the petition's defect in a "pre-election setting."643 
In Bell v. Bd. of Comm 'rs of Prince George's Co., the court 
reiterated that "[i]t is no answer to a failure to obey [the constitutional 
provision] to say ... that the act was subject to a referendum, that it 
was widely discussed in newspapers circulated by the County 
affected, and that there was an active campaign for and against its 
adoption. "644 
Under the rule of strict construction,645 that appears to be the only 
defensible conclusion in a pre-election challenge. Where petitions 
"fail to meet the [ c ]onstitutional or statutory requirements which 
authorize the exercise of the privilege granted, the proposed 
referendum must fail. "646 
VII. THE METHOD OF REVIEW 
Challenges to referenda have been filed as petitions seeking 
judicial review, complaints for injunctive relief, requests for a writ of 
common-law or administrative mandamus, complaints for declaratory 
judgment, and, as a mixture of some or all of the foregoing. 647 At its 
core, however, a circuit court is evaluating an administrative decision 
made by an elections board or official to certify or reject a petition. 
The administrative coding process was described in Part II.A.9.c. 
643. !d. 
644. 195 Md. 21, 33-34, 72 A.2d 746, 752 (1950). 
645. See cases cited supra note 619. 
646. Gittings v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections for Baltimore Cnty., 38 Md. App. 674, 
681, 382 A.2d 349, 353 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978). 
647. For example, frequently, plaintiffs bracket the field and seek an injunction, writ of 
mandamus, and declaration. International Assoc. of Fire Fighters, Local 1715 
Cumberland Firefighters v. Mayor & City Co. of Cumberland, 407 Md. 1, 6, 962 A.2d 
374, 377 (2008); City of Takoma Park, 301 Md. at 444, 483 A.2d at 351; Town of 
New Market Frederick Cnty. v. Milrey, Inc., 90 Md. App. 528, 532, 602 A.2d 201, 
203 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) (complaint for declaratory, injunctive, and "other" 
relief). In Doe v. Maryland State Bd. of Elections, the amended complaint initially 
sought declaratory and injunctive relief. 428 Md. 596, 604, 53 A.3d 1111, 1115 
(2012). It was resolved on summary judgment. !d. at 598, 53 A.3d at 1112. In Town 
of La Plata v. Faison-Rosewick, LLC, No 68, 2013 WL 5354355 (Md. Sep. 25, 2013), 
the court held that common-law mandamus and the declaratory judgment statute 
provided the grounds for review in the context of a municipal annexation referendum. 
One of the issues presented in Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 35 v. Montgomery 
Cnty., No. 132 (Sept. Term 2011) (sub curia), is: "Is a challenge to a Board of 
Elections decision subject to the rules and tenets of judicial review of an agency 
decision?" 
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It is clear that such decisions, when final, are reviewable: "Election 
supervisors are empowered to execute, not to make, election laws. 
Their decisions are at least as fully subject to review as decisions of 
administrative agencies."648 Thus, "[t]he election laws do not purport 
to make conclusive any decisions of supervisors misconstruing the 
law or their own powers. Decisions contrary to law or unsupported 
by substantial evidence are not within the exercise of sound 
administrative discretion and of the legislative prerogative, but are 
arbitrary and illegal acts."649 Courts have the inherent power to 
review decisions of administrative agencies to determine if they are 
arbitrary or capricious.65° For reasons set forth more fully below, 
however, the procedural vehicle through which the administrative 
decision is viewed may be important. 
A. The Election Law Article Provides For Judicial Review And 
Complaints for Declaratory Judgment 
For petitions governed by state law, election law section 6-209 
provides for ""[j]udicial review."651 Thus, under subsection (a)(l), a 
"person aggrieved" by certain specified652 determinations "may seek 
judicial review." Under subsection (b), however, "any registered 
648. Hammond v. Love, 187 Md. 138, 144, 49 A.2d 75, 77 (1946). 
649. ld. 
650. Schade v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, 401 Md. 1, 37-38, 930 A.2d 304, 326 (2007). 
Even absent statutory authority, "the judiciary has an undeniable constitutionally-
inherent power to review" administrative decisions, especially quasi-judicial ones, and 
ensure that the agency below was properly empowered and its responsibilities "have 
been performed within the confines of traditional standards of procedural and 
substantive fair play." Anne Arundel Co. v. Halle Dev., Inc., 408 Md. 539, 556, 971 
A.2d 214, 224 (2009) (quotation and citation omitted). 
651. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 6-209 is captioned "[j]udicial review." Under MD. 
CODE ANN., article 1, section 18: "The captions or headlines of the several sections of 
this Code which are printed in bold type, and the captions or headlines of the several 
subsections of this Code which are printed in italics or otherwise, are intended as mere 
catchwords to indicate the contents of the sections and subsections. They are not to be 
deemed or taken as titles of the sections and subsections, or as any part thereof; and, 
unless expressly so provided, they shall not be so deemed or taken when any of such 
sections and subsections, including the captions or headlines, are amended or 
reenacted." 
652. The specified determinations are ones made under ELEC. LAW § 6-202 (advance 
determination), ELEC. LAW § 6-206 (determinations at the time of filing), or ELEC. 
LAW § 6-208(a)(2) (the chief election official shall "determine whether the petition 
has satisfied all other requirements established by law for that petition and 
immediately notify the sponsor of that determination, including any specific 
deficiencies found"). 
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voter" may file a "complaint" under the Maryland Uniform 
Declaratory Judgments Act. Often, a single challenge seeks both a 
declaration and judicial review. 653 
In general, under these provisions a petition sponsor or similar 
interested person654 could seek "judicial review," under subsection 
(a)(l) of determinations of legal insufficiency, such as an advance 
determination, or a decision regarding the form of the petition page or 
lack of referability under, e.g., the appropriations exception. Any 
registered voter could challenge sufficiency decisions and signature 
"counts" in a declarator< action. In doing so, the voter would be 
challenging a decision65 of an administrative agency under a code 
provision captioned "[j]udicial review. "656 As noted in Part IV .A, 
however, taxpayers and petition sponsors, who may not be voters, 
may also file suit. 
B. Mandamus Has Been Used to Challenge Referenda 
1. Common-Law Mandamus 
Petitions for common-law mandamus were typically utilized to 
challenge referenda in older cases, but still make an appearance 
today.657 In Gisriel, for example, the Maryland Court of Appeals held 
653. Montgomery Cnty. Volunteer Fire-Rescue Ass'n v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of 
Elections, 418 Md. 463, 467, 15 A.3d 798, 800 (2011) (seeking judicial review and a 
declaration). In Howard Cnty. Citizens for Open Gov 't v. Howard Cnty. Bd. of 
Elections, 201 Md. App. 605, 608, 614, 30 A.3d 245, 247, 251 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2011), the plaintiffs filed a "petition" for ')udicial review." The challenge was heard 
on "memoranda" submitted to the court. !d. at 614, 30 A.3d at 251. 
654. It is often the case that the entity aggrieved is not a natural person. ELEC. LAW § 6-
209(a)(1) permits a "person" who is aggrieved to seek judicial review. "Person" is 
not defined in ELEC. LAW § 1-101 or § 6-101. Pursuant to Mo. CODE ANN. art. I, 
§ 15: "Unless such a construction would be unreasonable, the word person shall 
include corporation, partnership, business trust, statutory trust, or limited liability 
company." 
655. For a discussion of the nature of an election official's decision, see infra text 
accompanying note 664. 
656. The standard for review of other petitions may not be statutorily-specified. E.g., Mo. 
CoDE ANN. art. 23A, § 19 (annexation petitions). In Town of La Plata v. Faison-
Rosewick, LLC, No 68, 2013 WL 5354355 (Md. Sep. 25, 2013), the court held that 
common-law mandamus and the declaratory judgment statute provided the 
mechanism for review in the context of a municipal annexation referendum. 
657. See, e.g., Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters v. Mayor of Cumberland, 407 Md. 1, 6, 962 A.2d 
374, 377 (2008); Gisriel v. Ocean City Bd. of Supervisors of Elections, 345 Md. 477, 
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that the election officials "had a non-discretionary duty to delete from 
the Ocean City registered voter list the names of unqualified voters 
before determining the percentage of voters who had signed the 
petition."658 Their failure to do so was subject to a common law 
mandamus action. 659 
Although not a referendum case, in Seat Pleasant, the court wrote: 
"The writ of mandamus has been utilized in cases involving a variety 
of election challenges."660 The court noted that where election 
officials have "made an obvious mistake of law in counting or 
rejecting ballots, the court has the power to correct such mistake."661 
The Seat Pleasant court wrote: "[J]udicial review is properly sought 
through a writ of mandamus where there is no statutory provision for 
hearing or review and where public officials are alleged to have 
abused the discretionary powers reposed in them. . . . Stated 
differently, a clear mistake of law, however honest, is an arbitrary 
action, reviewable on mandamus and illegal action is reviewable, as 
such, without characterizing it as arbitrary."662 
Prior to issuing a writ of mandamus for "discretionary acts" there 
must be both lack of an available procedure for obtaining review and 
an allegation that the action complained of is illegal, arbitrary, 
capricious, or unreasonable.663 
2. Administrative Mandamus 
Administrative mandamus is an action for judicial review of a 
quasi-judicial664 order or action of an administrative agency where 
496, 693 A.2d 757, 766 (1997); Kelly v. Marylanders for Sports Sanity, Inc., 310 Md. 
437, 447, 530 A.2d 245, 250 (1987); Bayne v. Sec'y of State, 283 Md. 560, 563, 392 
A.2d 67,68 (1978); Ferguson v. Sec'y of State, 249 Md. 510,514,240 A.2d 232,234 
(1968); Cole v. Sec'y of State, 249 Md. 425, 428, 240 A.2d 272, 274 (1968). 
658. Gisriel, 345 Md. at 497-98,693 A.2d at 767. 
659. See id.; accord Town of La Plata v. Faison-Rosewick, LLC, No 68, 2013 WL 
5354355 (Md. Sep. 25, 2013) (mandamus and declaratory judgment held proper). 
660. City of Seat Pleasant v. Jones, 364 Md. 663, 675, 774 A.2d 1167, 1174 (2001). 
661. /d . . 
662. /d. at 674, 774 A.2d at 1173 (citations, quotations, and brackets omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
663. /d. at 688-89, 774 A.2d at 1182; see Town of La Plata v. Faison-Rosewick, LLC, No 
68, 2013 WL 5354355 (Md. Sep. 25, 2013). 
664. In Town of La Plata v. Faison-Rosewick, LLC, No 68, 2013 WL 5354355 (Md. Sep. 
25, 2013), the court held that a town official's review of a referendum petition was not 
quasi-judicial. A quasi-judicial action occurs when an executive branch official 
determines the rights of a single matter by reviewing the evidence before him/her. See 
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other review is not expressly authorized. 665 The recent decision in 
Town of La Plata appears to foreclose the use of administrative 
mandamus to review certification decisions of election officials. 666 
C. Requests for Injunctive Relief Have Been Permitted 
In Sun Cab Co. v. Cloud, a litigant argued that a court of equity 
cannot enjoin "the holding of a statewide election upon a question 
concerning the state as a whole"667 and that the referendum must be 
"dealt with under a [common law] writ of mandamus .... "668 The 
court rejected the argument, concluding that a court of equity may 
issue an injunction against a statewide referendum on the ground that 
the petitions for referendum were insufficient. 669 The court noted that 
"stopping a false pretension to a right to a referendum is obviously 
better done at the start than at some later stage in its career" and 
wrote that although the "writ of mandamus in [Maryland] is one 
which may be resorted to in some cases for preventative relief ... 
mandamus has not displaced injunction as the ordinary preventative 
remedy. "670 
Lewis v. Gansler, 204 Md. App. 454, 42 A.3d 63 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012), cert. 
denied, 427 Md. 609 (2012) (holding that quasi-judicial decisions concern "'who did 
what, where, when, how, why, [and] with what motive or intent,' while legislative 
facts 'do not usually concern the immediate parties but are general facts which help 
the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and discretion."'). In Gisriel, the 
plaintiff sought review of a decision of a city board of elections' refusal to authorize a 
referendum petition. 345 Md. at 483-84, 693 A.2d at 760. The court wrote that 
Gisriel "was seeking review of the non-legislative decision refusing to submit the 
zoning ordinance to the electorate." !d. at 500 n.16, 693 A.2d at 768 n.16 (emphasis 
added). Similarly, in Doe v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections, the circuit court 
wrote that the General Assembly has delegated review of the petitions to the election 
board and cited a decision stating that quasi-judicial authority was being exercised. 
2008 Md. Cir. Ct. Lexis 7, *25 (Montg. Co. Jul. 24, 2008), rev'd on other grounds, 
406 Md. 697 (2008). In Schultz v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 361 N.E.2d 477, 
480 (Oh. App. 1976), aff'd, 357 N.E. 2d 1079, 1081 (Oh. 1976), the court wrote that a 
county board of elections' review of a petition for sufficiency and validity is a quasi-
judicial action. 
665. Mo. CODE ANN. Rule 7-401. 
666. Town of La Plata v. Faison-Rosewick, LLC, No 68, 2013 WL 5354355 (Md. Sep. 25, 
2013), see note 664, supra. 
667. 162 Md. 419,425, 159 A. 922, 926 (1932). 
668. !d. 
669. !d. 
670. !d. at 425-26, 159 A. 926. 
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D. Dangers Presented by the Referendum Process 
The referendum is a "basic instrument of democratic 
government."671 However, despite its many benefits, such as 
encouraging citizen participation and providing checks and balances, 
the referendum process may present many concems.672 
The threat of referendum fraud is not hypothetical.673 For example: 
Dead men don't vote. And they can't sign their names to 
voter petitions, either. But one did in the town of Greene last 
year. The signature of a deceased town resident was 
discovered by an alert town clerk on a petition asking voters 
if they wanted the tax reform bill to go to a people's veto 
referendum in June .... 674 
Fraud allegations are often presented as rapidly as signatures are 
collected.675 Circulator misconduct was uncovered in Gelbman v. 
Willis. 676 While not reflected in the special master's report, one 
671. Elections-Referendum-Chartered Counties, 63 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 291, 292 (1978) 
(quoting, inter alia, Ritchmount P'ship v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections of Anne 
Arundel Cnty., 283 Md. 48, 61, 388 A.2d 523, 531 (1978)). 
672. See id. at 294-95. 
673. Howard Cnty. Citizens for Open Gov't. v. Howard Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 201 Md. 
App. 605, 628 n.22, 30 A.3d 245, 259 n.22 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011) (quoting John 
Doe No. I v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010)); Tyler v. Sec'y of State, 229 Md. 397, 
405, 184 A.2d 101, 105 (1962) (false circulator affidavits "gives rise, at least, to a 
presumption of fraud"). 
674. John Christie, Forgeries Raise Questions about Role Money Plays in Petition Process, 
BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Feb. 3, 2010), http:/lbangordailynews.com/2010/02/03/ 
politics/forgeries-raise-questions-about-role-money-plays-in-petition-process/. 
675. E.g., Citizens Against Slots at the Mall v. PPE Casino Resorts Md., LLC, 429 Md. 
176, 199 & n.l2, 55 A.3d 496, 510 & n.2 (2012) (noting failure to preserve claims of 
fraud and misrepresentation on appeal); Motion to Dismiss and Brief of Appellees-
Cross-Appellants at 14-15, Town of La Plata v. Faison-Rosewick, LLC, No. 68, 2012 
WL 8020918 (Md. Sept. Term 2012) (Town reported "possible perjury" and citizens 
reported misrepresentation), subsequent opinion, Town of La Plata v. Faison-
Rosewick, LLC, No 68, 2013 WL 5354355 (Md. Sep. 25, 2013); Alison Knezevich, 
Ball. Cnty. Referendum on Zoning Gets Legal Challenge, BALT. SUN, Nov. 10, 2012, 
at 4 ("[A]ttomeys say that petition circulators 'were flown here by signature-
collecting companies . . . put up in hotels and motels, and paid a bounty for each 
signature they could obtain.' .... "). Generally, petitioning does not present the 
danger of quid pro quo misconduct. First Nat'! Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 
765, 790 (1978). 
676. Report of Special Master at 1-3, Gelbman v. Willis, No. C-2001-7340.0C (Cir. Ct. 
Anne Arundel Cnty. Oct. 5, 2001) (Lerner, J.). In Town of La Plata, the municipal 
report stated that a town official observed signature pages that were left unattended. 
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circulator signed an affidavit stating that the circulator had observed 
signatures being affixed when the pages had been left unattended. 677 
It is common practice to use a telephone book or directory to 
commit circulator and petition fraud678 and in some petition drives, 
signatures are gathered by "round tabling." 679 For example, in one 
instance, circulators reportedly sat at a table, passed around a phone 
book, and signed voters' names to the petitions.680 Similarly, the 
North Dakota Attorney General's office described names being taken 
out of a phone book. 681 In one nearby jurisdiction: 
[T]he Board "gave some credence" to reports of a "signing 
party" at the Red Roof Inn where names and addresses were 
allegedly copied from the telephone books onto petition 
sheets.682 
In another case, a Montana trial court described multiple details of 
a referendum "bait and switch" scheme.683 Quoting the Maine 
Supreme Court,684 the Montana court wrote that "it is evident that the 
circulator's role in a citizen's initiative is pivotal. Indeed, the 
Town of La Plata v. Faison-Rosewick, LLC, No 68, 2013 WL 5354355 (Md. Sep. 25, 
2013). 
677. Report of Special Master at 1-3, Gelbman v. Willis, No. C-200 l-7340.0C (Cir. Ct. 
Anne Arundel Cnty. Oct. 5, 2001) (Lerner, J.). One of the authors was counsel of 
record in that case. 
678. Whitley v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, 429 Md. 132, 155, 55 A.3d 37, 51 (2012) 
(citing Montgomery Cnty. Volunteer Fire-Rescue Ass'n v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of 
Elections, 418 Md. 463, 492 & n.6, 15 A.3d 798, 815 & n.6 (2011) (Harrell, J., 
dissenting)). 
679. Christie, supra note 674 .. 
680. /d. 
681. /d. 
682. Citizens Comm. for the D.C. Video Lottery Terminal Initiative v. D.C. Bd. of 
Elections & Ethics, 860 A.2d 813, 816 (D.C. 2004). The court noted that 
"irregularities in the petition circulation process so 'polluted' the signature-gathering 
operation conducted by a subcontractor, Stars and Stripes, Inc. (Stars and Stripes), as 
to require invalidation of all petition sheets circulated and signatures gathered by the 
Stars and Stripes circulators." /d. at 813 (emphasis added). 
683. Montanans for Justice v. Montana ex ref. McGrath, 146 P.3d 759, 775 (Mont. 2006). 
684. Me. Taxpayers Action Network v. Sec'y of State, 2002 Me. 64, 795 A.2d 75, 82 
(noting that 3,054 signatures gathered by imposter were invalidated). The Maine 
statute did not provide specific grounds for invalidating signatures. /d. at 79-80. It 
merely directed validation. This created a broad authority to disqualifY signatures. 
/d. The court considered the circulator's affidavit indispensable, and invalidation of 
any signatures lacking that prerequisite was "necessary to preserve the integrity of the 
initiative and referendum process." !d. at 80. 
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integrity of the initiative . . . process in many ways hinges on the 
trustworthiness and veracity of the circulator."685 The Montana trial 
court wrote that "the people have a right to rely on the integrity of the 
initiative process from beginning to end."686 The Montana court then 
invalidated all signatures and petitions tainted by or associated with 
the fraud in order to preserve the integrity of the process.687 
Similarly, in San Francisco Forty-Niners v. Nishioka,688an 
injunction against an initiative "on the ground that the circulating 
initiative petition contained false statements intended to mislead 
voters and induce them to sign the petition" was affirmed.689 In short, 
"when presented with a petition by a circulator, voters have a right to 
rely on the integrity of the initiative process and the accuracy of the 
petition .... "690 In the court's words: 
Nevertheless, the people also have a right to rely on the 
integrity of the initiative process from beginning to end. 
Because the initiative process bypasses the normal 
legislative process, safeguards are necessary to prevent 
abuses and provide for an informed electorate. Ordinary 
citizens with a sense of trust should be able to believe in the 
accuracy of what they are signing. 691 
This presents a potential dilemma. On the one hand, the people 
have reserved an important power and there is a constitutional right 
that must be zealously protected. On the other, there is a risk of 
abuse in invoking a "drastic"692 tool, and the integrity of the electoral 
process and principle of representative government must be 
reasonably protected. It is in this context that the procedural 
685. Montanans for Justice, 146 P.3d at 777. 
686. Montanans for Justice v. State, No. CDV-06-1162(d) (Mont. 2006), available at 
http://www.yellowstonepublicradio.org/documentsllnitiatives.pdf. 
687. Montanans for Justice, 146 P.3d at 777-78. 
688. San Francisco Forty-Niners v. Nishioka, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 388 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). 
689. /d. at 390. While the ballot box may be the "sword of democracy," and courts 
"jealously guard" the "people's right" to the referendum, it is clear that election 
officials have a ministerial duty to reject initiative petitions which suffer from a 
substantial defect that directly affects the quality of information provided to the 
voters. /d. at 393. Petition deficiencies that threaten the proper operation of the 
process justify rejection. !d. 
690. /d. at 397. 
691. !d. 
692. Tyler v. Sec'y of State, 229 Md. 397, 403, 184 A.3d 101, 104 (1962) (citations 
omitted). 
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mechanism to review the action of the administrative agency must be 
deployed. 
E. The Twin Goals of the Validation and Verification Process Should 
Be to Ascertain that a Sufficient Number of Actual Voters 
Knowingly Affixed Their Signatures to Signature Pages in a 
Process That Contained Sufficient Safeguards Against Fraud, 
Misrepresentation and Mistake 
The goals to be protected by State election officials and courts are 
well defined: "Clearly, the provisions of [Article XVI] will be 
furthered if, by proper and reasonable means, a referendum petition is 
to be put upon the ballot only if it has the requisite number of genuine 
signatures of registered voters."693 The "overarching goal of the 
entire Petition Subtitle is to ensure that only eligible voters sign 
petitions .... "694 The process is designed to ensure "a sufficiently 
extensive demand by voters of more than one of the designated 
political subdivisions of the state. "695 
Validation and verification should be defined to ensure that a 
sufficient number of actual voters knowingly affixed their signatures 
to pages in a process that contained sufficient safeguards against 
fraud, misrepresentation, and mistake. The process mandates that 
either the full text, or a fair and accurate summary, of the measure to 
be referred be printed on or attached to the pages. This provides 
sufficient information to a potential signer and meets the requirement 
of "knowingly" affixed. 696 Cross-checking the voter registration rolls 
693. Burroughs v. Raynor, 56 Md. App. 432, 440, 468 A.2d 141, 144 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1983) (quoting Barnes v. Pinkney, 236 Md. 564, 571, 204 A.2d 787, 791 (1964)); 
Burruss v. Bd. ofCnty. Comm'rs, 427 Md. 231, 267,46 A.3d 1182, 1203 (2012). 
694. Howard Cnty. Citizens for Open Gov't. v. Howard Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 201 Md. 
App. 605, 618, 30 A.3d 245, 254 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011) (quoting Montgomery 
Cnty. Volunteer Fire-Rescue Ass'n v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 418 Md. 
463, 473, 15 A.3d 798, 801 (2011)). The Fire-Rescue dissent noted: "We disagree. 
The express goal of §6-207 'is to ensure that the name of the individual who signed 
the petition is listed as a registered voter."' Volunteer Fire-Rescue Ass 'n, 418 Md. at 
488-89, 15 A.3d at 813 (citing Mo. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 6-207(a) (LexisNexis 
2010)). 
695. Phifer v. Diehl, 175 Md. 364, 367, 1 A.2d 617, 618 ( 1938). 
696. In Mich. Civil Rights v. Bd. of State Canvassers, one justice wrote: "A necessary 
assumption of the petition process must be that the signer has undertaken to read and 
understand the petition. Otherwise, this process would be subject to perpetual 
collateral attack, and the judiciary would be required to undertake determinations for 
which there are no practical legal standards and which essentially concern matters of 
political dispute." 475 Mich. 905, 905 (2006). 
768 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
ensures that only the names of registered voters will be counted. 
Requirements such as the circulator's affidavit create a presumption 
that the signature was affixed by the voter, not by improper 
procedures such as forgery. As a matter of policy, the General 
Assembly may wish to evaluate whether this is sufficient in light of 
the procedures of the boards of election, standards applicable to 
circulators' affidavits, and the applicable standard of adjudication in 
the courts. 
F. The Statute Could Provide A More Comprehensive Framework for 
Review 
The General Assembly may choose to specify an explicit paradigm 
explaining the canons of construction. 697 Rather than applying either 
a liberal or strict construction, the legislature may choose to specify 
that petitions are to be construed to effectuate two consistent 
purposes. 698 
There may699 be significant differences between a petition for 
judicial review, a request for mandamus, and a complaint for 
injunctive and declaratory relief. In some referenda challenges, 
evidentiary hearings have been held and testimony taken. For 
example, in one mandamus proceeding, a sponsor's "representative 
testified" about signatures. 700 In Gelbman, circulators were 
deposed.701 In a recent judicial review case, however, testimony was 
excluded. 702 
697. The court of appeals has noted: "The primary issue before us is one of statutory 
construction." Md. State Bd. of Elections v. Libertarian Party of Md., 426 Md. 488, 
512 n.ll, 44 A. 3d 1002, 1016 n.ll (2012); accord Montgomery Cnty. Volunteer Fire-
Rescue Ass'n v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 418 Md. 463, 469, 15 A.3d 798, 
804 (2011) ("In the instant case, we concluded that the particular statutory provision 
at issue, i.e., §6-203(a)(l), is clear and unambiguous .... "). Therefore, nothing 
prevents the legislature from setting forth rules of construction. 
698. See Whitley v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, 429 Md. 132, 166, 55 A.3d 37, 57-58 
(2012); Town of La Plata v. Faison-Rosewick, LLC, No 68, 2013 WL 5354355 (Md. 
Sep. 25, 2013). 
699. In many instances, there may be no factual dispute and the differences between 
procedural mechanisms may be non-existent. 
700. Sec'y of State v. McLean, 249 Md. 436, 441, 239 A.2d 919, 922 (1968) ("Albritton 
testified"); Bd. of Educ. of Frederick Cnty. v. Mayor & Aldermen of Frederick, 194 
Md. 170, 176,69 A.2d 912,915 (1949). 
70 I. See supra note 333 and accompanying text. 
702. Citizens Against Slots at the Mall v. PPE Casino Resorts Md., LLC, 429 Md. 176, 199 
& n.l2, 55 A.3d 496, 510 & n.2 (2012). 
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If a circuit court entertains a challenge to the administrative 
decision of an election board under principles of judicial review, the 
standard of review may be deferential and the ability to introduce 
evidence during the judicial review process limited.703 If, however, 
the rubric is a complaint for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, 
or mandamus in their conventional sense, discovery and an 
evidentiary hearing may be permissible. Thus, especially in the 
context of a challenge filed shortly before an election, the choice of 
procedural mechanism may have significant ramifications. 
It might be helpful if the General Assembly were to set forth a 
uniform standard or standards for review of referendum petitions. In 
Citizens Against Slots at the Mall, for example, the circuit judge 
"reviewed the entire agency record" that consisted of 40,408 
signatures on 4,998 pages.704 That type of painstaking review, while 
appropriate in that case, should be rendered unnecessary in a review 
proceeding. It may be beneficial to define procedures to address 
allegations of petition misconduct in light of the accelerated pace of 
State and county referendum litigation and the policies and 
procedures of boards of elections in addressing such issues. 
G. State Constitutional Parameters for Legislation Governing 
Referenda. 
Legislation implementing the right to referendum must be 
reasonable and avoid undue burden. 705 The court of appeals, faced 
with a state constitutional challenge to the signature statute, stated 
that it must "first consider, in a realistic light, the extent and nature of 
the burden placed upon voters when determining what level of 
scrutiny to apply to a constitutional challenge that implicates voting 
703. MD. CODE. ANN. ST. GoVT. section 10-222(f)(l) provides that judicial review "shall 
be confined to the record for judicial review supplemented by additional evidence 
taken pursuant to this section." Subsection (2) authorizes a reviewing court to order 
that an agency take additional evidence under specified circumstances. Id. Under 
§I 0-222(g)(2), a party may offer evidence outside the record that relates to 
irregularities in procedure. The court of appeals interpreted the predecessor statute in 
Consumer Protection Div. v. Consumer Pub. Co., 304 Md. 731, 749, 501 A.2d 48, 57 
(1985). For a more complete discussion, see A. ROCHVARG, PRINCIPLES AND 
PRACTICE OF MARYLAND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 13.22 at 176-77 (Carolina 
Academic Press 2011). As noted supra at note 647, a pending decision may clarify 
the standard of review. 
704. PPE Casino Resorts Maryland, LLC v. Anne Arundel Co. Bd. of Supervisors of 
Elections, Case No. 02-C-10-149479, slip op. at 31 (Cir. Ct. Anne Arundel Co. Jun. 
25, 201 0), rev 'don other grounds, 429 Md. 176, 55 A. 3d 496 (20 12). 
705. Barnes v. State ex ret. Pinkney, 236 Md. 564, 573, 204 A.2d 787, 791-92 (1964). 
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and associational rights."706 Where, as in the case of signature 
requirements, it is minimal, the court applied rational basis scrutiny 
and held the requirement constitutional.707 The statute arrived in 
court with "a strong presumption of constitutionality .... "708 That 
presumption was not overcome in the context of a challenge under 
Articles 7 and 24 of the Declaration of Rights709 and a "reasonable 
non-discriminatory measure" will be sustained. 710 
While the United States Constitution does not require that a state 
create a right of referendum, "if a State does create such a procedure, 
the State cannot place restrictions on its use that violate the federal 
Constitution."711 Once the right is created, "the exercise of that right 
is protected by the First Amendment applied to the States through the 
Fourteenth Amendment."712 Thus, neither state law nor a state 
constitution may impermissibly burden the right.713 
Generally, however, signing a petition is not entitled to the same 
protection as exercising the right to vote. 714 Thus, in rejecting claims 
that the signature statute violated the right of protected political 
speech, right to petition, and right to associate, it has been held that 
the requirement is content-neutral, non-discriminatory, and 
permissible under the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 715 Equal protection, as well as procedural and 
706. Burruss v. Bd. ofCnty. Comm'rs, 427 Md. 231,253,46 A.3d 1182, 1195 (2012). 
707. !d.; Doe v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 406 Md. 697, 732 n.28, 962 A.2d 
342, 363 n.28 (2008) ("[T]he mandatory signature requirements of Section 6-
203(a)(l) are not unduly burdensome, requiring a signer to provide only a surname, 
one full given name, the initials of any other names, the signer's address and date of 
signing."). 
708. Burruss, 427 Md. at 263, 46 A.3d at 1201. 
709. !d. at 265, 46 A.3d at 1202. The court also rejected a challenge under the Maryland 
Constitution, article XI-A, sections IA and 7. Because of the specific nature of that 
provision, it is not discussed in this article. 
710. !d. at 253,46 A.3d at 1195. 
711. Kendall v. Howard Cnty., No. JFM-09-660, 2009 WL 3418585, at *4 (D. Md. Oct. 
20, 2009) (citing Taxpayers United for Assessment Cuts v. Austin, 994 F.2d 291, 295 
(6th Cir. 1993), a.ff'd, Kendall v. Balcerzak, 650 F.3d 515 (4th Cir. 2011)). The 
circuit court in Petition of Howard Cnty. Citizens for Open Gov 't, No. 13-C-
076855AA (Cir. Ct. How. Co. Apr. 27, 2010), aff'd, 201 Md. App. 605 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 20 II), also relied on A us tin. 
712. Kendall, 2009 WL 3418585 at *4 (citing Stone v. City of Prescott, 173 F.3d 1172, 
1175 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
713. !d. (citations omitted). 
714. !d. 
715. !d. at *5-6. 
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substantive due process challenges to validation and verification, 
have been rejected.716 
Thus, "[ w ]hile the referendum process enjoys a considerable 
degree of constitutional protection, the State may regulate the 
referendum process in reasonable, content neutral, nondiscriminatory 
manner."717 Signature requirements have been repeatedly upheld 
against challenge. 718 
Participants do not have a constitutional right to observe petition 
processing by boards of election. 719 Procedural due process does not 
confer a right to participate.720 The rationale is that an election board 
must complete verification within twenty days and, because a sponsor 
may present arguments to a court sitting in judicial review, there is no 
prejudice.721 As noted above, the election board's "limited resources 
should be focused on the 'large and difficult' task of validating and 
verifying thousands of signatures in this compressed time-frame" and 
that presents a policy question. 722 
716. !d. at *6-9. On the procedural due process issue, the District of Maryland quoted 
Protect Marriage Illinois v. Orr, 463 F.3d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 2006), for the 
proposition that: "The cost of allowing tens of thousands of people to demand a 
hearing on the validity of their signatures would be disproportionate to the benefits, 
which would be slight because the state allows the organization orchestrating a 
campaign to put an advisory question on the ballot . . . to challenge the 
disqualification of any petitions. Nor is it clear to us what right of liberty or property 
(an essential predicate of a due process claim) the plaintiffs have been deprived of by 
being required to comply with the requirements of state law." !d. at *8. The District 
of Maryland noted that, under MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW§ 6-209(a)(l), any person 
aggrieved by a deficiency determination may seek judicial review. !d. at *9. 
717. Howard Cnty. Citizens for Open Gov't v. Howard Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 201 Md. 
App. 605, 623, 30 A.3d 245, 256 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011). 
718. /d. at 623, 30 A.3d at 256 ("[Section]6-203[, which imposes signature requirements,] 
is a reasonable and content neutral regulation of the referendum process."); Barnes v. 
Maryland, ex rei Pinkney, 236 Md. 564, 571-72, 204 A.2d 787, 791 (2008); Doe v. 
Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 406 Md. 697, 729-32, 962 A.2d 342, 361-62 
(2008). 
719. See supra Part II.A.9.d; Preisler v. Calcaterra, 243 S.W.2d 62, 65-66 (1951). 
720. Howard Cnty. Citizens for Open Gov't., 201 Md. App. at 631-32,30 A.3d at 261-62. 
721. !d. 
722. See supra Part II.A.9.d, citing Sec'y of State v. McLean, 249 Md. 436, 439-40, 239 
A.2d 919, 921 (1968) ("One of Taxpayers' signature gatherers promptly convinced 
the Secretary that he had overlooked 5,000 signatures ... by finding them in a box in 
a cabinet in the Secretary's office[, discussing] a meeting [with the] Secretary."); Md. 
State Bd. of Elections v. Libertarian Party of Md., 426 Md. 488, 501, 44 A.3d 1002, 
1010 (2012) ("constructive discussions between the parties" resulted in the board of 
elections crediting additional signatures); Howard Cnty. Citizens for Open Gov 't., 201 
Md. App. at 610-11,30 A.3d at 249; Kendall v. Balczerak, 650 F.3d 515,519 (4th 
[Vol. 42 
VIII. RECENT LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS TO AMEND THE 
REFERENDUM AND INITIATIVE PROCESSES 
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Proposals to change the referendum and introduce the m1t1ative 
process have been introduced in three recent sessions of the General 
Assembly. Proponents oflegislative change contend that the process, 
"designed in the era before electronic signatures needs a fresh 
look."723 Some have opined that the law makes it "too easy" to 
petition. 724 Others have vigorously disagreed725 and appellate courts 
Cir. 2011) ("[The Board] sent an email to several persons involved in the referendum 
process requesting their presence at a meeting of the County Board the following 
evening."); Anne Arundel Cnty. v. McDonough, 277 Md. 271, 286, 354 A.2d 788, 
797 (1976). 
723. Erin Cox, Petition Process Under Scrutiny, BALT. SUN, Jan. 9, 2013, A3. "State 
leaders contemplate changes to referendum process." Id. Gov. O'Malley stated that it 
has "probably been made a little too easy" to refer laws. Jd. The comments were 
apparently in response to Del. Neil Parrott "who developed the website 
mdpetitions.com that allowed voters to download petitions and submit them. . . . 
Some described him as having granted the minority party its most effective tool 
against the Democratic supermajority that dominates both chambers of the General 
Assembly." Jd. As indicated in note 5, above, however, what is "reform" to 
proponents may constitute suppression to opponents. Thus, for example, while a 
sponsor of the Referendum Integrity Act described it as a fraud-prevention measure, 
an opponent described it as "death by a thousand cuts .... " Associated Press, "Bill 
could make it tougher for Md. ballot measures," The Daily Record, Mar. 20, 2013, 
http:/ /thedailyrecord.com/20 13/03/20/death-penalty-referendum-seems-unlikely/. 
724. Erin Cox, Petition Process Under Scrutiny, BALT. SUN, Jan. 9, 2013, A3. 
725. Editorial, "A Referendum on Referendums," BALT. SUN, Nov. 12, 2012, 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/editoriallbs-ed-petition-
20121112,0,1385554.story#sthash.oVWGav7Y.dpuf. The editors responded: 
Our view: The criticism by Gov. O'Malley and others in 
Annapolis that petitioning a law to referendum has become 
'too easy' is a bit too easy, too. . . . We don't blame 
supporters of the Dream Act and same-sex marriage for 
lamenting the inconvenience of a referendum. After working 
so hard for so long to win General Assembly approval, they 
had to mount expensive campaigns to keep the laws on the 
books. But not to be too Pollyannaish about this, what they 
ended up with - laws that everyone now knows have the 
support of a majority of voters - actually benefits their 
causes. . . . Obviously, a balance must be struck over how 
difficult it is to petition a new law to ballot. Too easy and 
people would do it on everything just to be contrarian; too 
hard and a state already dominated by one party would truly 
be without a viable option to express dissent. What Maryland 
has now seems entirely reasonable and perhaps improved by 
Mr. Parrott's efforts. Legislators are welcome to explore the 
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have described the petitiOn process as one that is not easy.726 In 
response to calls to make it more difficult, a news editorial replied: 
"Let's not discourage participatory democracy quite so quickly. 
There might actually be something to it."727 
Recent legislative proposals regarding direct democracy may be 
grouped into three broad categories: (A) expansion such as 
eliminating the "appropriations exception" and establishing the 
initiative; 728 (B) increased regulation by imposing additional 
requirements and providing additional safeguards against fraud in the 
subject when they reconvene in January, but they should be 
reluctant to deny voters this periodic chance to make their 
voices heard." 
/d.; see infra note 731. 
726. Town of Oxford v. Koste, 204 Md. App. 578, 588-89,42 A.3d 637,643-44 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 2012), aff'd, 431 Md. 14, 31,63 A. 3d 582, 594(2013) ("We echo the Court 
of Special Appeals's sentiment that the referendum process is intended to be a 
rigorous one to complete and the hurdles that stand in the way of a referendum are 
meant to be cleared only by voters who demonstrate a high level of diligence."). In 
Koste, the court noted "the legitimate concern that legislative governance could be 
slowed down dramatically if referendum elections were too frequent occurrences. If 
referendum elections were to become a more routine occurrence, it would take 
substantially longer and exhaust substantially more resources for laws to become 
enacted (if at all), thus stagnating potentially the legislative process." !d. at 33-34, 42 
A.3d at 594. 
727. The Editorial stated: 
"Clearly, what concerns Mr. O'Malley and others are the efforts of Del. 
Neil Parrott, the Washington County Republican who brought 
referendums to the Internet age. Instead of relying entirely on the 
manpower-intensive process of collecting signatures on the street, he set 
up a website that made the signature collection process more convenient 
and accurate .... We'd rather have Mr. O'Malley and others, Democrat 
or Republican, looking for ways to encourage public participation in 
government decisions rather than looking into ways to discourage it. " 
Editorial, "A Referendum on Referendums," BALT. SUN, Nov. 12, 2012, 
http:/ /www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/editorial!bs-ed-petition-20 121112,0,1385 
5 54. story#sthash.o VWGav7Y .dpuf. 
728. H.B. 43, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012); H.B. 871, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 
2012) (proposed establishing the initiative); H.B. 10, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 
2011); H.B. 31, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2010) (proposed abolishing the 
appropriations exception). See also supra notes 41-42, regarding proposed 
amendments to MD. CoNST. art. XVI. 
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referendum petition circulation process;729 and (C) accelerated 
disclosure of financial contributions and expenditures. 730 
A. Unsuccessful Efforts to Expand the Referendum by Elimination of 
the "Appropriations Exception, " and Establish the Initiative 
In recent legislative sessions, some Republican731 members of 
the House of Delegates have sought to expand direct democracy 
through proposed constitutional amendments eliminating the 
appropriations exception and establishing the initiative. 732 Proposals 
to eliminate the appropriations exception733 have not made it out of 
Committee, each year receiving an unfavorable report from the 
House Appropriations Committee.734 In the 2012 session, many of 
the same sponsors introduced House Bill 871, which would have 
amended the constitution by establishing an initiative process.735 
House Bill 871 was submitted to the House Rules and Executive 
Nominations Committee, but also failed to make it out of 
Committee. 736 
729. See, e.g., Maryland Referendum Integrity Act, H.B. 127, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 
2012). 
730. See H.B. 1275, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012) (bills on public reporting for 
referendum petitions). See Campaign Finance Reports, H.B. 378, Ch. Law 409, 2010 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2010) (effective law on reporting of expenditures and 
contributions of Ballot Issue Committees). 
731. Expansion of direct democracy may be viewed as shifting the balance of power. See 
supra note 5 and text accompanying notes 723-27 and 737-41. 
732. H.B. 43, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012); H.B. 871, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 
2012); H.B. 10, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2011); H.B. 31,2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Md. 2010). 
733. See H.B. 43, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012); H.B. 10, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 
2011); H.B. 31, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2010). Substantively, the proposed bill 
would have amended the operative clause for the appropriations exception in article 
XVI, section 2, to provide: "A law making any appropriation for maintaining the State 
Government, or for maintaining or aiding any public institution, not exceeding the 
next previous appropriation for the same purpose, shall be subject to rejection or 
repeal under this section." H.B. 43, 2012 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012). 
734. See Maryland Department of Legislative Affairs, 2012 Session, Fiscal and Policy 
Note, House Bill 42. For the procedural history of H.B. 43 (2012 Sess.), see, 
http://mlis.state.md. us/20 12rslbillfile!hb0043 .htm. 
735. See H.B. 871,2012 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012). 
736. See H.B. 871, 2012 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012). 
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B. The Push for Further Regulation of the Referendum Process and 
The Maryland Referendum Integrity Act 
In an effort to further regulate the referendum petition 
circulation process, a group of House Democrats proposed the 
Maryland Referendum Integrity Act as House Bill 127 during the 
2012 session, and House Bill 493 during the 2013 session. 737 The 
Maryland Referendum Integrity Act (the "Proposed Integrity Act") 
would have engrafted additional requirements on the current 
framework for direct democracy.738 
The Proposed Integrity Act would have addressed some areas of 
the referendum petition process where there is a high perceived 
potential for misconduct. 739 Specifically, it would have required 
more of signatories and circulators than currently is necessary/40 
while extending the period within which to seek judicial review of 
referendum petition sufficiency, making challenges easier.741 While 
they parallel each other in many ways, H.B. 127 and H.B. 493 
differed in significant ways. 
For example, H.B. 127 would have required signatories to 
personally handwrite identifying information to be provided with the 
signed petition; 742 a heightened requirement from the current 
provision that simply requires the identifying information to be 
737. See H.B. 493, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013); Maryland Referendum Integrity Act, 
H.B. 127, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012). 
738. H.B. 127, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012) .. 
739. !d. 
740. Other jurisdictions have imposed higher requirements in different ways. Voters in 
Howard County, MD, approved a measure increasing the number of votes necessary 
to refer a county measure. Arthur Hirsch, Howard Voters Raised Bar for Petitions, 
but Did They Know It?, BALT. SUN (Nov. 8, 2012), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/ 
20 12-11-08/newslbs-md-ho-results-resultsballot-20 121107 _1_ signatures-charter-
change-charter-review-commission. 
741. Untimely challenges have been universally rejected. E.g., Canavan v. Md. State Bd. 
of Elections, 430 Md. 533, 61 A.3d 828 (2013) (per curiam). 
742. This proposed requirement was likely in response to the advent of computer-facilitated 
signature pages. In Whitely v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, 429 Md. 132, 55 A. 3d 132 
(2012), and Doe v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, 428 Md. 596, 53 A. 3d 1111 (2012), the 
court described the use of these techniques. Specifically, in Whitely, the court of 
appeals stated: "The site's computer software allowed a user to generate electronically 
a petition signature page by entering his or her identifying information in specified 
fields on the website. The registered voter then could print the page, affix his or her 
signature, complete the required petition circulator's affidavit attesting to the genuine 
nature of his or her signature, and submit it to the petition sponsor in support of 
referring SB 1 to the ballot." Whitely, 429 Md. at 135-36, 55 A.3d at 39-40. 
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included with the petition in "printed" or "typed" form. 743 The 
proposal also would have added a requirement that the circulator's 
affidavit be notarized when the petition circulator signs the affidavit 
attesting that the circulator was in the presence of the signatories to 
the petition when the petition was signed.744 Additionally, it would 
have extended the period of time within which to request judicial 
review of a petition sufficiency determination, from ten to thirty days 
after a sufficiency determination. 745 
H.B. 493 would have added technical requirements. For example, 
in addition to the current requirements, signatories would have been 
required to affix their date of birth and address, "as the address 
appears on the statewide voter registration list."746 Notably, under the 
proposal, the signature pages would be required to contain "[a] 
statement notifying signers that information provided on a petition is 
subject to public disclosure .... "747 Instead of the single affidavit 
now required, circulators would have been required to write their 
initials next to each signature "at the time that the signature is 
affixed .... "748 "Self-circulation," a process currently permissible/49 
743. See H.B. 127, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012). House Bill 127 proposed a change 
to Mo. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 6-203(a)(2) (2010) that would have required each 
signatory to a referendum petition to "provide" identifying information required by 
the current statutory framework "in the individual's own handwriting." !d. 
744. See id. 
745. See id. House Bill 127 proposed a change to ELEC. LAW § 6-210(e)(l) to allow 
judicial review to be "sought by the 30th day following the determination to which it 
relates." H.B. 127, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012). The current language allows 
judicial review to be "sought by the I Oth day following the determination to which it 
relates." ELEC. LAW.§ 6-210(e)(l). 
746. H.B. 493. Interestingly, the House Ways and Means Committee bill file to H.B. 493 
indicates an "Amendment to H.B. 493" that would have provided after the word 
"signed," "but a common law name shall suffice for the purposes of signing a petition 
in accordance with the right to use one's common law name under the Maryland 
Constitution." 
747. !d. This requirement could make it more difficult to obtain signatures. Recently, 
media reports indicated that an employee was disciplined for signing a referendum 
petition. See, e.g., Annie Linskey, Galludet Official Suspended for Signing Anti-Gay 
Marriage Petition, BALT. SUN, Oct. 12, 2012, at 3. The proposed warning may be 
contrasted with other bills introduced to provide a degree of confidentiality. See infra 
notes 833-34. 
748. !d. 
749. Whitely v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, 429 Md. 132, 55 A.3d 37 (2012). One 
proponent of permitting self-circulation analogized it to submittal of an absentee 
ballot. Written testimony of Mr. Steve Struharik on HB 493. Testimony of Paul 
Jacob, President of Citizens in Charge & Citizens in Charge Foundation, provided 
additional reasons for permitting self-circulation. Whether or not those arguments are 
sound is a policy question. 
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would have been prohibited. 75° Circulators would be required to take 
an "online training course," provided free of charge. 751 Restrictions 
would have been placed on computer-facilitated signature pages and 
the petition sponsor would have been required to form a ballot 
committee before soliciting signatures, and file campaign finance 
reports.752 The Bill also would have provided that the "responsible 
officers of a petition sponsor's ballot issue committee shall be a party 
to any proceeding to test the validity of the petition."753 
The Proposed Integrity Act would have prohibited certain 
practices in the petition circulation process by codifying new criminal 
violations of the election law article and also prohibited individuals 
convicted of criminal violations of the election law article from 
serving as referendum petition circulators. 754 It would have 
criminalized the act of promising compensation or bonuses to petition 
circulators based on the number of petition signatures collected, 
while also criminalizing the act of willfully or knowingly accepting 
such compensation. 755 
House Bill 127 from the 2012 legislative session and House Bill 
493 from the 2013 legislative session are among the most extensive 
attempts to substantially change the framework through which 
referendum petitions are circulated and signatures gathered.756 House 
Bill 127 was set for hearing in the House Ways and Means 
Committee, but the Bill did not make it out of committee. 757 Per the 
Maryland General Assembly website, House Bill 493 was set for a 
750. H.B. 493. 
751. Id. In its testimony in support of S.B. 673, the companion to H.B. 493, Maryland 
Common Cause supported the "increase[ d] transparency" under the Proposed Integrity 
Act, but suggested that "[t]here should be a de minimus threshold of names the 




754. See H.B. 127, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012). 
755. /d. The same language was carried over into the 2013 legislative session. See H.B. 
493, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013) 
756. See H.B. 123, 2001 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2001). Aside from the referendum petition 
bills proposed in the 2012 and 2013 legislative sessions, the most recent alteration of 
this election law was in 2001, but involved only the method in which these 
referendum questions were identified and presented to SBE and to the public. See id. 
757. H.B. 127, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012). The Maryland Senate did not take action 
on the bill. See id. 
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hearing and debate on February 21, 2013; however, it was not 
enacted. 758 
The prohibition on "bounties," i.e., paying circulators per 
signature gathered, is illustrative of the difficulty in developing 
regulatory systems.759 It seems intuitively plausible that the state 
should be permitted to ban a process that, on its face, appears similar 
to unlawful vote buying.760 That conclusion, however, is not free 
from doubt and "bounties," or pay-per-signature plans have been 
supported as nothing more than reasonable, well-accepted 
productivity incentives.761 
758. Referendum Integrity Act, H.B. 493, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013) 
759. See Erin Cox, State Leaders Contemplate Changes to Referendum Process, BALT. 
SUN (Jan. 8, 2013), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-0l-08/news/bs-md-
referendum-reform-proposed-20 130 1 08 _1 _petition-process-website-mdpetitions-
com-petition-drives (discussing how "bounty systems" which pay circulators for 
signatures collected can be beneficial to the democratic system but may also lead to 
fraud). 
760. There are other similar prohibitions codified within Maryland's election law. See Mo. 
CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 16-40l(a) (LexisNexis 2010) (prohibiting a person from 
willfully and knowingly offering anything of value for the purpose of influencing 
another's decision to sign a petition). A violation of section 16-401 is a misdemeanor, 
punishable by "a fine of not less than $10 nor more than $250 or imprisonment for not 
less than 30 days nor more than 6 months or both." !d. Moreover, a convicted 
violator is permanently disqualified from serving in a decision-making capacity in the 
election process and ineligible to work within a public office for five years after 
conviction. See id. at§ 16-1001 (LexisNexis 2010). 
761. See supra note 768; Jay M. Zitter, Validity, Construction, and Application of State 
Statutes Regulating or Proscribing Payment in Connection with Gathering Signatures 
on Nominating Petitions for Public Office or Initiative Petitions, 40 A.L.R. FED. 317, 
326 (2008) (featuring a discussion of the necessity and value of paid signature 
gatherers in modern democracy). Mr. Paul Jacob suggested that per-signature 
payment is a productivity measure and "there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that 
a criminal ban on productivity pay has any effect in reducing fraud." Testimony of 
Paul Jacob, President of Citizens in Charge & Citizens in Charge Foundation. He 
rhetorically asked: "How would a petition company lawfully let go an hourly worker 
for not gathering enough signatures or not gathering any signatures at all? ... Would it 
be illegal. .. for a petition company to raise their [sic] compensation of a professional 
petition circulator in the future based on the good job that person did in Maryland ... 
. ?" He suggested that similar bans have been struck down in five states. In 
Independence Inst. v. Buescher, 718 F.Supp.2d 1257, 1262-63 (D. Col. 2010), there 
was evidence that hourly payment doubled the cost over per-signature payment, and 
"[b ]ased on the evidence presented at the hearing, the Court finds that the effect of § 
1-40-112(4) is to raise the cost per signature for a ballot petition campaign by at least 
6% to 18% and potentially as much as a dollar per signature." Based on the evidence 
presented, the Buescher court found "that pay-per-signature compensation is no more 
likely than pay-per-hour compensation to induce fraudulent signature gathering or to 
increase invalidity rates." /d. at 1267. Three years of litigation followed. 2010 
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Before the Supreme Court's decision in Meyer v. Grant/62 
many jurisdictions banned professional, or "paid," circulators.763 
After all, paid interlopers did not fit the mold of the Populist and 
Progressive petitioners, i.e., citizens seeking to thwart corrupt 
legislatures that were influenced by special interests.764 The Supreme 
U.S.Dist.Lexis 92946, *30 (D.Col. Aug. 13, 2010) (reiterating holding), subsequent 
decision, 2010 U.S.Dist.Lexis 10082 (D.Col. Sep. 10, 2010) (attorneys' fees), 
subsequent decision, 2011 U.S.Dist.Lexis 26848 (D. Col. Mar. 2, 2011) (discovery 
order), 2011 U.S.Dist.Lexis 75074 (D. Col. Jul. 6, 2011) (same), subsequent decision, 
2012 U.S.Dist.Lexis 38025 (D. Col. Mar. 21, 2012) (motion to exclude expert on grass 
roots organizing and direct democracy), subsequent decision, 2012 U.S.Dist.Lexis 
38028 (D. Col. Mar. 21, 2012) (motion to disqualify expert on pay-per-hour signature 
petition drives and impact of hourly compensation), subsequent decision, 2012 
U.S.Dist.Lexis 38029 (D. Col. Mar. 21, 2012) (motion to exclude expert on economic 
impact of ban on pay-per-signature scheme), subsequent decision, 869 F.Supp.2d 
1289, 1297, 1309 (D. Col. 2012) (motion for summary judgment reiterating prior 
holding enjoining ban and noting need for "fact-intensive inquiry"), subsequent 
decision, 936 F.Supp.2d 1256 (D. Col. 2013) (deciding after trial that evidence 
demonstrated that pay-per-signature ban raised cost of petitioning by at least 18%, 
reduced circulator efficiency, had no measurable impact on validity rates, and did not 
impact the rate of fraud), subsequent decision, 2013 U.S. Dist.Lexis 81833, *2 (D. 
Col. Jun. 11, 2013) (concluding three years of litigation). After trial, the Buescher 
court concluded that "[f]rom a theoretical standpoint pay-per-hour signature gathering, 
rather than pay-per-signature gathering, incentives fraud. However, the evidence at 
trial of actual fraud was minimal and established that fraud occurs under both pay-per-
hour and pay-per-signature systems because some individuals are simply prone to 
commit fraud." ld. The Buescher court also found that the evidence relied on by the 
Colorado legislature was insufficient to justify the ban. Jd. As such, if future 
legislative action is contemplated, the pay-per-signature issue may be worthy of 
empirical study. see, id. at 1272, 1277 ("failure of proof is a common theme in the 
cases on pay-per-signature petition circulating," and there has been fraud under both 
models); Term Limits Leadership Council, Inc. v. Clark, 984 F.Supp. 470, 472-73 
(S.D. Miss. 1997) (requiring more than "legislators' perception that payment per 
signature encouraged fraud," and noting: "[U]ncontroverted evidence that out-of-state 
circulators have not been willing to work on any basis other than a payment per-
signature basis. Additionally, there was uncontroverted evidence that payment of a flat 
daily rate to Mississippi circulators had yielded poor results. That is, they collected far 
fewer signatures than those paid per signature. On the basis of this proof, it is 
apparent that the statutes under consideration make it 'less likely' that plaintiffs will 
be able to gamer a sufficient number of signatures to place their initiative on the 
ballot, and that the statutes 'thus limit[] their ability to make the matter the focus of 
statewide discussion.' Meyer, 486 U.S. at 423, 108 S. Ct. at 1892. Thus, according to 
the analysis in Meyer, the statutes burden plaintiffs' political expression."). 
762. Meyerv. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988). 
763. See Zitter, supra note 761, at 326. 
764. See The Populist and Progressive Era, CITIZENS IN CHARGE, 
http://www.citizensincharge.org/learnlhistory/the-populist-and-progressive-era (last 
visited Aug. 30, 2013). 
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Court, however, held those bans to be unconstitutionaC65 and 
proponents of referenda and initiatives around the country have often 
turned to professional signature collectors as a means by which to 
obtain the requisite number ofvotes.766 Maryland is no exception.767 
The Proposed Integrity Act, however, would not present an outright 
ban on paid circulators. 768 Proponents might describe the criminal 
prohibition on providing and receiving compensation or bonuses on 
the basis of number of signatures gathered as a limited regulation that 
fosters the important state interest of discouraging fraud in the 
referendum petition circulation process. 769 
In Meyer v. Grant, proponents of an amendment to the Colorado 
Constitution contended that "they would need the assistance of paid 
personnel to obtain the required number of signatures within the 
allotted time,"770 but the statute at issue rendered it a felony to pay 
petition circulators. 771 In holding the statute to be unconstitutional, 
the Court reasoned that "(t]he circulation of an initiative petition of 
necessity involves both the expression of a desire for political change 
and a discussion of the merits of the proposed change.'m2 Thus, 
during the petition circulation process, an "interactive 
765. Meyer, 486 U.S. at 428. 
766. Zitter, supra note 761, at 317. 
767. E.g., Alison Knezevich, Baltimore County Zoning Referendum Fight Puts Spotlight on 
Hired Petition Companies, BALT. SUN (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.baltimoresun.com/ 
news/maryland/baltimore-county/bs-md-co-petition-companies-20 130114,0, 
1437012.story (describing a recent referendum petition drive in Maryland in which 
paid professional circulators were accused of lying to gain signatures and inspiring at 
least one physical altercation). Del. Eric Luedtke sponsored HB 493 in an attempt to 
eliminate these alleged or perceived types of misconduct. See HB 493, 2013 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013), at 1. 
768. See Referendum Integrity Act, H.B. 493, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013); 
Referendum Integrity Act, S.B. 673, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013). 
769. See Knezevich, supra note 767 (noting that other states have tried to regulate the 
petition industry). 
770. Meyer, 486 U.S. at 417. The text of the statute at issue stated: 
Any person, corporation, or association of persons who directly or 
indirectly pays to or receives from or agrees to pay to or receive 
from any other person, corporation, or association of persons any 
money or other thing of value in consideration of or as an 
inducement to the circulation of an initiative or referendum 
petition or in consideration of or as an inducement to the signing 
of any such petition commits a class 5 felony and shall be 
punished as provided in section 18-1-105, C.R.S. (1973). 
/d. at 416 n.l (citing CoLO. REv. STAT.§ 1-10-110 (1980)). 
771. /d. at416-17. 
772. /d. at 421. 
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communication" takes place between petition circulators and 
prospective signatories that involves "core political speech."773 
The supporters of the ban on paid circulators argued that even if the 
statute imposed some limitation on First Amendment expression, 
because other avenues of expression remained open, the burden was 
permissible.774 The Court was not persuaded, reasoning that "[t]he 
First Amendment protects appellees' right not only to advocate their 
cause but also to select what they believe to be the most effective 
means for so doing. ,ms Justice Stevens explained how the ban on 
paid petition circulators restricted political expression, stating: 
First, it limits the number of voices who will convey 
appellees' message and the hours they can speak and, 
therefore, limits the size of the audience they can reach. 
Second, it makes it less likely that appellees will gamer the 
number of signatures necessary to place the matter on the 
ballot, thus limiting their ability to make the matter the 
focus of statewide discussion. 776 
The Court's reasoning was rooted in the idea of "quantity of 
expression,"777 meaning that payment to circulators allows an 
individual to engage more people in core political speech than if such 
payment were prohibited.778 Thus, the blanket prohibition of 
payment to circulators was unconstitutional because the statute 
"restrict[ ed] access to the most effective, fundamental, and perhaps 
economical avenue of political discourse, direct one-on-one 
communication. "779 
A few years later, the Supreme Court was faced with the question 
of whether another Colorado statute requiring, inter alia, that 
proponents of an initiative report names and addresses of all paid 
circulators and the amount paid to each violated the First 
Amendment.780 Although not directly on point, the Court rejected 
proponents' argument that disclosure of the identities of paid 
circulators and not volunteers acted as a "control or check on 
773. Id. at421-22. 
774. Id. at 424. 
775. Id. 
776. !d. at 422-23. 
777. !d. at419-20. 
778. See id. at 419-22. 
779. !d. at 424. 
780. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 186, 188-89 (1999). 
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domination of the initiative process by affluent special interest 
groups."781 The Court reasoned that "[t]he added benefit of revealing 
the names of paid circulators and amount paid to each circulator ... 
is hardly apparent and ha[d] not been demonstrated."782 Additionally, 
the Court reasoned that that ballot initiatives simply "do not involve 
the risk of 'quid pro quo' corruption present when money is paid to, 
or for, candidates."783 Moreover, the Court recognized the "arsenal of 
safeguards" already employed by Colorado to deter fraud and 
diminish corruption in the electoral process.784 Taken together, 
Meyer and Buckley would appear to indicate that restrictions on 
payment of circulators may be rigorously examined because of their 
possible interference with core political speech.785 
Similarly, in State v. Brookins, the Maryland Court of Appeals held 
unconstitutional a statute prohibiting payment to campaigners 
conducting election day related services such as "walk around 
services or any other services as a poll worker or distributor of 
sample ballots."786 The court reasoned that, "[w]hen a law burdens 
core political speech, we apply 'exacting scrutiny,' and we uphold the 
restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state 
interest."787 The court recognized that the State's interest in 
preventing "real or apparent corruption of the electoral process" was 
a compelling one; however, it did not accept the State's assertion that 
the statute was sufficiently narrowly tailored to accomplish that 
interest. 788 
781. ld. at 202. Essentially, the proponents argued that the disclosure requirements allow 
voters to be "informed of the source and amount of money spent by proponents to get 
a measure on the ballot." Jd. at 203. 
782. Jd. 
783. Jd. 
784. Jd. at 205. 
785. See id. at passim; Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414,420-24 & n.5, 428 (1988). 
786. State v. Brookins, 380 Md. 345, 350, 884 A.2d 1162, 1165 (2004). 
787. ld. at 355, 884 A.2d at 1168 (quoting Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 
334, 347 (1995)). 
788. Jd. at 372, 884 A.2d at 1178. The State argued that the statute was narrowly tailored 
because (I) the provision was limited to a single day when "the danger of corruption 
and its appearance are at their height"; (2) the "prohibition applies only to those 
whose partisan election day activities are motivated by the potential corrupting 
influence of money"; and (3) the statute leaves open the ability to pay for "other 
political campaign activities that are less likely to be corrupt or appear corrupt, 
including providing meals for workers," transporting workers to polls, and 
telephoning voters. Jd. at 370-73, 884 A.2d at 1177-79. The court disagreed with the 
state's analysis and concluded that the statute is not "necessary to accomplish the" 
goal of eliminating real or apparent corruption from the electoral process, nor was it 
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In some other jurisdictions, courts have held a ban on per-signature 
payment to circulators to be unconstitutional. 789 In Initiative & 
Referendum Inst. v. Maine, campaigners moved to invalidate the ban, 
arguing that their initiative petition failed because they were unable 
to pay professional circulators on a per-signature basis.790 The State 
disagreed, pointing out that a number of other petition campaigns had 
been successful and blamed the circulators' lack of effort for the 
failure to obtain a sufficient number of signatures. 791 Because this 
case was decided on cross motions for summary judgment, the court 
accepted the campaigner's version of events, and held that the ban on 
per-signature payment "severely burdened their attempt to circulate 
an initiative petition."792 
Of note, however, is the fact that the Initiative & Referendum lnst. 
court recognized that on its face, a pay-per-signature scheme "creates 
a temptation to engage in unseemly behavior (including falsifying 
signatures) to boost a circulator's income" and that the 
"[p ]reservation of the integrity of the political process, including 
prevention of the appearance of fraud and corruption . . . is an 
important regulatory interest."793 Indeed, the court went on to explain 
that it reached the conclusion it did in light of the standard of review 
at the summary judgment phase and highly disputed facts but that at 
trial, the ban on per-signature payments could certainly pass muster if 
it were "found to impose little or no burden on the initiative-petition 
process. "794 
In On Our Terms '97 PAC v. Sec'y of State of Maine, a case 
involving many of the same parties as Initiative & Referendum lnst., 
the United States District Court for the District of Maine held a 
statute "prohibit[ing] payment to circulators of initiative and 
referendum petitions for the collection of signatures if that payment is 
based on the number of signatures collected" unconstitutional as 
"narrowly tailored to punish the targeted action without needlessly infringing the First 
Amendment rights of others." /d. 
789. See Initiative & Referendum lnst. v. Maine, No. CIV 98-104-B-C, 1999 WL 
33117172, at * 1 (D. Me. April 23, 1999). 
790. See id. 
791. See id. at *11. The State pointed to the "brevity of the campaign (approximately three 
weeks), the tiny fraction of the budgeted monies expended for circulators' services ... 
and the passing up on an opportunity to collect signatures during" the previous 
elections. /d. 
792. /d. at * 12. 
793. /d. at * 13. 
794. /d. 
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violative of the First Amendment.795 Discussing Meyer, the Our 
Terms '97 court compared the pay-per-signature ban to the complete 
payment ban held unconstitutional in Colorado and stated that while 
the statute "did not completely stifle initiative and referendum 
activity,"796 Maine's "supposition that professional petition 
circulators are more likely to commit fraud than volunteers cannot 
carry its burden of proving that its regulation is narrowly tailored to 
meet a compelling need. "797 
Citizens for Tax Reform v. Deters, involved a similar, yet 
distinguishable statute. 798 The challenged provision, designed to 
reduce the number of fraudulent signatures, made it a felony to "pay 
anyone for gathering signatures on election-related petitions on any 
basis other than time worked. "799 In short, it banned all forms of 
compensation other than payment on an hourly basis. Specifically, 
the statute at issue rendered it a felony to "receive compensation on a 
fee per signature or fee per volume basis for circulating any 
declaration of candidacy, nominating petition, initiative petition, 
referendum petition, recall petition, or any other election-related 
petition[.]"800 The Sixth Circuit, recognizing that the elimination of 
fraud was certainly a compelling state interest, ultimately held that 
the statute was not narrowly drawn and therefore was 
unconstitutional.801 While "not as draconian as the complete ban in 
Meyer," restricting circulators to volunteers and hourly workers 
nonetheless placed an undue burden on core political speech.802 
Thus, a number of decisions following Meyer bring into question 
the validity of the Proposed Integrity Act's suggested ban on 
bounties.803 At the other end of the spectrum, however, courts have 
distinguished Meyer and upheld statutes prohibiting pay-per-
signature schemes in light of the compelling state interest in 
preserving the integrity of the referendum, initiative, and electoral 
795. 101 F. Supp. 2d 19, 20 (D. Me. 1999). The wording of the Maine statute was similar 
to the Proposed Integrity Act provision; however, it is one of a few cases that 
considered a law similar to that proposed in Maryland and reached this result. See id. 
796. !d. at 26. 
797. Zitter, supra note 761. 
798. See Citizens for Tax Reform v. Deters, 518 F.3d 375, 377 (6th Cir. 2008). 
799. Jd. 
800. Jd. 
80 I. See id. at 387-88. 
802. Jd. at 385. 
803. See supra text accompanying notes 780-802. 
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process as a whole.804 For example, Person v. New York State Bd. of 
Elections805 involved a statute that prohibited the payment of 
signature gatherers on a per-signature basis.806 The Second Circuit 
distinguished a pay-per-signature prohibition from the outright ban in 
Meyer and held that "a state law prohibiting the payment of electoral 
petition signature gatherers on a per-signature basis does not per se 
violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments."807 The court found 
"insufficient support for a claim that a ban on per-signature payment 
is akin to the complete prohibition" found unconstitutional in Meyer 
concluding that the statute leaves open sufficient alternative methods 
of payment. 808 
Similarly, in Initiative & Referendum Institute v. Jaeger, the court 
held that, because the "statute at issue ... only regulates the way in 
which circulators may be paid" and did "not involve the complete 
prohibition of payment that the Supreme Court ruled 
unconstitutional," the State had "produced sufficient evidence that 
the regulation [was] necessary to insure the integrity of the initiative 
process."809 Indeed, the State had produced "sufficient evidence 
regarding signature fraud" and "appellants [had] produced no 
evidence that payment by the hour, rather than on commission, would 
in any way burden their ability to collect signatures."810 
Finally, in Prete v. Bradbury, the court upheld a statuty prohibiting 
the payment to electoral petition signature gatherers on a piecework 
or pay-per-signature basis.811 It found that the challengers had failed 
to demonstrate that the statute significantly burdened First 
Amendment rights in circulating the petitions and that the State had 
sufficiently established an important regulatory interest in preventing 
fraud and forgery in the electoral process.812 Importantly, the court 
explained that the "First Amendment does not . . . prohibit all 
restrictions upon election processes" and states "may, and inevitably 
must, enact reasonable regulations of parties, elections, and ballots to 
804. See Person v. N.Y. State Bd. ofE1ections, 467 F.3d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 2006); Prete v. 
Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949, 968, 970-71 (9th Cir. 2006); Initiative & Referendum lnst. v. 
Jaeger, 241 F.3d 614,617-18 (8th Cir. 2001). 
805. Person, 467 F.3d 141. 
806. !d. at 142-43. 
807. !d. at 143. 
808. !d. 
809. 241 F.3d at 618. 
810. !d. 
811. 438 F.3d 949, 951 (9th Cir. 2006). 
812. /d. at 968, 970-71. 
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reduce election[] and campaign-related disorder."813 Many other 
courts have reached the same result. 814 
It is against this backdrop that, if enacted, the ban on bounties in 
the Proposed Integrity Act would be evaluated. A ban may be 
deemed similar to the "arsenal of safeguards" discussed in Meyer and 
Buckle/15 or, alternatively, an interference with core speech. Perhaps 
it is possible to analyze it by harkening back to one's basic 
philosophy regarding direct democracy.816 To the Populist and 
Progressive supporters (and to petition sponsors), while paid 
circulators and bounties may appear antithetical to their philosophy, a 
mechanism that furthers direct democracy should be permitted.817 To 
proponents of representative government (and opponents of a 
particular petition), bounties conjure up images of the wild, wild west 
and should have no part in the process. 818 
813. !d. at 961 (quoting Timmons v. Twin Cities New Party, 520 U.S. 351,358 (1997)). 
814. See, e.g., Busefink v. State, 286 P.3d 599, 601 (Nev. 2012) (finding that a statute 
prohibiting compensation based on the number of voters registered did not violate 
First Amendment); Bernbeck v. Gale, No. 4:10CV3001, 2011 WL 3841602, at *6 (D. 
Neb. Aug. 30, 2011) (upholding state statute banning per-signature payment because 
plaintiffs "have presented no evidence which would establish that the ban ... burdens 
their ability to gather signatures"); Project Vote v. Kelly, 805 F. Supp. 2d 152, 181 
(W.D. Pa. 2011) (holding that a statute prohibiting the acceptance of payment based 
on number of voter registrations obtained did not violate First Amendment). 
815. See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 204-05 (1999) 
(citing Colorado's "arsenal of safeguards" outlined in Meyer that already made 
petition fraud illegal); Meyer, 486 U.S. at 425-27 (noting that under Colorado law, it 
was already illegal to forge signatures, make false or misleading statements about the 
substance of a petition, or bribe people to sign petitions). 
816. See Richard J. Ellis, Signature Gathering in the Initiative Process: How Democratic is 
It?, 64 MONT. L. REV. 35, 58 (2003) ("Allowing rich individuals or well-financed 
special interests to qualify measures for the ballot almost regardless of eiiher the depth 
or intensity of popular support seems to violate the original vision of direct 
democracy. Grassroots democracy degenerates into 'greenback democracy'; a system 
designed to save us from the special interests becomes captured by those very same 
interests."). 
817. !d.; see K.K. DuVivier, Out of the Bottle: The Genie of Direct Democracy, 70 ALB. L. 
REv. 1045, 1046 (2007) (noting that the Progressives supported citizen-initiated ballot 
referenda because they felt that such changes would allow citizens to exert more 
direct control in government). 
818. See Ellis, supra note 816, at 37 (stating that paid signature collectors are essentially 
"mercenaries, bounty hunters, paid by the signature, and largely indifferent to the 
substance of the petition"). The authors take no position on this policy question. 
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C. Financial Reporting and Efforts to Make the Numbers Available 
Quickly 
The third area of recent legislative attention has centered on 
disclosure of efforts to fund referenda.819 Two recent referenda 
triggered massive expenditures.82° For example, supporters and 
opponents of Question No. 7 (concerning the expansion of gaming) 
spent approximately $92 million on the campaign.821 The practice of 
using professional, i.e., paid, circulators IS constitutionally-
protected822 and frequent. 823 
In 2010, House Bill 378 was signed into law by Governor 
O'Malley as chapter 409 of the 2010 legislative session.824 The Act 
amended election law section 13-309(a)(3) to require ballot issue 
committees, defined as committees organized to support or defeat a 
referendum that makes its way onto the ballot, to file a campaign 
finance report "on or before the fourth Friday immediately preceding 
a General Election."825 One practical result was to make public last-
minute contributions and expenditures for the November 2012 
referendum on the expansion of gaming. 826 SBE published the 
campaign finance reports for various ballot issue committees on its 
819. See Eric G. Luedtke, Bill is not Designed to Stop Referendums, BALT. SUN, Mar. 3, 
2013, at 24 (noting that the Referendum Integrity Act would require petition sponsors 
to file a campaign finance report in the interest of full disclosure of sources of 
funding). 
820. See Nathon Rott, Slots Casino Approved Despite Fears for Horse-Racing Industry, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2010, at A31 (reporting that campaign spending in 2010 
regarding Question A, which allowed a large slot machine parlor to be built in Anne 
Arundel County, exceeded eight million dollars); John Wagner, Question 7 Spending 
Tops $40 Million, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2012, at 83 (reporting that campaign 
spending on Question 7, which allowed a casino to be built in Prince George's County 
as well as table games to be instituted at existing slot parlors, hit $40 million almost a 
month before the election actually took place). 
821. See Alexander Pyles, $92M Spent on Maryland Gambling Campaigns, DAILY 
RECORD, Nov. 28, 2012 available at http://thedailyrecord.com/2012/ll/28/92m-spent-
on-maryland-gambling-campaigns. 
822. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988) (holding that statutory prohibitions against 
the use of paid circulators abridged the right to engage in political speech in violation 
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments). 
823. See, e.g., Knezevich, supra note 767. 
824. H.B. 378, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2010). 
825. Jd. 
826. See Pyles, supra note 821. 
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website.827 Almost all of these reports were made available prior to 
the general election. 828 
Currently, the Election Law Article requires the person filing a 
referendum petition to also file a "signed statement, under the 
penalties of perjury, showing the contributions and expenditures of 
the petition .... "829 During the 2012 session, House Bill 1275 
(cross-filed in the Senate as Senate Bill 982) proposed an addition to 
the election law article that would require SBE to make the financial 
statement filed pursuant to section 7-104 available online.830 House 
Bill 1275 received a favorable committee report in 2012 and the 
House of Delegates voted to pass the bill; however, the bill did not 
make its way through the Senate.831 As noted above, however, SBE 
generally posts such information. 832 
D. The 2013 Legislative Session and Forward 
Likely partially in response to a Supreme Court decision under 
a state freedom of information act and a nisi prius decision,833 both of 
which held that signature pages must be disclosed under "sunshine 
acts," Delegate Robinson pre-filed a bill that proposed the 
establishment of certain measures to protect petition 
confidentiality.834 Introduced in the 2013 session, House Bill 49 
would have prohibited petition sponsors or circulators from 
827. See Reporting Requirements for Persons Supporting or Opposing the Question 
Related to Senate Bi//1, Mo. ST. Bo. OF ELECTIONS, http://www.elections.state.md.us/ 
campaign_finance/2012_gaming_reporting.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2013). 
828. See, e.g., Get the Facts- Vote No on Question 7 Political Action Committee Original 
Campaign Finance Statement, https://campaignfinancemd.us/Public/ ViewFiled-
Reports (enter "Get the Facts" on the "Committee Name" search name box). The 
report was filed on October 26, 2012, eleven days before the General Election. I d. 
829. See Mo. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW§ 7-104(C)(l)(LexisNexis 2010). 
830. See H.B. 1275, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012). 
831. See id. 
832. See Campaign Finance, Mo. ST. Bo. OF ELECTIONS, http://www.elections.state.md.us/ 
campaign_finance/index.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2013). 
833. See supra note 747; e.g., Alison Knezevich, Judge Allows Release of Petition in 
Baltimore County Zoning Referendum Drive, BALT. SUN, Oct. 31, 2012, available at 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/20 12-1 0-31/news/bs-md-co-petition-hearing-
20 121 031_1 _petition-partners-signature-gatherers-greenberg-gibbons. The court held 
that the names of people who signed petitions are "clearly a public record." Lawyers 
for parties opposing the referendum drive sought the signature pages to investigate 
alleged misrepresentations during signature gathering. Jd. Lawyers for the sponsors 
argued that disclosure during the pendency of signature gathering would have a 
chilling effect on signature gathering. ld. 
834. H.B. 49, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013). 
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disclosing the names and address of signatories to the public. 835 The 
Bill was set for hearing in the House Ways and Means Committee 
during the 2013 Legislative Session; however, the hearing was 
cancelled and not rescheduled.836 
In John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, the Supreme Court was faced with 
the question of whether the disclosure of referendum signatory 
information under a public information act violated the signatory's 
First Amendment rights. 837 En route to holding that disclosure 
requirements did not violate the First Amendment, the Court first 
stated that the "compelled disclosure of signatory information on 
referendum petitions is subject to review under the First 
Amendment" because an "individual expresses a view on a political 
matter" when he or she signs a referendum petition. 838 Thus, as in 
Meyer and Buckley, supra, review of First Amendment challenges to 
disclosure requirements in the electoral context must withstand 
"exacting scrutiny."839 
The respondents asserted two interests to justify burdening 
First Amendment rights: (1) to preserve the integrity of the electoral 
process by "combating fraud, detecting invalid signatures, and 
fostering government transparency and accountability"; and (2) 
providing information to the electorate. 840 The Court agreed, holding 
that public disclosure maintains the integrity of the electoral process 
by ensuring that only those signatures that should be counted are, 
promoting transparency and accountability, and curing the 
inadequacies of the verification and canvassing process.841 The Court 
also found that the burden asserted by the plaintiffs was not heavy-
indeed, several other petitions had been disclosed in recent years, 
with modest burdens on First Amendment rights.842 Thus, the State 
met its burden of demonstrating that the disclosure of signatory 
information on referendum and initiative petitions did not violate the 
First Amendment.843 Other courts are in accord, although, given that 
835. /d. 
836. HB0049 - History, Mo. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/webmga! 
frmMain.aspx?pid=billpage&stab=03&id=hb0049&tab=subject3&ys=2013RS (last 
visited Aug. 30, 2013). 
837. 130 S.Ct. 2811 (2010). 
838. /d. at 2817. 
839. /d. at 2818. 
840. /d. at 2819. 
841. /d. at 2820. 
842. See id. at 2820-21. 
843. See id. at 2821. 
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the Supreme Court's decision in Doe is fairly recent, case law on the 
subject is not nearly as well-developed as other referendum issues.844 
News reports indicate that a number of petition sponsors and 
circulators have complained of interference from "blockers." H.B. 
221 would have criminalized certain conduct, such as prohibiting a 
person from or hindering a person from signing a petition. 845 It 
remains to be seen if a similar proposal will be introduced again. 
IX. THE NEED FOR A CLEAR AND SIMPLIFIED, STATUTORY 
SIGNATURE MANDATE 
The statute provides precise parameters for a verifiable signature.846 
Boards of elections do not compare the voter's signature on the 
petition against the voter registration signature on file in MD 
Voters.847 There are no trained handwriting analysts on the payroll of 
the elections boards. 
The value of a signature that meets the statutory parameters is 
debatable and its importance a matter of policy for determination by 
the General Assembly: 
For several centuries, a personal, handwritten signoff has 
been an integral aspect of commercial, legal and social 
intercourse. 
But before widespread literacy in Western civilization, 
writes Stephen Mason, "there was no value placed on a 
personal signature." Documents were often ratified with a 
cross, symbolizing a Christian oath of truthfulness. 
Sometimes various objects were used as symbols of 
authenticity - especially when property was being bought 
or sold. In 114 7, for instance, a pair of British brothers gave 
a gift to a priory and offered locks of hair from their heads 
as proof of their gift. 
By the 14th century, Mason writes, many people were using 
seals and sealing wax to signify the conveyance of property. 
844. See, e.g., Many Cultures, One Message v. Clements, 830 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1162, 
1187, 1193 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (holding that Washington statutes imposing disclosure 
requirements on grassroots lobbying groups did not violate First Amendment); 
Shepherdstown Observer, Inc. v. Maghan, 700 S.E.2d 805, 813-15 (W.Va. 2010). 
845. H.B. 221, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013). 
846. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW§ 6-207(b) (LexisNexis 2010). 
847. See MD. CODE REGS. 33.06.05.02 (2010). 
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Members of royal families and eventually upper-crusty folks 
began signing their names on important documents. 
During the Renaissance, writes Chris Hawkins in his book, 
A History of Signatures: From Cave Paintings to Robo-
Signings, artists signed their works. A signature became 
known as part of a piece of art - sometimes with an artistic 
flourish or ornate underscore. 
In the 18th century, Mason writes, cases concerning valid 
signatures started cropping up in British courtrooms. The 
practice crossed the sea to the New World, where the core 
documents of the American experiment were signed by 
Founders and Framers. The distinct signatures of Thomas 
Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, John Hancock and others are 
part of our visual heritage. 
And by the 20th century, Americans were routinely signing 
their names - in their particular hands - on all essential 
legal documents, checks, credit card payments and other 
binding agreements. 
[Nevertheless, the] signature has become a rushed and 
atavistic formality. We haphazardly scrawl our ways 
through checkout lines and mortgage refinancings. We don't 
write - or sign - as many handwritten notes as we once 
did because we send emails and e-messages. We don't write 
- or sign - as many checks because we pay bills online. 
And no one seems to care anymore if our signature is legible 
or consistent or even our signature. We might as well all be 
a doctor dashing off an unreadable prescription. 
The once-sacrosanct signature has become in our time an 
object of ridicule .... At the prank site Zug, you can see the 
zany steps that writer John Hargrave takes to point out the 
absurdity of providing a signature these days. As part of his 
experiment, Hargrave signed credit card receipts with, 
among other things, artistic expressions, boxy grids, an X, 
stick figures, hieroglyphics and other people's names (such 
as Mariah Carey, Beethoven and Zeus). He said all his 
signings were accepted. 
Credit card signatures "are designed to make youfeel safe," 
Hargrave observes. But ultimately they are "useless." 
So today we print our names. We sign online petitions with 
typed-in signatures. We offer voice authorization for two-
year contracts read over the telephone. President Obama 
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even signs key legislation - such as the fiscal cliff deal -
with an autopen. 
We no longer just rely on traditional signatures to work as 
assurances any more. Whole industries are springing up 
around alternatives. More and more we use personal 
identification numbers, or PINS, as methods of 
authentication. Verification technology is able to recognize 
us by our voices, our eyes, our fingerprints, our DNA and 
other means. 
So, will the centuries-old handwritten signature eventually 
disappear from everyday life? "Likely," says Hawkins. "But 
probably not until after a generational shift." 
Children born in 2013, Hawkins adds, "will probably not 
share our generation's emotional attachment to a 
signature. "848 
Experience demonstrates that a "substantial number" of signatures 
will be invalidated in even a well-run petition drive.849 The Maryland 
Court of Appeals has repeatedly interpreted the applicable statute.850 
As noted above, it has stated that "[h ]ow it shall be ascertained 
whether these constitutional requirements [Maryland Constitution, 
article XVI] have been met by petitions filed, the referendum article 
has not prescribed."851 That gap is filled by legislation and SBE 
regulations. 852 It may be time to consider whether less restrictive 
requirements, such as permitting use of "common law names," 
848. Linton Weeks, The Great American Signature Fades Away, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 
14, 2013, 12:36 PM), http://www.npr.org/20 13/01/14/16923364 7 /the-great-american-
signature-fades-away?sc=ipad&f= I 019. 
849. See supra note 7; E.g., Roskelly v. Lamone, 396 Md. 27, 32 n.8, 912 A.2d 658, 661 
n.8 (2006). The State Board of Elections made the 20% suggestion and also noted 
that, "[i]n jurisdictions where residents move frequently, the invalidity rate may be 
higher." !d. 
850. See, e.g., Md. State Bd. of Elections v. Libertarian Party ofMd., 426 Md. 488, 507, 44 
A.3d 1002, 1013 (2012); Montgomery Cnty. Volunteer Fire-Rescue Ass'n v. 
Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 418 Md. 463, 469-71, 15 A.3d 798, 801-02 
(2011); Doe v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 406 Md. 697, 731-32,962 A.2d 
342,362 (2008). 
851. Sun Cab Co. v. Cloud, 162 Md. 419, 422, 159 A. 922, 923 (1932). Of course, 
Maryland Constitution, article XVI, section !(b), authorizes the General Assembly to 
enact implementing legislation, which it has done. See ELEC. LAW §§ 6-102, 6-206, 
6-207; MD. CODE REGS. 33.06.01.02, 33.06.05.02. 
852. See, e.g., ELEC. LAW §§ 6-102(c), 6-206, 6-207; Mo. CODE REGS. 33.06.01.02, 
33.06.05.02. 
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nicknames m signatures or eliminating some of the more arcane 
requirements, would in any way lessen the protections against 
fraud. 853 
By the same token, the legislature may wish to clarify the election 
boards and courts' roles in connection with ferreting out fraudulent 
signatures. Present administrative practice relies on validation and 
verification, without, for example, a comparison of the petition 
signature against the signature on voter registration records. It may 
be that elections officials have neither the expertise nor the resources 
for such a comparison, and they apparently do not make a 
comparison. Nor does the statute direct or compel them to do so. 
On the other hand, one circuit judge, citing an opinion of the 
Attorney General, has stated that even though elections officials are 
not handwriting experts, their "role is something more than a bean-
counter."854 The Attorney General opined that, if the board can 
determine with a reasonable degree of certainty that a signature was 
made by a person other than the purported signer, it should reject the 
signature. 855 If that is the rule-and it is not suggested either that it is 
or should be-it should be made clear by the legislature. 
X. THE NEED FOR A CLEAR AND SIMPLIFIED 
CIRCULATOR'S AFFIDAVIT ENUNCIATING A 
STANDARD FOR ADDRESSING ALLEGED CIRCULATOR 
FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION, AND MISTAKE IN THE 
CONTEXT OF POLITICAL SPEECH 
The Maryland Court of Appeals has interpreted the circulator's 
affidavit a number of times.856 In Tyler, for example, it addressed 
853. See Weeks, supra note 848 (explaining how traditional perceptions of signatures are 
changing). Media reports indicate that there may be an effort to relax the signature 
requirement introduced during the next legislative session. D. Jacobs, "Referendum 
on referendums still on hold," The Daily Record, June 13, 2013 (Del. Cardin "wants 
to make easier the signature requirement for referendum .... "). 
854. Doe v. Montg. Co. Bd. of Elections, 2008 Md. Cir. Ct. Lexis *7, *26 (Jul. 28, 2008), 
rev 'don other grounds, 406 Md. 697 (2008). 
855. !d. at *25. In Sun Cab Co., the plaintiff sued to enjoin a referendum, alleging that 
many signatures were forgeries, others were fictitious names, some signatories were 
deceased, and others were not qualified to sign. 162 Md. at 421, 159 A. at 922. The 
court's opinion, however, addressed arguments presented by the intervening 
defendant and did not resolve the allegations of these irregularities. !d. at 431,159 A. 
at 926. 
856. See, e.g., Whitley v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, 429 Md. 132, 163, 55 A.3d 37, 56 
(2012); Tyler v. Sec'y of State, 229 Md. 397, 401, 184 A.3d 101, 103 (1962); 
Ferguson v. Sec'y of State, 249 Md. 510, 515, 240 A.2d 232, 234-35 (1968). 
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non-compliance with the precise rubric of Maryland Constitution, 
article XVI.857 In Whitley, it held that the statute does not preclude 
"self-circulating."858 In Fraternal Order of Police, it may address the 
zip code requirement in COMAR.859 
The state has a legitimate interest, not only in rooting out fraud, but 
also in "ferret[ing] out invalid signatures caused ... by simple 
mistake."860 "[V]erification and canvassing will not catch all invalid 
signatures" and "[t]he job is large and difficult .... "861 The 
circulator's affidavit is "integral. "862 
It is not a criticism of the appellate courts, which have interpreted 
statutory language, to suggest that important policy choices are 
presented by the current situation. "Self-circulation" is not prohibited 
by statute, and therefore is permitted under Whitley, but it may be 
counter-intuitive. 863 It is an area that should be addressed by the 
General Assembly. It may be that permitting self-circulation, unless 
there is an indicator of invalidity, remains the better course of action. 
An earlier version of the election laws provided that any question 
concerning the invalidity of a signature "affects that signature only 
and does not affect or impair any other portion of the petition or 
petitions."864 That provision was removed in 1998.865 One circuit 
court, relying on SBE Guidelines, has held that "only questioned 
signatures that are individually infirm" may be rejected.866 
The legislature may wish to specify the effect to· be given to a 
defect or defects in a circulator's affidavit. 
857. Tyler, 229 Md. at 401, 184 A.2d at 103. 
858. Whitley, 429 Md. at 163, 55 A.2d at 56. 
859. See supra notes 260-263, 318-320 and accompanying text. 
860. Doe No. I v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2819 (2010). 
861. I d. at 2820. 
862. Tyler, 229 Md. at 403--04, 184 A.2d at I 04. 
863. Whitley, 429 Md. at 161, 163, 55 A.3d at 54, 56. 
864. Doe v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections, No. 293857-V, 2008 Lexis 7, at *18 (Md. 
Cir. Ct. July 24, 2008), rev'd on other grounds, 406 Md. 697, 962 A.2d 342 (2008). 
865. Id. 
866. Id. at *18-19. This would seem at odds with Tyler, where a defective circulator's 
affidavit removed the presumption of validity of all signatures. 229 Md. at 404, 184 
A.2d at 104-05. See supra, note 330. The latter would appear logical. 
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XI. FINANCING OF REFERENDUM CAMPAIGNS 
Just as campaign financing, in general, has become a significant 
legal and policy issue, 867 fmancing of referendum campaigns has 
exploded. 868 Issues related to it are beyond the scope of this article. 
Long before Citizens United, the Attorney General concluded that a 
statutory limit on contributions by individuals, corporations and 
others on efforts to promote or defeat a referendum question 
unconstitutionally infringed on the federal constitutional rights of 
freedom of speech and association. 869 The Attorney General relied on 
Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkley,870 a referendum 
decision in which the Supreme Court struck down contributions 
limits in ballot question elections. 871 There, distinguishing between 
candidate campaigns and ballot questions, the Supreme Court 
concluded that "[t]here is no significant state or public interest in 
curtailing debate and discussion of a ballot measure. Placing limits 
on contributions, which in tum limit expenditures, plainly impairs 
freedom of expression. The integrity of the political system will be 
adequately protected if contributors are identified in a public filing 
revealing the amounts contributed. "872 
The Berkely Court's distinction is based on the analysis of 
Belotti.873 There, the Supreme Court concluded that ballot questions 
do not present the risk of quid pro quo corruption that is present in 
candidate elections. 874 
867. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010). 
868. See e.g., Pyles, supra note 821, at lOA (noting that media reports indicate that $92 
million was spent on the 2012 gaming referendum); Alexander Pyles, Petition Website 
Under Fire, DAILY REcoRD, Oct. 29, 2012 ("A Republican lawmaker's business 
venture, which successfully helped to petition three state laws to referendum over the 
last year, is being accused of campaign finance violations by the Maryland 
Democratic Party. In an email sent Friday, Democrats said MDPetitions.com was in 
violation of campaign finance laws because it sent out a mailer urging a 'no' vote on 
several laws subject to voter approval on Nov. 6 without registering as a ballot issue 
committee with the Maryland State Board of Elections." The disposition, if any, of 
those allegations is not known). 
869. Elections-Political Contributions, 67 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 192, 192 (1982). 
870. /d. at 196. 
871. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1981). 
872. /d. 
873. /d. at 297-99. 
874. First Nat' I Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978). 
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XII. CONCLUSION 
Depending on one's philosophy, referenda may be the bulwark of 
democracy or a threat to our system of representative government.875 
Perhaps because of these competing views, the Maryland Court of 
Appeals has struggled heroically with a statute lacking in clarity.876 
The solution, however, may be somewhere in between. If there is to 
be a referendum process, as there is under the Maryland Constitution, 
the courts and electorate deserve a simplified, easily-followed 
procedure that will avoid expensive, accelerated litigation and 
decisions based on technical requirements that may no longer be 
necessary, while providing adequate safeguards against petition 
misconduct and preserving and protecting the important role of 
representative democracy. 
875. See supra text accompanying notes 43-48; see also Part VI.B. 
876. See supra notes 850-852 and accompanying text. 
SUPPLEMENT 
After this article went to print, the Maryland Court of Appeals 
issued its decision in Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 35 v. 
Montgomery Co, MD. 1 Montgomery County enacted a bill that 
limited the right to collective bargaining by public employees. The 
Fraternal Order of Police ("FOP") petitioned it to referendum under 
article XI-F of the Maryland constitution and the Montgomery 
County charter. 2 The court of appeals held that erroneous circulators' 
zip codes did not invalidate certified petition signatures. 
The county board of elections determined that the FOP had 
submitted approximately 4,600 more signatures than were required to 
place the question on the ballot. Of those approved signatures, 
however, 6,136 had been collected by two circulators, Messrs. Head 
and Rowe, each of whom had submitted circulators' affidavits 
containing incorrect zip codes on 1,961 signature pages. Mr. Head, 
for example, wrote his zip code as "49008" when, in fact, it was 
"49006." The FOP argued that this was "an unintentional mistake of 
no consequence."3 In all other respects, the circulators' affidavits 
complied with the statute and regulations. If the zip code defect 
invalidated the voters' signatures, the FOP's petition would have 
lacked sufficient signatures to place the question on the ballot. 
Section 6-204 of the election law article provides that the 
circulator's affidavit "shall contain the statements, required by 
regulation, designed to assure the validity of the signatures and the 
fairness of the petition process."4 The relevant regulations and 
affidavit required that circulators provide their correct zip code in the 
circulators' affidavit. 5 
Montgomery County and the staff director of the county council, a 
registered voter,6 filed a complaint seeking judicial review and 
1. No. 132 (Sept. Term, December 2, 2013) (hereinafter "FOP"). The pending case was 
discussed at several points in the article. See notes 263, 310, 320, 548, 647, and 859. 
2. See Part III.A and text accompanying note 488. 
3. FOP, Slip Op., 15. 
4. MD. CODE ANN., Elec. Law §6-204(b). 
5. MD. CODE REGS. 33.06.03.07.B.(2). COMAR 33.06.03.08.B amplified this 
requirement, providing that the circulator's affidavit must state that "[a]ll of the 
information given by the circulator under Regulation .07 of this chapter is true and 
correct." In accord with that regulation, FOP's circulators' affidavits provided, under 
penalties of perjury, that "the information given to identify me is true and correct .... " 
FOP, Slip Op., 7. 
6. See Part IV.A, discussing "[w]ho [m]ay [b]ring [s]uit?" 
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declaratory judgmene to invalidate the petition on grounds later 
abandoned. The circuit court held that the county lacked standing; 
however, because one plaintiff was a registered voter with standing, 
the court of app.eals held that it was unnecessary address that issue.8 
The FOP, "as proponents of the petition to referendum," was granted 
leave to intervene in support of its petition.9 It moved to dismiss the 
complaint, asserting failure to follow administrative procedures; 
however, the motion was denied and the circuit court granted the 
right to conduct discovery. 10 The county and staff director then 
amended their complaint to seek a declaration that the board of 
elections erred by counting signatures on pages with the erroneous 
circulators' zip codes. 
The circuit court held that the erroneous zip codes were fatal. The 
Maryland Court of Appeals reversed, holding that "minor errors in 
the circulator affidavit will not invalidate petition signatures already11 
certified by the appropriate administrative body."12 It reasoned that 
"[t]here is simply no call among the controlling authorities for 
invalidating otherwise valid petition signatures in the absence of 
fraud because a petition circulator failed to dot an 'i' or cross a 't' ." 13 
The court wrote that misstating one or two digits in a circulator's zip 
code did not defeat the purpose of a circulator's affidavit, which was 
7. See Part VII, discussing the method of review. 
8. FOP, Slip Op. at 13 n. 13; see generally Part IV. 
9. See Part IV.B discussing "[w]ho [m]ay [i]intervene?" 
10. FOP, Slip Op., 10 n. 12; see Part VILE ("If, however, the rubric is a complaint for 
declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, or mandamus in their conventional sense, 
discovery and an evidentiary hearing may be pennissible. Thus, especially in the 
context of a challenge filed shortly before an election, the choice of procedural 
mechanism may have significant ramifications."). The FOP objected to the county's 
efforts to expand review beyond the administrative record and the circuit court's 
decision to permit discovery. The court of appeals held that it was not necessary to 
reach this issue. /d. at I 0 n. 12. Because the appeal presented a question of law, i.e., 
whether the incorrect zip code invalidated certain signatures, the court did "not 
address the issue of whether the Circuit Court erred in granting the right to conduct 
discovery." /d. 
11. See Part V.A.2 ("The right to judicial relief does not accrue until there is 
aggrievement by a final decision of the election board."). The FOP decision states: 
"Despite the incorrect zip codes in the circulator affidavits, the [county board of 
elections] checked each signature and certified that 34,828 of the 48,935 signatures 
were those of registered voters of Montgomery County." FOP, Slip Op., 7. 
12. FOP, Slip Op., 21. It is noteworthy that the holding referred to "already certified" 
signatures. See id. 
13. /d., citing Montgomery Co. Fire-Rescue Ass'n v. Montgomery Co. Bd. of Elections, 
418 Md. 463, 470-71, 15 A.3d 798, 802 (2011). 
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to permit circulators to be located and, if necessary, served with 
process. 14 
The FOP court reiterated the Tyler analysis that, "while provisions 
pertaining to ballot referendums are to be liberally construed, a 
referendum valid on its face carried the drastic effect of suspending 
legislation designed to correct a particular evil."15 The Tyler court 
had held that an affidavit that falsely stated that all of the signatories 
were registered voters was defective, removing the presumption that 
the signatures were valid. 16 The FOP court noted that Maryland 
election law had changed "significantly" since Tyler, deciding it was 
inapplicable. 17 
Instead, the FOP court looked to the purpose of the election law 
regarding ballot referenda. 18 It reasoned that voters "should be given 
every opportunity" to have their votes counted and "common sense" 
should be employed. 19 It looked to out-of-state decisions holding that 
"the voter's right to have their signatures counted on a petition 
outweighs objections related to immaterial irregularities."20 The 
court quoted a Missouri decision for the proposition that "procedures 
designed to effectuate these democratic concepts should be liberally 
construed to avail the voters with every opportunity to exercise these 
rights."21 The Maryland Court of Appeals noted that the Missouri 
court "refused to find fatal an irregularity not specified as fatal by 
statute .... "22 It also noted that other jurisdictions "have held that 
technical deficiencies in referendum petitions will not invalidate the 
petitions if they substantially comply with statutory and constitutional 
requirements. "23 
14. The dissent cited Doe v. Montgomery Co. Board of Elections, 406 Md. 697, 962 A. 
2d 342 (2008), for the proposition that an affidavit "contrary to the clear and 
unambiguous statutory mandate ... should be rejected." FOP, Slip Op., (Battaglia, J., 
dissenting). Doe, addressing voters' signatures, stated that "a signer is required to 
comply with the signature requirements governing petitions for referendum." !d. at 
733,962 A.2d at 56-57. 
15. FOP, Slip Op. 17, citing Tyler v. Sec. of State, 229 Md. 397, 184 A.2d 101 (1962); 
see Part VI. 
16. Tyler is discussed at page 153. The insufficient affidavit in Ferguson v. Sec. of State, 
249 Md. 510, 517, 240 A.2d 232, 235-36 (1968), is discussed at pages 152-53. 
17. /d.at18. 
18. /d. at 19. 
19. /d. 
20. !d. 
21. !d. at 20, quoting United Labor Comm. of Missouri v. Kirkpatrick, 572 S.W.2d 449, 
454 (1978); see Part VI. 
22. !d. 
23. !d. at 21 (citations omitted). 
800 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
